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The topic of pensions is very broad and multidimensional in nature so it is of great 
interest to many scholars representing various fields of science. Pension systems 
all over the world have been continuously undergoing some major or minor 
reforms, which refer to the general model or design of old-age social security, or 
which aim to change some of its parameters, especially the pensionable age. These 
reforms have a common ultimate goal, which is to ensure adequate benefits in old 
age funded by financially and economically sustainable pension systems. Changes 
to pension systems refer to various pension plans: those organized by the state 
through the public institutions, those organized by employers in cooperation with 
financial institutions, or those organized solely by financial institutions and 
dedicated directly to individuals. Thus, the spectrum of problems worth 
addressing by scholars is very wide. In this book, pensions and their background 
are investigated from the perspective of the social sciences, primarily management, 
economics, finance, and law. We address the very relevant and current problems 
of pension systems, retirement, the demographical determinants of pension 
systems’ adequacy and sustainability, and the political and legal aspects of 
pension reform.  
The monograph includes 23 chapters addressing the problems of contemporary 
pensions from both a general and a national view, studied from a theoretical or 
empirical perspective. The book is structured as follows. First, the managerial, 
administrative and business aspects of retirement and pension wealth are 
discussed. The next five sections are devoted to very important and current 
problems of family and gender issues in the context of old-age social security. The 
subsequent six chapters refer to other social and economic aspects of pensions 
with some references to social security reforms. In the next three sections, some 
financial and actuarial issues are discussed and investigated. Finally, in the last 
five chapters, the authors address selected problems of pension reform with 
special attention paid to their policy and legal aspects. In these 23 chapters, issues 
concerning various countries are presented. In some chapters, a single-country 
empirical approach is employed (with reference to Poland, Spain, Turkey, 
Slovakia, Latvia, or Czechia, for example), whereas some other sections present 
multinational studies.  
As the editors of this monograph, we would like to express our gratitude to all of 
the authors for accepting our invitation to contribute and for their time and effort 
in preparing the chapters. We also thank all of the reviewers for their valuable 
comments and suggestions which contributed significantly to the final version of 
the book: Joseph Friedman (Temple University, USA), Jose Enrique Devesa 
Carpio (University of Valencia, Spain), Jose Alvarez Garcia (University of 
Extremadura, Spain), Magnus Feldman (University of Bristol, United Kingdom), 
Sylwia Flaszewska (Lodz University of Technology, Poland), Agnes Orosz  
DOI: 10.34658/9788366287938.1
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(Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary), Laura Milos (West University of 
Timisoara, Romania), Aleksandra Szpulak (Wroclaw University of Economics 
and Business, Poland), Patrycja Kowalczyk-Rólczyńska (Wroclaw University of 
Economics and Business, Poland), Sonia Buchholtz (SGH Warsaw School of 
Economics, Poland), Damian Walczak (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, 
Poland), Radosław Kurach (Wroclaw University of Economics and Business, 
Poland).    
Filip Chybalski, Edyta Marcinkiewicz 
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IMPACT OF A PENSION SYSTEM  
AND AN ENTERPRISE  
ON EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT:  
AN INTERGENERATIONAL CONTEXT 
Filip Chybalski  
Lodz University of Technology 
filip.chybalski@p.lodz.pl 
Małgorzata Gumola 
Lodz University of Technology 
malgorzata.gumola@p.lodz.pl 
1. Introduction
The process of population ageing forces pension reforms which change 
intergenerational relations not only on the macro level but also on the micro one. 
In the case of a macro level, the issue of the relationship between pension reforms 
and the whole economy with special attention paid to the labour market (including 
the competition between different generations on the labour market) is a topic very 
often investigated by scholars (Barr and Diamond 2006; Chybalski and 
Marcinkiewicz 2015; Gruber et al. 2009; Hernaes 2013; Lefèbvre 2012). With 
regard to a micro level, ageing populations and changing pension systems are 
processes affecting intergenerational relations in both families/households as well 
as in enterprises. In case of a family/household, many research focus on 
consumption smoothing starting from a life cycle hypothesis (Ando and 
Modigliani 1963; Modigliani and Brumberg 1954), and continuing with its 
empirical tests (see for review: Bernheim et al. 2001; Campbell and Mankiw 1989; 
Campbell and Deaton 1989; Parker 2008; Parker 1999). Other studies address e.g. 
intergenerational transfers within a family in cash, time or in kind (Albertini et al. 
2007; Daatland et al. 2012; Hagestad and Herlofson 2007), the coincidence of couples 
retirement (joint retirement) (Gustman and Steinmeier 2005), or the impact of roles 
played in a family/household (e.g. grandparenthood) on retirement (Hochman and 
Lewin-Epstein 2013; Kridahl 2017). With regard to an enterprise level, many studies 
tackle the problem of age management forced by ageing populations and decreasing 
labour supply (Brooke and Taylor 2005; Fuertes et al. 2013; Grima 2011; Muller-
Camen et al. 2011; Schröder et al. 2009; Walker 2005). Other important issues are 
intergenerational relations and intergenerational conflicts in the workplace (Dencker 
et al. 2007; 2008; Lyons and Kuron 2014; Whitney Gibson et al. 2009) or 
intergenerational mentoring (Marcinkus Murphy 2012; Ropes 2013).  
Ageing populations force many changes in the approach to the human resources 
management in companies. The reason behind this is mainly decreasing labour 
supply. Thus, the literature on age management and intergenerational workplaces 
DOI: 10.34658/9788366287938.2
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is very extensive. However, there is another important issue concerning 
companies facing the problem of shrinking human resources. This is the 
relationship between a pension system, an enterprise playing the role of an 
employer (workplace), and an employee making a retirement decision, in which 
an enterprise can modify the impact of pension system’s regulations on 
employee’s retirement decision. Thus, the goal of this paper is to identify and 
characterize main elements of this nexus in the context of retirement decisions 
taking intergenerational relations into account. We focus on the pension system’s 
impact (with its main parameter, which is a pensionable age (statutory retirement 
age)) on the employers’ behaviour, as well as the employers’ (workplace) impact 
on employees’ retirement decisions (reflected in effective retirement age). The 
paper is structured as follows. First, we present a pension system in an 
intergenerational context. Second, we attempt to discuss a pensionable age as a 
determinant of an enterprise activity in the role of an employer. The subsequent 
section tackles the issue of the possible impact of the employer on employees’ 
retirement decisions. The paper ends with a brief summary of issues discussed. 
2. Pensions in an intergenerational context
Pensions are usually investigated in the literature, both theoretically and 
empirically, from an individual or economy’s perspective. The former refers to a 
microeconomic goal of a pension system which is consumption smoothing. This 
approach to pensions has its roots in theories of consumption, starting from the 
model of intertemporal choice (Fisher 1930), through permanent income 
hypothesis (Friedman 1957) to life cycle hypothesis (Ando and Modigliani 1963; 
Modigliani and Brumberg 1954). Further developments refer to behavioural 
economics in the context of individual pension decisions (Benartzi and Thaler 
1999; Beshears et al. 2008; Blake 2006; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Mitchell 
and Utkus 2003; Thaler 1985). From an economy’s point of view, including labour 
market, macro aspects of pensions are investigated, which results from 
a macroeconomic definition of a pension system. In line with this, a pension 
system is a tool for dividing current GDP between generations (Barr and Diamond 
2006; Góra 2008). This approach is deeply embedded in overlapping generations 
approach (Diamond 1965; Samuelson 1958).  
In a micro approach, an individual is perceived as a “traveller” across different 
generations defined through the prism of age groups. First, an agent participates 
in education (the young generation), then is economically active and works 
(the working-age generation) and in the last phase of the life course is a pensioner 
(the elderly generation receiving pension benefits). This “intergenerational 
journey” forces some behaviour referring to the division of current incomes. 
Namely, income is divided between current consumption and saving. Saving is 
perceived as future consumption dedicated for the retirement period. Thus, in this 
context, a pension system allows for distribution of consumption to the future, 
from the period when an agent is economically active to the period after economic 
activity characterized by the lack of work income. 
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In a macroeconomic perspective a crucial thing is an intergenerational distribution 
of GDP as there is no alternative way to finance pensions. The working-age 
generation creates GDP which is divided between all generations. To simplify, 
today’s workers finance the education of their children as well as pensions of their 
parents, regardless of a pension system’s model (unfunded PAYG or funded). This 
intergenerational transfer is based, in principle, on the intergenerational 
reciprocity rule. Today’s working-age generation financing pensions of their 
parents returns an earlier debt for education (incurred when today’s working-age 
individuals were young and their parents were in the working age). Simultaneously, 
the same working-age generation finances education of their children whose 
generation in the future will finance pension benefits of their parents on the same 
reciprocity rule. This intergenerational character of pensions with regard to an 
individual (family/household) as well as to the whole economy is obvious and natural. 
Although pensions in the intergenerational context are considered mainly from 
perspectives mentioned above, they reflect their intergenerational character in the 
scale of an enterprise as well, which is much less often addressed in the literature. 
First, a pension system constitutes an important macro determinant of enterprise 
activities. Second, pension schemes are organized not only outside the companies 
but also within them, and companies can affect their employees’ decisions 
regarding retirement. In the former case, both the model of a pension system 
indirectly as well as a pensionable age (statutory retirement age) directly can affect 
employees’ decisions about when to retire, which influences human resources in 
quantitative terms. In the latter case, employers responding to state regulations in 
terms of pensions may organize (on the voluntary or obligatory basis) occupational 
pension schemes in the company as well as may take actions impacting their 
employees’ retirement decisions. Thus, individual decisions about when to retire 
can be affected not only by a state but also by employers. On the one side, a state 
creates general rules of retirement (mainly through the indication of a pensionable 
age). On the other side, a company can support (reinforce) or mitigate (counteract) 
the impact of state regulations on individual retirement decisions through 
encouraging or even forcing workers to accelerate or delay retirement. Pensions may 
affect intergenerational relationships in an enterprise (e.g. through occupational 
pension schemes, retirement regulations in a company), but similarly, 
intergenerational relations in an enterprise as a workplace may affect retirement 
decisions of employees. Below, in next two sections, we discuss these issues.  
3. Pensionable age as a determinant of employers’ behaviour
A pensionable age can influence enterprises and employers both directly and 
indirectly. The direct impact is an obvious one. The government sets following 
general categories of a retirement age: 
 Pensionable age, which according to OECD terminology is “age from which 
an individual is eligible for pension benefits”. Barr and Diamond (2010) name 
it “a normal retirement age” and it allows for “a full benefit” which means 
a benefit not reduced due to early retirement, 
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 Minimum retirement age, which is the lowest age entitling to be paid pension 
benefit, however, this benefit is usually reduced due to early retirement  
(i.e. before a pensionable age). 
Additionally, a mandatory retirement age, i.e. age at which an individual is forced 
to retire (due to legal regulations or employment contracts) may also exist. 
However, today such practices are said to be age discrimination. Thus, mandatory 
age is usually applied only with regard to some specific professions, as e.g. judges.  
State regulations concerning the pensionable age affect two parameters characterizing 
agent’s decisions about retirement. These are: 
 Effective retirement age, which is an age at which an individual starts to be 
paid a pension benefit, i.e. it is an actual retirement age. OECD calculates it 
for the population (separately for males and females) as an average effective 
age of retirement, 
 Effective age of labour market exit, which is an age at which an individual 
stops finally working. 
Obviously, the pensionable age does not determine solely the effective retirement 
age or effective age of labour market exit. The world does not work in such a way 
that people retire (even on average) exactly at pensionable age. In majority of 
OECD countries people usually retire earlier, before this age. Nevertheless, 
pensionable age (and minimum retirement age) is an important factor influencing 
individuals’ decisions about retirement (Manoli and Weber 2016; Staubli and 
Zweimüller 2013) and, thus, affecting the labour supply significantly.  
This direct impact of a pensionable age on human resources is not the only one. 
Pensionable age can affect human resources also in an indirect manner, interacting 
together with other elements of a pension system. This refers mainly to the linkage 
between an employee’s salary in the working-age period and expected pension 
benefit, where a type of a pension scheme really matters. There are two models of 
calculating pensions: defined contribution (DC) and defined benefit (DB). These 
models characterize the linkage between the salary of an employee and his or her 
pension benefit.  
In DC model pension benefit is directly determined by contributions paid to the 
pension scheme during the working period and the rate of return in this scheme 
(these both create pension wealth) as well as by the life expectancy after effective 
retirement age. Thus, since pension contribution is calculated as a percentage of  
a salary, a pension benefit is actually a derivative of salaries in the whole working 
life. Moreover, the pension wealth is transformed into annuity taking the life 
expectancy after retirement into account. This means that effective retirement age 
is crucial for the calculation of a pension benefit in DC model. Besides, as 
contributions paid earlier (in the younger age) are indexed over the longer period 
than those paid later (especially directly before retirement), a higher salary at the 
end of working period does not affect the amount of pension benefit significantly 
(a higher salary in the earlier phase of working life would affect a pension benefit 
stronger due to a greater number of indexation periods of the contribution paid 
from this salary). Therefore, DC model generally motivates to delay retirement 
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and, therefore, increases human resources in an enterprise, due to two reasons: 
longer accumulation period of pension wealth (however, earlier savings play more 
important role than later ones) and shorter decumulation period. 
In case of DB model the impact of a pensionable age on retirement decisions is 
more complex as a design of defined benefit scheme plays an important role. 
Blake (2006) discusses three main ways of pensions’ perception with regard to 
enterprises and human resources management: pensions as altruism, pensions as 
a deferred pay and pensions as a contingent claim. Altruism of pensions results 
from a care of employers about their employees as the former assume that 
the latter are not aware of possible financial shortages after retirement. With this 
in mind companies organize pension schemes. Pension as a deferred pay  
(i.e. pension benefit) is a tool of HRM aiming to motivate employees to stay loyal 
to the employer. Pension as a contingent claim can be perceived through the prism 
of a reward or insurance. The former refers to the distribution of benefits created 
in an enterprise between employers and employees, whereas the latter to the risk 
shared between them. The role played by pensions in HRM together with the 
design of a pension scheme affects employees’ decisions about when to retire. 
Moreover, this role is very often determined by state regulations in terms of 
pensions (in some countries occupational pension schemes are obligatory, in other 
countries they are voluntary).  
As Barr and Diamond (2006) indicate, DB schemes based on a final salary (final 
salary schemes), in case of  which pension benefits are linked mainly to salaries 
in the final phase of working life, are especially problematic in the context of 
human resources supply. This motivates employees to stay with the same 
company instead of considering the change of workplace as they see advantages 
referring to a deferred pay. However, such schemes may determine significant 
differences in attitudes to the work across different generations in the workplace. 
Namely, final salary schemes encourage older workers to take activities aiming at 
increasing their salaries. They can achieve these goals working overtime. A quite 
different situation is in case of younger workers who do not see the linkage 
between present salaries and a deferred pay, i.e. future pension benefit. Therefore, 
a pension scheme does not motivate them to work extra hours, however, there are 
other factors which can do it, e.g. a prospect of increasing salary or a possible 
promotion (Blake 2006). Thus, regardless of a pensionable age, final salary 
schemes may motivate older employees to delay retirement, since salaries directly 
before retirement have the greatest impact on their pension benefit perceived as  
a deferred pay. Simultaneously, such schemes may stimulate intergenerational 
conflicts in the workplace as older workers are especially motivated to insist on a 
salary increase in the final stage of their working life. They can achieve this goal 
with the support of unions. As van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2011) indicate, salary 
can correlate with the age of employees instead of their productivity, which is 
caused by unions’ activity aiming at supporting older workers and discriminating 
younger ones. 
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The last issue addressed in this section is the impact of a pensionable age on 
enterprises’ decisions about the investment in human capital (of their employees). 
Both, individuals as well as companies take decisions on the basis of expectations. 
This refers to human resources management and spending on trainings, education 
or mentoring as well. State regulations in terms of pensions and retirement age 
affect these expectations as an employer develops a forecast concerning the 
further expected duration of working life of a given employee. This forecast is 
useful for the decision how much to invest in this employee. One can expect that 
investment in older workers, i.e. at age directly before pensionable age, can be 
perceived by employers as risky since the possible return period is short, whereas 
investment in human capital requires time to become profitable. The same refers 
to employees whose motivation to participate in trainings and education depends 
on the expected distance to retirement. People are not willing to learn directly 
before quitting the labour market. Thus, from both enterprises’ as well as 
employees’ perspectives, pensionable age affects their decisions about investment 
in human capital. Therefore, the factor of decreasing productivity of older workers 
is not their age (at least not directly) but low or even lack of investment in their 
knowledge and skills. Moreover, an increase in a pensionable age stimulates such 
investments (Bauer and Eichenberger 2016; Boeri and Ours 2008). A different 
pensionable age for males and females also matters in the context of HRM as it 
may cause a discrimination of females in terms of participation in trainings and 
education. In case of a male and female of the same age (e.g. 58 years), an 
employer will probably be more eager to finance the development of the former 
due to a longer expected return period on this investment in human capital as 
compared to the latter.   
4. Enterprise and prevailing intergenerational relations
as determinants of employees’ retirement decisions
In this section we concentrate on how the workplace itself can determine 
employees’ decisions about retirement. Thus, we disregard here a direct or indirect 
impact of macro-factors and focus on drivers existing in an enterprise, with  
a particular emphasis on intergenerational relations prevailing in the workplace 
and the role played by employers. 
Currently, employers have to deal with a diversity of employees being 
representatives of four different generations. Starting from the oldest one, these 
are: Baby boomers (born between 1946 and mid-1960s), Generation X (born 
between mid-1960s and late 1970s), Generation Y (born between late 1970s and 
mid-1990s) and Generation Z (born after mid-1990s). At the time when Baby 
boomers began to reach retirement age (or at least approach it), the number of older 
people in enterprises significantly increased  and the issue of intergenerational 
relations has become even more important. Up to late 1990s, when the retirement 
age was approached by generation of Veterans (born before 1946), benefiting 
from pension privileges such as reduced retirement age (due to job characteristics) 
or early retirement, was very common. This affected negatively the mentality of 
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labour market participants, both employers and employees. The former did not 
have to focus on age management in their organizations nor on managing 
intergenerational relations as pushing older workers into early retirement was 
beneficial for them. The latter (mainly people from Baby Boom Generation) 
assumed that they would also be able to leave the labour market before reaching 
retirement age without major consequences (Mulders and Henkens 2019). 
Growing exactly in the same mentality as their predecessors but at the same time 
facing a completely different reality, promotes a sense of injustice and growing 
tension between generations. This often contributes to a growing desire among 
older workers to leave the labour market earlier.  
Nevertheless, it is not the only problem related to intergenerational relations, 
which enterprises have to face nowadays and which influences employees’ 
decision on retirement. Older workers have different skills and abilities than their 
younger colleagues. Technology development has never been so fast and it is 
progressing at a pace which is hard to accept by the elderly. Not keeping up with 
changes can be negatively perceived by younger generations (especially Y and Z 
Generations). This can lead to some intergenerational conflicts (the likelihood of 
potential conflict will be even greater in companies where seniority is particularly 
rewarded). Such conflicts can lead to an objection of younger employees and to 
an increasing sense of social exclusion (marginalization) among older people. 
This, in consequence, may contribute to the decision on early retirement. 
Intergenerational conflicts can also have their roots in stereotypes, which 
characterize each generation. They are perceived as the greatest barrier to 
successful intergenerational cooperation, as they focus mainly on negative beliefs 
or values about other age groups and consequently, deepen the gap between 
generations (Čič and Žižek 2017).   
The age diversity of the workforce is a great challenge for an enterprise. The 
greater the number of generations on the labour market, the greater the challenge, 
as high diversity in employees’ demography generally impedes the group 
performance (Phillips and O’Reilly 1998). Besides skills level, intergenerational 
differences can also refer to psychological traits, career patterns and paths, 
personality, motivational mechanisms, commitment, leadership styles, levels of 
creativity and retention (Urick et al. 2017). All of these differences affect 
intergenerational relations and the workplace atmosphere. Retirement decisions 
in multigenerational workplaces are also influenced by the attitude of younger 
employees towards older ones (Böckerman and Ilmakunnas 2019) and the 
workers’ relationship with the employer (Morrell and Tennant 2010). Both factors 
determine the job attractiveness, the higher it is, the greater the desire to remain 
longer on the labour market.  
Generational differentiation caused by age diversity can be on the one side risky 
as it may result in intergenerational conflicts, but on the other side, it can become 
a great opportunity for cross-generational mentoring (Knight 2014). It can take 
the form of both mentoring and reverse mentoring. In the former one, older 
workers sharing their experience with younger colleagues can feel needed, while 
in the latter one, they can acquire knowledge from younger generations, thus, 
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reducing their skill gaps. In that way, a cross-generational mentoring can 
contribute to the well-being of older workers in the workplace, and thus, to their 
longer (and still productive) stay on the labour market.  
In addition to intergenerational relationships prevailing in the workplace, 
employers are the ones, who can affect directly employees’ decision on 
retirement. Drucker (2001) believes that it is mainly human resources managers’ 
task to develop policies enhancing older workers to stay longer on the labour 
market (even after reaching a pensionable age). Their involvement can have a 
proactive character, when they initiate a conversation with employees about the 
future and potential opportunities, or a reactive character, when they respond to 
some suggestions or requests of their employees (Davies et al. 2018).  
Mulders and Henkens (2019) state that there are three main HR strategies that 
employers should apply to encourage older workers to stay longer on the labour 
market. These are: information strategies, health strategies, and person-job fit 
strategies. The first one is about making employees aware of various pension 
solutions and their consequences (mainly financial ones). A conscious individual 
is supposed to make more rational decisions, nevertheless, nowadays, pension 
awareness and knowledge is extremely low in society (Barrett et al. 2013; 
Holzmann et al. 2003). Individual advice within the workplace can also build the 
employee’s loyalty towards the employer. The second HR strategy relates to 
occupational health. Obviously, with age, the health tends to deteriorate. Worse 
well-being caused by health problems and consequently sick leaves, contribute 
significantly to decreasing productivity. Nevertheless, employers can promote 
healthy lifestyle and provide employees with a medical care. Free (paid by the 
employer) and easily available medical assistance can be a great tool for building 
loyalty among employees, especially older ones. The last human resources 
practice refers to proper job adjustment. Especially in case of a physical work (but 
not only) it can be problematic or nearly impossible to do the same job until 
retirement. Thus, it is employers’ task to reorganize jobs or retrain older 
employees in order to provide them with better suited positions in the workplace.  
Another HR practice, which can influence employees’ decision on retirement, is 
a flexibility of working arrangements (Shacklock and Brunetto 2005). The 
possibility of switching from full-time to part-time work, taking use of home-
office or being covered by phased retirement programs encourages older workers 
to remain on the labour market longer. Another solution applied by employers 
which can greatly influence employees’ decision on retirement (most often used 
in a public sector) is a seniority wage, which is a degree of linkage of worker’s 
remuneration with his or her age. Nevertheless, the research shows that it acts as 
an incentive to stay longer in the particular workplace, but at the same time results in 
lower employment rates among elderly (Preter et al. 2013). Reduced employment 
opportunities for older workers being unemployed results in a discouragement to 
remain on the labour market, and consequently to its leaving (Duval 2003).  
The employees’ loyalty towards employers can be built with another HR tool, 
which is already mentioned, occupational pension scheme. It is a pension product, 
which shows employers' concern for the future of their employees. Despite the 
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fact that it is the state that defines the functioning of these plans in some extent, 
e.g. by defining the form of participation (they can be voluntary, quasi-mandatory 
or mandatory), employers are entities that can decide on the level of benefits 
arising from them, e.g. by defining the level of contributions or establishing some 
additional payments on their side.  
It should be noted that employers can influence employees’ decisions on 
retirement in both ways (encourage people to stay on or leave the labour market). 
Taking the issue of a decreasing workforce into account, caused by an aging 
population, it might seem that employers should do their best to keep their 
employees longer in the workplace. Nevertheless, one should not forget that 
organizations can focus more on own profits rather than their workers. Thus, they 
can act selectively when it comes to the application of HR practices, and try to 
keep employees, who are most profitable for them, and at the same time push out 
workers, whose maintenance would require special outlays from them.  
5. Summary
A pension system’s impact on the labour market seems obvious. Nevertheless, 
much less attention has been paid so far to analysing this impact from 
intergenerational relations’ viewpoint. Especially, when it comes to the micro 
perspective, in which we focus on the impact of a pension system (with the main 
attention paid to a pensionable age) on enterprises operating within the labour market 
(as employers), and on the impact of enterprises (as employers/workplaces) on 
employees’ decisions to retire before, just at, or after pensionable age.  
In the case of the impact of a pension system on enterprises, the most significant 
parameter that directly and indirectly affects enterprises’ behaviour is a pensionable 
age. The direct impact is obvious – the higher the pensionable age, the higher the 
effective retirement age and effective age of labour market exit. The indirect 
impact, on the other hand, results not only from a pensionable age but also from  
a pension scheme model. Defined contribution model generally motivates employees 
to stay longer on the labour market, as longer accumulation phase equals to higher 
benefits. In case of a defined benefit model, its impact on a labour market depends 
additionally on the way of determining a pension benefit. Defined benefit model 
based on a final salary motivates workers to stay longer in the workplace as  
well, but at the same time, it can lead to some intergenerational conflicts due to 
differentiated needs of each generation. The indirect impact of a pensionable age on 
enterprises concerns also the investment level in human capital. Higher pensionable 
age stimulates both financial expenditures of employers on trainings as well as the 
willingness of employees to participate in them. 
In the case of the impact of enterprises on employees’ retirement decisions, the 
most significant factors relate to prevailing intergenerational relations in the 
workplace and applied human resources strategies. In the former case, the ability 
to manage multigenerational relationships favours longer stay on the labour 
market. Nevertheless, the greater the number of generations on the labour market, 
the more difficult it is to develop an intergenerational cooperation instead  
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of conflicts. In the latter case, employers and human resources managers, in 
particular, can use different practices to enhance employees to stay longer in the 
workplace. Nevertheless, one should not forget that enterprises can put their own 
interests above interests of their employees. In the age of decreasing workforce, 
organizations can search for different solutions to retain employees longer in the 
enterprise, but it can concern only workers with high productivity or specialization 
in a given field. For less productive employees or ones with lower qualifications, 
the employer's approach can be quite the opposite. It can be beneficial for them to 
pursue their earlier leave and exchange a staff for a younger one. 
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1. Introduction
The deteriorating demographics in the majority of developed countries, which is 
reflected in the aging of societies, obviously entail some economic and social 
problems. This impact is associated with the welfare position of the elderly.  
A shrinking labor force and a growing elderly population are major threats to the 
sustainability and adequacy of pension systems. According to Eurostat statistics, 
between 2005 and 2018, in many European countries the increase in at-risk-of-
poverty rates in the age cohort of 60+ was considerably greater than the increase 
in the below-60 age group. It mostly affected Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries (such as Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovakia), but not solely (e.g., Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). 
The prospects for future retirees are not optimistic, as in face of major 
demographic, economic, and social changes governments are forced to reduce 
their welfare systems, predominantly by cutting pension benefits. According to 
the projections of net theoretical replacement rates (TRR) for EU Member States, 
in the vast majority of EU countries the estimated change in TRR between 2016 
and 2056 is negative; for some countries, such as Poland and Romania, the drop 
exceeds 40% (European Commission 2018), which is a tremendous deterioration. 
Among different ideas intended to improve the position of the elderly in the future, 
one can distinguish the role of housing. The connection between housing and 
welfare is widely acknowledged in the current literature. For example, Torgensern 
(1987) points out the role of housing in the welfare package by naming 
it a “wobbly pillar under the welfare state”, the least decommodified area of 
welfare among pensions, health care, education, and other social services. 
Decommodification can be described as the individual’s economic well-being 
independent of the paid labor market (see Esping-Andersen 1990). Housing is less 
a social right, and more an individual responsibility, than the abovementioned 
areas of social policy. That is why housing is predominantly seen as the part of a 
life-cycle wealth accumulation strategy which can bring in-kind income or cash 
income to an individual during retirement. Such a concept can be referenced to 
theoretical developments such as the asset-based welfare theory (Sherraden 1991), 
which later evolved into the housing asset-based theory (Toussaint and Elsinga 
2009; Ronald et al. 2015). Nonetheless, housing is still a considerable area of 
DOI: 10.34658/9788366287938.3
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social policy and a social service, which — along with various other vulnerable 
social groups — is intended for the elderly. 
This paper deals with the topic of social housing which supports seniors. Its aim 
is to identify the key aspects of social housing management with the older 
population as a target group. The link between effective functioning of the public 
sector and citizens’ welfare is evident. Therefore, in this paper special emphasis 
is placed on the managerial approach to social housing as a way of maximizing 
performance in delivering public services, with a special focus on satisfying the 
housing needs of the elderly. As the role of the public sector mainly applies to 
social housing, this area is of particular interest in this paper. However, other 
public governance interventions which are not directly connected with the 
delivery of public services are acknowledged (such as setting legal frameworks 
for the private sector in terms of housing regulations). As summarized by Hwang 
et al. (2019) previous research on housing from a customer’s perspective can be 
categorized into four broad areas: housing behavior, housing satisfaction, policy, 
and design. The authors also indicate fairly unexplored areas, such as adjustments 
in local policy to meet the growing demand for social housing for seniors, current 
housing stock assessment, housing modifications, including those involving 
technology. These aspects also refer to the challenges for institutions and entities 
which govern or manage housing stock. 
First, this paper discusses various management aspects at different governance 
levels (state, municipality, and housing organization) which are applicable to 
social housing in general, as well as with reference to older people. Second, it 
provides some statistics concerning the housing and the economic situation of the 
elderly population in European countries. 
2. Governance issues in social housing – an overview
The three most common ways of satisfying an individual’s housing needs include 
acquiring one’s own home, renting privately, or public renting. A whole range of 
policy measures can be taken to facilitate the achievement of this goal with 
reference to vulnerable social groups (the elderly, among others). Table 1 presents 
the detailed classifications of the policy instruments which can be divided into 
three broad categories: schemes for homebuyers to foster homeownership, 
schemes for homeowners and tenants that involve some sort of financial subsidy, 
and schemes strictly dedicated to tenants consisting of arrangements that 
guarantee tenants’ rights and provide social housing. It reports the number of 
countries that adopted each policy (out of a total of 46 countries surveyed by the 
OECD in the Questionnaire on Affordable and Social Housing [QuASH]). 
It seems justified to state that among the measures listed, the most helpful for 
elderly welfare are housing allowances and social rental housing.  
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Table 1. Overview of housing policy instruments (2018 or latest year available) 
Housing policy instruments 
Number of reporting 
countries adopting 
each policy type 
Schemes for homeowners/buyers 
Financial support for housing regeneration 41 
Tax relief for access to homeownership 34 
Subsidized mortgages and guarantees to homebuyers 29 
Subsidies to facilitate homeownership 24 
Mortgage relief for over-indebted homeowners 18 
Schemes for homeowners and tenants 
Housing allowances 37 
Subsidies to develop affordable housing (other than social 
housing) 24 
Schemes for renters 
Social rental housing 34 
Some form of rent control (on initial levels and/or increases) 24 
Minimum quality regulations for rental dwellings 21 
Measures to regulate short-term holiday rentals 19 
Tax relief measures for rental costs 14 
Rent guarantees and deposits 11 
Source: OECD, QuASH 2016, 2019. 
There is no unified definition of social housing (see Hansson and Lundgren 2019 
for a review); however, its most emphasized features are 1) target groups 
comprised of people with low incomes and/or with a particular socioeconomic 
status and 2) providers which are public-sector entities (state or municipal 
government), non-profit organizations, or for-profit private organizations. With 
reference to the provider, one can consider different levels of governance being 
associated with social housing policies. The state is responsible mostly for policy 
design and specific social housing regulations. However, at this level the state can 
also act as a social housing provider via public agencies. The lower level of 
governance is the municipality (local government). Typically, it is involved in the 
provision of social housing and maintenance as owner of the social housing stock, 
but it may also be responsible for local social housing regulations. The third level of 
governance, which is a housing association/community or non-profit organization, is 
directly engaged in everyday maintenance and day-to-day management. Figure 1 
presents different solutions for providers of social housing used in various countries. 
As shown, in many countries a mix of different kinds of providers offer social housing 
services. However, local authorities (municipality level) most frequently act as social 
housing providers, as do non-profit organizations.  
Although the core service of social housing providers is social rental housing and 
its maintenance, the scope of their operations can be broader. Scanlon et al. 
(2017), in their report concerning the activity of housing associations in the UK, 
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identify several kinds of services provided in addition to pure social renting. These 
include social care targeted towards particular vulnerable groups (e.g., people with 
certain disabilities, dementia, etc.) or pursuing educational programs in their 
communities (such as personal finance advice or professional skills training). In 
the case of older people, such initiatives can cover the prevention of loneliness as 
well. Housing associations in the UK also offer commercial services independently 
from social housing, which also includes market renting services. 
In order to assess the range of social housing and the importance of this solution as  
a housing policy instrument, Table 2 presents the share of social rental dwellings in 
the total housing stock. According to OECD data (QuASH), the greatest proportion 
of dwellings as social rentals is reported for the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria, 
where it exceeds 20%. At the other end of the scale, there are countries such as Latvia, 
Czechia, and Lithuania, where the proportion is less than 1%. 
Fig. 1. Percentage of total social rental housing stock by type of provider 
(2018 or latest year available) 











































































































































Other types of tenure For profit and individual providers
Social housing not for profit/ coop providers Regional and/or municipal authorities/public agencies
National authorities/ public agencies
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Table 2. Number of social rental dwellings as a percent of the total number 










Netherlands 37.7 2018 Canada 4.1 2011 
Denmark 21.2 2018 Hungary 4.0 2013 
Austria 20.0 2018 Spain 4.0 2017 
United Kingdom 16.9 2018 New Zealand 3.7 2018 
France 14.0 2018 United States 3.3 2017 
Ireland 12.7 2016 Japan 3.1 2018 
Iceland 11.1 2018 Germany 2.9 2017 
Finland 10.5 2017 Portugal 2.0 2011 
Poland 7.6 2017 Luxembourg 1.6 2013 
Slovenia 6.4 2015 Estonia 1.1 2017 
Korea 6.4 2015 Lithuania 0.8 2017 
Malta 5.5 2013 Czechia 0.4 2011 
Australia 4.4 2017 Latvia 0.2 2013 
Norway 4.3 2018 
Source: OECD, QuASH 2016, 2019. 
The approach to social housing that includes managerial aspects requires a proper 
definition of social housing management. One can distinguish two areas that 
management may reference, which correspond to the aforementioned levels of 
governance. The first area refers to direct social housing maintenance, while the 
second is broader and concerns public authorities and their efficiency in delivering 
social housing as a public service, similarly to education, health care, public 
security, etc. As indicated by Pearl (1997), the common (narrow) understanding 
of social housing management refers to property management and activities such 
as rent collection, repairs, etc. Similarly, as defined by Power (2017) basic housing 
governance includes all of the activities that “operate within a given housing 
community, and that include the rules that govern the housing community as well 
as day-to-day management through processes such as maintenance”. This “first 
line” management — involving direct contact with a tenant — obviously has a great 
impact on the tenant’s perception of social housing. For example, specifically 
referring to older residents living in subsidized housing, Johnson et al. (1993) prove 
that the manager’s leadership style has a direct effect on residents’ satisfaction.  
A broader view of social housing management is presented by Priemus et al. 
(1999). They define it as “the set of all activities to produce and allocate housing 
services from the existing social housing stock”. Additionally, among several 
different areas of interest of social housing managers, they specify four main 
categories: 1) technical management (maintenance), 2) social management 
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(housing allocation), 3) financial management, and 4) tenure management 
(buying, selling, and modifying properties). It can be argued that tenure 
management in particular is crucial with reference to seniors, as their physical 
condition very often requires special facilities. Fox et al. (2017), on the basis of  
a survey conducted among older tenants living in Irish social housing, highlight 
several aspects of housing arrangements that are especially important for older 
people, such as physical adaptation of a dwelling for disabled persons (e.g., 
bathroom adaptation, no stairs, nonslip floor surfaces), outdoor space (e.g., patio, 
balcony, or small garden, especially important for less mobile people), 
accessibility of technology for safety, security, and health monitoring, a safe and 
quiet neighborhood, which enables social contact as well as health and support 
services. All of these aspects are associated with the poorer and deteriorating 
general health of the elderly as compared to younger age groups. As noted by Fox 
et al. (2017), if such accommodations for disabilities are not directly provided in 
social housing, older people should be at least assisted in applying them. 
Priemus et al. (1999) distinguish between day-to-day housing management and 
strategic housing management. The latter also includes all interactions with 
different stakeholders, such as municipality authorities, government authorities 
(regulators), financiers, current and future tenants, etc. If such strategic 
management refers to public-sector providers, it can be considered through the 
lens of three major theories of public service provision: traditional public 
administration, new public management, and new public governance (see Osborne 
2010). Supromin and Choonhakhlai (2019) present different models of providing 
social services (at the municipality level) for the elderly, corresponding to the 
three aforementioned paradigms. The traditional public administration approach 
focuses on planning and policy implementation, with very limited cooperation 
with third parties. In a new public management model, municipalities cooperate 
with private-sector organizations and transfer some tasks to them. They pay more 
attention to efficient management. The new public governance model, which is 
the most complex one, assumes the co-production of public services entailing 
close cooperation — at both the planning and implementation stages — with 
various entities, including private-sector organizations, non-profit organizations, 
social partners, etc. The co-production concept seems to be a means to mitigating 
the undesirable effects which are likely to appear when the new public 
management approach is implemented. As argued by Sprigings (2002), the new 
management practices in social housing entail the discrepancy between social 
justice purposes and expected performance indicators. As a result, such objectives 
as the prevention of social exclusion or inequality are lost sight of. 
3. Housing in Europe – the elderly perspective
In order to assess the need for social housing in the elderly population, at present 
and in the near future in European countries, it can be useful to take a closer look 
at the statistics. The findings from such an analysis can identify some present and 
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new challenges that policymakers and other parties involved in the management 
of social housing now face and will face in the future.  
Figure 2 presents the most recent data on the distribution of the population in 
European countries by tenure status. In almost all of the countries studied, apart 
from Germany and Austria, the percentage of homeowners is greater than 60%. 
Especially in Central and Eastern European countries, it reaches very high levels 
— above 80%. This arises mainly from the fact that many CEE countries 
privatized a large amount of the public housing stock in the 1990s, after the 
political and market transition resulting from the collapse of communism  
(see, e.g., Pichler-Milanović 1999; Clapham 1995). Sitting tenants seized the 
opportunity to become owners of the dwellings they occupied at discounted 
prices. For this reason, in CEE countries there is a relatively low proportion of 
owners with mortgages or loans. With reference to tenants in the countries studied, 
their average proportion among the population is slightly higher than 25.3%. The 
majority of households in this group — 16.2% of the population in each country 
on average — pay rent at market prices, and 9.2% on average benefit from reduced 
prices or pay no rent. Social housing is mainly included in the latter category. 
Some of the countries where renting at reduced prices or for free is most popular 
are the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, and Slovenia. 
Fig. 2. Distribution of population by tenure status (2018) 
Source: Eurostat (EU-SILC). 
Some useful information about the trends in housing statistics can be observed 
when comparing the current state (the most recent data available are for 2018) 
with that of more than a decade ago. Figure 3 presents the data for 2007, just at 
the very beginning of the financial crisis, which had a severe impact on the real 








































































































































no significant changes which would be common for all countries can be observed. 
This means that the effects of the financial crisis on the distribution of tenure status 
among the populations were not very relevant — or if they had a visible impact, 
it was only short-term. Nonetheless, there are countries where the difference 
between 2007 and 2018 is noticeable. For example, whereas in the majority of the 
countries there was a slight decline or a slight increase (lower than 3%) in the 
share of households benefitting from reduced or free rent, in Poland this figure in 
2018 was 23.3% lower than in 2007, and in Czechia it was 15.1% lower. However, 
whereas in Poland this change was associated with an increase in the homeownership 
rate (by 21.4%), in Czechia it was accompanied mostly by a growth in the 
percentage of households renting their dwellings at market price (by 10.9%). 
Fig. 3. Distribution of population by tenure status (2007) 
Source: Eurostat (EU-SILC). 
Figure 4 refers to the tenure status of the population aged 65 and above, which 
enables to consider specifically the elderly perspective. It presents the share of 
tenants (non-homeowners) in this group. As shown, there are significant 
differences among the countries in this respect. This diversity is even greater when 
compared to the whole population (see Figure 2). However, in average terms, 
among the elderly population the rates of homeownership are slightly lower than 
in the whole population. A very small percentage of older tenants is reported for 
some CEE countries: Croatia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. 
Similarly, in Ireland, Spain, and Norway this share is below 10%. The countries 
where older tenants are a larger social group include Denmark, Germany, Cyprus, 
the Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden; the percentage of non-homeowners among 








































































































































Fig. 4. Percentage of the population aged ≥65 years with the tenure status 
of non-homeowner (2018) 
Source: Eurostat (EU-SILC). 
Some previous studies have suggested that elderly women are especially at risk  
of housing problems, i.e., homelessness and inadequate housing, which is 
a consequence of their career paths (or lack thereof) which in turn arises from their 
traditional roles in society (Darab and Hartman 2013). To illustrate this problem, 
Figure 5 presents the gender differences in terms of severe material deprivation 
rate among people over the age of 75. This EU-SILC indicator expresses  
the proportion of the population unable (not unwilling) to pay for at least four of 
the following: 1) rent, mortgage, or utility bills; 2) keeping their home adequately 
warm; 3) unexpected expenses; 4) food to eat meat or protein regularly;  
5) vacations; 6) a television set; 7) a washing machine; 8) a car; or 9) a telephone.
It is a measure of absolute poverty related not to one’s income, but to one’s living 
conditions, also comprising housing in a general sense. The observed patterns in 
the countries studied reveal that the level of severe deprivation varies 
significantly. A particularly high severe material deprivation rate for women is 
reported for some CEE countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovenia, and Slovakia. This problem also concerns three Mediterranean countries: 
Portugal, Italy, and Greece. In almost all cases (Denmark being the sole exception), 












































































































































some countries they are even two or three times higher, so the differences between 
severe material deprivation rates for men and women are significant. The higher 
poverty levels among older women may be attributed first of all to the gender 
pension gap (see Bettio et al. 2013; Frericks et al. 2009), which results from the 
different working patterns of men and women.  
Fig. 5. Severe material deprivation rates among men and women in the >75 age 
cohort (2018) 
Source: Eurostat (EU-SILC). 
An indicator that specifically relates to housing affordability is the housing cost 
overburden rate. It is defined by Eurostat as the proportion of people living in 
households where the total housing costs are more than 40% of disposable income 
(the “net” of housing allowances). Figure 6 presents the housing cost overburden 
rate in the population of less affluent (below 60% of the median equivalized 
income) older men and women. Across the countries studied, the average 
percentage is 30.3% for women and 26.7% for men. However, there are some 
countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, and Greece) where more than half of the 
population faces very high housing costs relative to their incomes. Again, in each 
country there are differences between the rates for women and men, but contrary 
to the severe material deprivation rate, women are not so clearly more vulnerable 
to such problems. In nine countries, more men than women have problems with 
housing affordability, though the differences are quite minor (except for Norway). 
At the same time, there are countries where these gender differences exceed 10% 





















































































































































Fig. 6. Housing cost overburden rate of men and women (with incomes of less 
than 60% of the median equivalized income) in the >65 age cohort (2018) 
Source: Eurostat (EU-SILC). 
4. Conclusions
The development of social housing for seniors is consistent with the concept of 
“aging in place,” which denotes “remaining living in the community, with some 
level of independence, rather than in residential care” (Davey et al. 2004, p. 133). 
It is believed to have positive impact on the emotional, social, and functional 
wellbeing of older people, and this issue has been widely discussed in the current 
literature from many perspectives (see Vasunilashorn et al. 2012 and Hwang et al. 
2019 for a summary). This implies that social housing for elderly people who are 
not homeowners and cannot afford private rent at market prices is particularly 
important. However, in order for social housing to meet the particular needs of 
older people, it requires both proper policy design and adequate governance. 
As shown in this paper, the management issues can be related to different levels 
of governance. They cover various tasks associated with all aspects of accomplishing 
the objective of providing social housing. However, when considering social housing 
as a public service, the managerial performance criteria (such as, e.g., cost 
efficiency) cannot displace or overshadow the social objectives. In the case of 
housing for the elderly, it is important to take into account the special needs of 
this group resulting from their poor physical health.  
This paper presents some statistical data corresponding to the current, but also 
future, demand of older people for social housing as a public service. According 

















































































































































data for the time span of 1985-2013, despite the fact that the poverty rates for 
people aged 65 and above declined during the period studied, in many countries 
they are still higher than those of the working-age population. Moreover, the 
tendency seems to be quite different in the latter group, as the poverty rate among 
people under the age of 65 increased between 1985 and 2013. The data presented 
in this study also confirm that seniors are vulnerable to poverty and social 
exclusion. This affects the Central and Eastern European countries to a greater 
extent. Although in CEE countries homeownership rates are much higher than in, 
e.g., Western European countries, older people there are in a worse economic
situation. Thus, to improve the welfare of the elderly in these countries, some other 
means should be taken, as social housing development applies to a relatively small 
proportion of the elderly population.  
The data presented also reveal that female seniors are more exposed to poverty 
risk. Unless the situation of women on the labor market is improved, in terms of 
greater participation, equal pay, and more sustainable careers, the process of pension 
privatization and individualization (see Frericks et al. 2007) may further put more 
women at risk of poverty and inadequate housing while retired. One fairly 
unexplored area of research and a challenge in practice is the aspect of gender in 
social housing and the adjustment of these public services to women’s needs.  
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1. Introduction
The situation in which possessed retirement savings would guarantee the 
achievement of financial independence in the period of retirement would be ideal 
in old age security. This means that a pensioner’s income from retirement benefits 
and (or) private savings would enable meeting their needs not only on 
a satisfactory level, but also maintaining a minimum of the standard of living 
similar to the period of their professional activity. 
Unfortunately, achieving financial independence through state pension systems is 
not possible in Poland, as well as in most developed countries of the world, because 
they usually ensure only the level of the so-called social security. The level 
of retirement benefits received from such systems usually constitutes around 50-60% 
of the average remuneration received before retirement, while the replacement rate 
considered as optimal should represent 65-80% (OECD 2015; Mercer 2019). 
Therefore, especially in the context of demographic changes, the future pensioners 
are more and more often facing the need to seek other possibilities ensuring their 
old age security. 
Due to the low level of interest in voluntary forms of saving that are offered under 
the pension system (in Poland they include individual pension accounts, 
individual pension security accounts, employee pension funds’ and employee 
capital plans), there is a question concerning alternative ways of providing 
security in old age. It is emphasised in the literature (Olejnik 2016; Redmond et 
al. 2017, pp. 362-375; Haurin and Moulton 2017, pp. 245-276) that old age 
security can be provided not only by savings accumulated in the pension system, 
but also by consciously and intentionally raised and clearly separated private 
assets intended to secure this period of life, expected support  from children, and 
even the plan to continue working indefinitely. Therefore they can, for example, 
include the following:   
 physical assets (e.g. property, real estate, works of art, gold, wine), 
 assets accumulated in financial institutions, investment or long-term care 
insurance, stock market investments, money kept at home, 
 intangible assets generated within the natural system, e.g. “investing” in children, 
with the hope of being supported by them in the period of old age. This approach 
is considered a type of deposit set up by parents to secure their needs in old age. 
DOI: 10.34658/9788366287938.4
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Therefore, people who have children, invest considerable financial resources in 
the upbringing of their children, in the hope that the children will fulfil their 
obligation towards their parents (Coall and Hertwig 2010, pp. 2-4). 
The primary purpose of the private accumulation of pension assets is obviously 
for individuals to make their old age (financially) secure. However, such assets 
are also often a very important element of intergenerational transfers (Olejnik 
2015, pp. 31-42; Chybalski et al. 2018, pp. 5-18). The issue of the succession1 of 
family businesses definitely stands out in this area (Blackburn 2003; Piketty 
2015). Thus, it seems important to know whether having your own, preferably 
prosperous company generating profits also after official termination of work and 
retirement, can be perceived as one of the unconventional methods of ensuring 
financial security in old age.  
It is worth stating that statistical data concerning family businesses in Poland are 
quite ambiguous, although according to the Institute of Family Business (2016), 
36% of companies in 2016 are family enterprises generating 18% of GDP (for 
comparison, family businesses make up more than 60% of all companies in 
Europe, European Commission 2020). Such companies developed in Poland 
especially after 1989, and now generational change will be more and more often 
observed. They will be passed on to the next generation – either in the form of 
succession to the children or through their sale. In the latter case, the income 
obtained from the sale may certainly constitute financial security in the retirement 
life of the previous owner. However, in the case of succession to the children, 
there is a question whether it can also be a form of old age security. 
Therefore, the purpose of the paper is to identify the role of family companies in 
relation to both parties – parent founders and successors – in the context of 
security in future old age. Therefore, the paper firstly shows a review of the 
literature related to the perception of family businesses through the prism of old 
age security. The second part of the article presents the results of qualitative 
research conducted in this area.  
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Own company as a retirement security 
Meeting consumer needs in the period of old age requires households to make  
a distribution of income in time – that is to accumulate savings. Therefore, income 
obtained after finishing working life comes from the savings accumulated before 
1 In the literature on the subject, the term “succession” is not clearly defined. According 
to Słownik Języka Polskiego [Polish dictionary]  succession means: 1. “inheritance from 
somebody; works of art or cultural goods left after ancestors”. 2. “inheriting the rights to 
the throne” 3. “taking over a senior position” (sjp/pwn.pl, accessed December 27, 2019). 
Analysing the definitions of succession, it should be noticed that they enclose not only the 
transfer of ownership or assets, but also the allocation of the labour force and gentle 
donation of management along with decision-making. 
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– either in the pension system organised by the state or in any individual form
outside this system. 
Consumer behaviours related to individual retirement benefit may be influenced 
by owning a business.2 Running such a company gives the opportunity of the 
longest working life (Potts et al. 2001), which is very important for many people, 
and a lot of people over 50 definitely want to work. This is of great importance 
especially in the situation of ageism – discrimination on the labour market and in 
the workplace based on age. Owning their own company also gives senior citizens 
the opportunity to turn a decent profit in their retirement.  
Running a business is also one of the factors that affect saving motivated by old 
age security. For example, research conducted by Loretto, White and Duncan 
(2001, p. 397) shows that people running a business choose individual pension 
schemes explicitly more often than others and that they think in this way they can 
save more. However, this is not always the case, because the study by Redmond, 
Walker and Hutchinson (2017, pp. 362-375) shows that the lack of long-term 
financial security can be a potential outcome of self-employment.  
The literature focuses relatively little attention on the perception of an own 
company run in the form of family enterprises as one of the ways of attaining old 
age security.  
It should be stated that the very possession of own business does not mean that it 
is automatically a family business. A family company is defined as “one that will 
be passed on to the family’s next generation to manage and control” (Ward 2011, 
p. 273). To clarify this concept a little, it should be noted that the definition of
a family company comprises several criteria, both objective (e.g. ownership, 
management method) and subjective (e.g. family involvement in management and 
work in the enterprise, orientation on transferring the company to the next 
generation). Therefore, the research issue regarding the perception of the role of 
family businesses and the related succession process in retirement security seems 
to be interesting and significant. 
2.2. Succession of family businesses as a multigenerational transfer 
Succession is a multidimensional process. Firstly, this is because transferring the 
“achievement”, which a private enterprise is, is not only the transfer of ownership, 
the accumulated assets or capital (including patents, copyrights, knowledge, etc.), 
but often also a very important human need and motivator to improve the quality 
of life for the successors (children) or other person.  
2 It should be mentioned that as L. Cook (2017) states, in the United Kingdom: “With the 
sheer number of baby-boomers now approaching retirement age, the era of the 
“olderpreneur” is upon us”. The author also indicates that “the number of self-employed 
people aged 65 and over has more than doubled in the past five years. By the age of 70, 
almost 60 per cent of those still in work are self-employed”. 
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Secondly, the transfer of a family business to the next generation is rather  
a specific intergenerational transfer. This is because in this case we are dealing 
with transfers not only in the “vertical” arrangement (i.e. a family business 
received as a classic inheritance after the death of the owner3), but also horizontal, 
i.e. the transfer associated with the desire or necessity to transfer knowledge, 
competences, etc. to the successor by the parent founders even in their lifetime. 
The literature on family businesses mostly studies fear of retirement and death of 
the main founder of such a company among others (Cabrera-Suarez et al. 2001; 
Filser et al. 2013, pp. 256-277). Therefore, thirdly, due to a rising life expectancy 
of parent founders, their decisions at the stage of “pre-succession” are relatively 
extended (which, however, can lead to unexpected drops). The owners often 
believe that their company success depends on their involvement, so they wish to 
stay in the company even after retirement (Bruce and Picard 2006, pp. 306-309). 
This phenomenon is caused, among others, by the fact that business owners 
invested a lot of time and effort to build and develop their firm, thus devoting their 
whole lives to it. The fear of retirement associated with the company's succession 
may also be the result of perceived loss of status and fears of not knowing what to 
do after retirement. What's more, seniors postpone the process of succession, 
because it makes them aware of the approaching retirement age, and thus raises 
negative emotions associated with old age and death. And this, in turn, may give 
rise to conflicts between the business owners and their potential successors, 
especially because of diverse perceptions of how to run the company, as well as 
due to different visions of the directions of the company development4 (Filser et 
al. 2013, pp. 256-277).  
As a consequence, it happens that due to family conflicts related to succession, 
the companies often fail (Tkaczyk 2017, pp. 29-30). This is proved by the results 
of the research presented in the PwC Report (2016). They indicate that in Europe 
only just over 30% of all family firms transfer the business ownership to the 
successors and only 15% of them have a ‘plan’ for the succession process.  
3 Here it should be noticed that in the literature, among various categories of motives 
encouraging people to accumulate resources intended for leaving as succession, Kohli and 
Kunemund (2003, pp. 123-142) emphasize the motif of eternizing the resources – this is 
the so-called “Dynasty model”. The succession is then the result of the necessity to transfer 
the accumulated resources that have been collected for the sole purpose of their increase 
or perpetuation. Therefore, they will be willing to leave the succession if their children 
want to continue the family business and do not change their lifestyle (Chu 1991). 
4 The issue of conflicts in family businesses is the subject of many studies. It is worth 
noting that such conflicts result from completely different factors that characterize 
business and family ties, i.e. goal orientation versus emotional aspects. In addition, 
stability and tradition are important for the family, whereas for the company it is important 
to react quickly to changes in the environment. Therefore, introducing changes in the 
enterprise may have a negative impact on family relationships and thus cause a conflict 
(Leach 2011, pp. 28-40; Harvey and Rodney 1994, pp. 329-350; Pieper et al. 2013,  
pp. 489-495). 
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Thus, it is often emphasised in the literature that it is vital to develop a plan of 
succession and indicate the role of the owners during the process and afterwards. 
In the latter case, it is also necessary to possibly plan the pension benefits through 
for example obtaining income from the company profits or remuneration for 
further work performed by the parent founders (Walsh 2011, p. 17). What is more, 
the research by Collins, Worthington and Schoen (2016, pp. 51-70) shows that 
“when family firm CEOs have confidence in the continuity of their firm after they 
retire, their retirement well-being expectations are higher”. Bulut et al. (2019) also 
emphasize that beside sustaining the profitability of the family business, the most 
important criteria for the selection of a suitable successor for the family company 
also include the expectations of the parent founders related to their retirement 
benefit and resulting possibilities to secure the financial comfort of their family in 
the future.   
3. Research results
3.1. Methodology of research  
Primary research was conducted to identify the perception of owning a family 
business as a potential security for old age. Qualitative studies were performed in 
which the method of individual-in-depth-interviews was applied. They were 
followed by semi-structured interviews and field note-taking. The scenario 
consisted of several parts, and the paper presents the results of one group of 
questions, i.e. the perception of the role of owning a family business as a way of 
providing financial security in old age. 
This study was conducted for 2 months in 2019, among representatives of family 
businesses, located in Wielkopolska and Kujawy (although in most cases they 
were operating throughout Poland).  
Participants were selected through purposive sampling. This kind of sampling was 
found appropriate to obtain the best insights about the perception of a family 
business in the category of retirement security. Purposive sampling is useful in 
qualitative research, particularly among populations which are difficult to access, 
and when the  research issues may be perceived by the respondents as difficult and 
sensitive. Therefore, participation in the research presented below was obviously 
determined by having a company and an adult child / children – the successors 
(potential or real).     
The survey was conducted among 18 respondents:5 9 family business owners and 
9 successors. There were 8 men and 1 woman, aged 48-70, among the respondents 
who were the owners of the participating companies, whereas the successors 
(including potential ones) were represented by 7 men and 2 women aged 22-42. 
Due to the subject matter of the study, the predecessors and successors were 
interviewed separately. It should be added that in the case of three enterprises, the 
5 Some interviews (12) were conducted as part of the master's thesis by Mateusz Filipiak: 
“The role of intergenerational transfers in pension security on the example of family 
businesses”, Poznań University of Economics and Business, Poznań 2019.  
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succession process had already been completed, in one company it was in process 
during the implementation of the study, in three it had not been planned yet, and 
in two cases company liquidation was planned for the moment of reaching the 
retirement age of the owner. Sectors represented by the respondents included the 
construction services, car mechanics, hotel industry, gardening services, clothing 
production and trade, as well as the production of plexiglass products.    
The analysis of the content of the collected material was performed according to 
the principles developed by Miles and Huberman (1984), and with the use of the 
descriptive, attribute and process coding of statements in accordance with Saldan's 
recommendations [2009]. 
3.2. Findings 
The conducted research shows that the perception of family businesses in  
the context of pension security is very diverse. In their spontaneous answers  
(at the beginning of the interview), company owners (especially: younger owners 
or owners representing entities that were not in a very good financial condition or 
were operating in non-prospective industries), do not perceive their company as  
a way of making their old age financially secure (4 respondents out of 9). 
However, they declared that in the case of a possible termination of their activity 
before reaching retirement age, they would treat the capital obtained from the sale 
of the company as a form of retirement security. It is worth quoting the statement 
of one of the respondents at this point: “My son does not want to take over the 
company. I have already planned its liquidation. I will keep these funds for serious 
expenses in old age. They will be kept and will constitute financial security in the 
event of illness, or disability” (male 67 years old, gardening services).  
It is worth noting that all owners of family businesses recognise the potential of 
these entities in the context of providing old age security. Firstly, they indicate 
that while conducting business activity, they have been trying / were trying to 
secure their future through saving cash (by establishing foreign currency deposits, 
purchasing bonds, etc.; this method was indicated by 5 out of 9 respondents). 
Secondly, they make investments in real estate, especially by purchasing flats for 
rent or other assets that can be easily sold (3 owners). Thirdly, some (3 respondents) 
would like to receive a certain percentage of profits or other financial support from 
successors regularly after the transfer of the enterprise (“If I transfer everything I 
have worked for to my children, which is a good start for a child, then it is logical 
for the child to give a few percent of the profits to support his parents”, (male 
aged 59, construction sector).  (“I count on such support, because from the 
pension I receive, you can only buy medicines and do small grocery shopping. 
However, to have a decent life, go somewhere or visit some places, I only count 
on the support from the younger generation. (...) They received from us a well-
organized workshop, (...) they have the opportunity to earn money, which we have 
created for them, so hopefully, they will offer us a share” (male aged 65, 
construction industry)). Fourthly, some also indicated that they expect financial 
support from time to time (especially in case of illness), but this is not necessary. 
For them, maintaining a business is more important, so that “all generational work 
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is not wasted, and continuity is maintained”, hence they would prefer the 
successors to  support more the next successors – their children rather than the 
company founders (3 respondents). Fifthly, business owners would also like to 
work in their companies as long as their health would permit, even after the 
succession process and retirement (4 respondents). This factor, along with the 
financial aspect (obtaining additional remuneration for work), is associated with 
the wish to advise, influence and control the activities of the company founded or 
received by them. The last aspect of the perception of a family business in the 
context of retirement security is related to this. Namely, it is the intention to run 
the company as long as possible, and then its sale (despite having children) to 
obtain funds for old age security (2 respondents). The owners indicated that due 
to other interests of their children or potential conflicts, they do not intend to 
transfer the company (“Ending my life is equivalent to closing the business. I close 
the door and the company ceases to exist. Conflicts appear where transfer of business 
to children starts. It has always been like that” (male aged 57, hotel industry)). 
On the other hand, analysing the opinions of the other side of the succession 
process – those of the successors – it can be noticed that in the context of 
retirement security for seniors they see two basic issues. The first of them is  
the problems related to financial support, whereas the second one is further work 
of the senior pensioner.  
In the case of financial support, two clear attitudes can be identified:  
1) full agreement as to the fact that there should be a kind of “compensation”
made by successors for senior citizens for the received company (“I want to
support financially, but also send to health resorts or trips, so that he would
feel appreciated, and would know that we are grateful” (male aged 40, car
mechanics)). They also think that financial support may depend on the form of
takeover and the size of the assets that are in the hands of the parents. They
point out that while taking over the entire company and depriving the seniors
of the source of income, it is natural that they want to reward them somehow,
so that they can have a decent life. They also emphasize that “you have to
remember that they have devoted all their lives to children and the company,
and you cannot take over the company and leave them with nothing. They
should be rewarded for the effort they put into the company development and
ensure them a decent life” (male aged 30, construction industry).
2) the lack of acceptance for the need to support the seniors (“I am always
annoyed that it is said that if parents give something to their children, they
expect something in return. (…) These are no longer times that you have to run
a business for the rest of your life and be faithful and unhappy”, (women aged
40, hotel industry)). It is worth adding that the successors think that their
parents, while running well-profiting companies, can / could take care of their
own livelihood in old age (“The older generation should be able to manage
their own wealth wisely so that people who take over the company do not have
to think that they owe something to someone” (male aged 28, construction
industry)).
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However, when analysing the attitudes of successors towards further work of the 
parent founders in the family businesses, they all express fairly consistent opinions. 
They indicate that after the succession process is finished, it is natural to consult 
parents in matters regarding decisions that are made. Over time, however, they 
expect full independence in the company management. 
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the role of family businesses in retirement 
security is a very multidimensional issue. The performed research shows that 
conducting business activities and reasonable management of accumulated assets 
should provide owners with adequate financial resources in their retirement age.  
Analysing the role of a family business in the context of retirement security in the 
study, attention was also focused on such aspects as: 
 the opportunity to work in such a company for as long as the senior citizen 
wants and as long as their health condition permits to do that; in this case age 
discrimination does not exist (naturally, if there are no conflicts between parent 
founders and successors in this respect), 
 in the absence of a suitable successor – funds obtained from the sale of the 
company (which usually occurs just before reaching retirement age or even 
after reaching it) may also constitute a significant source of financial security 
in old age, 
 in the succession process, the senior may expect a share in the future profits of 
the transferred enterprise, 
 sometimes informal retirement support from successors to parent founders is 
expected.   
It is necessary to add that the study has certain limitations. First, the results are 
based upon a small sample size, thus results should not be referred to the whole 
population of family businesses. Hence, in the future, a broader survey among 
family businesses with the use of qualitative or a quantitative research would be 
relevant. Another shortcoming of the study is that the author conducted the 
research only in the area of intra-family succession. It would also be advisable to 
perform further research over other areas of perceiving a family business as a way 
to secure old age, e.g. the transfer of the company to non-relatives. 
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1. Introduction
Social security especially in its forms such as pension and health insurance, is 
currently characterized by a financial imbalance of government obligations with 
financial revenues: insurance premiums, social taxes. This imbalance is 
characteristic of almost all countries with social insurance systems. In 2016, the 
twenty largest OECD countries together had 78 trillion. US dollars deficit in 
underfunding of solid-state (pay-as-you-go) and funded (defined benefits) state 
pension obligations, which is equivalent to about twice the collective national debt 
of these countries. The under reservation of private pension obligations is also 
insufficient, for example, private pensions in the United States are provided with 
only 82 percent of the reserves necessary for pension funds to fulfill their 
obligations, the deficit is about 3 trillion. US dollars. It is predicted that the 
average share of pension expenses in the GDP of countries in the world will grow, 
according to expert estimates, from 9.5% in 2016 to 12% in 2050 (City bank 
2016). Health expenditures also show a significant upward trend, as the 
corresponding expenditures in OECD countries grew by 3.4% in 2016, which was 
the largest increase since the post-crisis 2009. At the same time, the share of health 
expenditures is also quite high with an average value of 8.9% of GDP for OECD 
countries in 2016, and from 17.2% of US GDP to almost 6% of GDP in Turkey 
and Mexico (OECD Health Statistics 2018). 
Taking into account the demographic trend of aging and strengthening of 
digitalization on employment, it is obvious that this situation will continue in the 
future. One of the reserves for balancing the obligations of social insurance funds 
and reducing administrative costs is the improvement through the integration of 
administrative structures, the creation of unified centers for the provision of social 
services, and the widespread use of electronic forms of their provision. Criticism 
of the concept of social insurance, its lack of effectiveness in recent years is not 
always caused by global demographic problems or financial crises. In many 
respects, the inefficiency of social insurance is determined by the inefficiency of 
its management, while ‘in debates on social insurance reforms, the inability to 
distinguish between management and conceptual issues often criticizes the 
principles of social insurance, when the main focus should be on weaknesses in 
the ways of administering such a system’ (Gillion et al. 2001). On the whole, one 
of the main claims to increasing state social expenditures lies not in their size, but 
DOI: 10.34658/9788366287938.5
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in the requirements (requests of society, citizens) of the absence of losses, i.e. the 
effectiveness of their distribution, targeting, testing the need for social benefits. 
Losses as a result of this targeted redistribution should be minimized or generally 
eliminated as the consequences of the so-called ‘leaky bucket’, when a significant 
redistribution of resources is accompanied by uncontrolled ‘leaks’ (Okun 1975; 
Korpi 1985, 1996; Padovano and Turati 2012; Saltkjel 2017). The impact on the 
country's economy and its growth depends on the size of its social sphere, i.e. the 
larger the social system, the greater the impact it has. However, the vector of this 
influence depends on the effectiveness of the social sphere, its redistribution 
profile and administration (Cichon et al. 2004). 
According to a number of estimates, unproductive administrative costs in the 
redistribution of social resources, for example, in the health sector, can reach 
almost 8% of all expenses in this social sphere, while the total pressure of 
administrative expenses is more than 30% of all expenses, of which a significant 
part is accounted for by private providers (Evans 2013). However, the loss of 
accumulated social insurance resources when they are redistributed between 
generations, income strata, and other categories of recipients of insurance 
payments, in our opinion, is not so much in increased administrative costs (which 
in state social insurance are usually from 1 to 4.5%), how much is the organization 
of the mechanism of social insurance itself, its compactness, economy, and 
efficiency (Stefan 2015). At the same time, administrative costs are always  
a potential source of inefficiency in the productive reallocation of resources 
(Cichon et al. 2004).  
In this paper, we consider approaches, trends and expenditures in social security 
administration (SSA), mainly using the countries of the European Union. The 
potential of SSA in the current context are largely underestimated. We focus on 
the institutions and approaches in SSA, the comparative evaluation of expenditures 
and administrative costs of SSA in the EU countries, and related issues and 
challenges of SSA based on the comparison of different approaches. Drawing on 
this context, we define research questions as: What are the leading institutions and 
approaches in SSA?  Whether and in what a reserve of SSA is present for social 
security sustainability? We use an analytic approach, data and assumptions about 
how SSA potential is influencing social security sustainability.  
2. Assessment of indicators of the SSA in the EU area
The widespread increase in the social security expenditures is associated with 
general issues of the current state of society and economy: demographic and 
technological. Most of these changes lead to a transformation of the traditional 
employment model with the participation of the state, corporations and employers 
in these expenditures. The increase in the pension burden, health care expenditures 
and the growth of informal employment with the wide participation of non-state 
social service providers lead to a subsequent in government spending on social 
security, which increased by about 18% over the past 9 years, from 2008 to 2017 
using the example of the EU countries (Table 1).  
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Table 1. Changes in social security expenditures and their administrative costs 













EU 28 countr. 17,7 15,2 7,6 5,4 
Euro area 12 count. 16,5 13,8 8,9 6,4 
Belgium 14,0 7,3 32,6 24,8 
Bulgaria 38,7 46,8 14,2 20,9 
Czechia 16,1 13,8 11,8 9,6 
Denmark 21,7 16,0 50,4 43,3 
Germany 24,4 23,6 26,3 25,5 
Estonia 27,4 29,3 70,8 73,4 
Ireland 18,5 10,7 28,8 20,3 
Greece -17,2 -14,7 -54,7 -53,3 
Spain 4,9 3,5 -12,7 -13,9 
France 21,3 16,4 7,8 3,5 
Croatia 5,6 10,2 -34,3 -31,5 
Italy 6,8 3,8 -12,2 -14,7 
Cyprus 7,0 -2,1 1,7 -6,9 
Latvia 27,4 42,8 2,8 15,3 
Lithuania 2,2 15,6 -2,2 10,6 
Luxembourg 35,4 10,9 25,6 3,0 
Hungary -7,5 -5,2 -21,4 -19,3 
Malta 41,4 23,7 38,1 20,8 
Netherlands 17,2 12,5 7,7 3,3 
Austria 13,7 7,6 -3,3 -8,5 
Poland 39,7 40,2 22,5 23,0 
Portugal 7,9 10,6 -30,2 -28,5 
Romania 27,1 33,2 95,0 104,4 
Slovenia 12,5 10,0 -15,5 -17,4 
Slovakia 27,6 26,2 4,0 2,9 
Finland 22,6 18,3 -31,7 -34,1 
Sweden 22,3 12,1 23,4 13,1 
United Kingdom 18,0 10,4 -41,3 -45,1 
Iceland 29,5 19,7 -23,1 -28,9 
Norway 32,2 19,5 9,4 -1,1 
Switzerland 35,7 22,8 40,8 27,4 
Serbia -5,1 -0,6 -30,3 -27,0 
Turkey 79,2 58,6 96,2 73,5 
Source: Eurostat, Social protection expenditure. 
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Such an increase (with some exceptions) is not uniform in different countries, 
which may indicate different efforts and reforms in the field of social security in 
depth and effectiveness. Compared with a smaller increase in administrative 
expenses, whose growth amounted to about 15% for the period 2008-2017, this 
difference is more likely to be characterized by improved SSA.  
Despite the differences in changes in total social security expenditures and 
administrative expenses, in the latter show a downward trend in most developed 
countries, on the contrary, a tendency to increase administrative expenses is 
typical for countries where social security systems are still under construction. 
If developed countries have already formed their social security systems and are 
already implementing reforms in the field of their administration, then developing 
countries need first of all the formation of their social security systems and 
relevant institutions. Based on this, we can conclude that not only the formal 
framework as such, but also the period and quality of SSA affect its effectiveness 
in each country. The same situation is characteristic in the pair between total 
expenses and administrative expenses per inhabitant. There are more volatile and 
different situations that characterize the various consequences of the reforms of 
different countries when adapting social security systems to changing conditions 
of society and the economy. Since we have received confirmation that institutions 
and approaches in SSA have a significant role, which can lead to lower 
administrative costs, at least, it is important to compare some characteristics of 
such institutions. 
3. Institutes and approaches in SSA: recent trends
To what extent social insurance is associated with the provision of social assistance, 
it is embedded in the tax and budget systems of the country, non-state providers are 
involved in the provision of social services, and representatives of trade unions and 
employer associations are involved in management – these and other issues determine 
the features of its administration institutions. The main tasks of SSA include, in our 
opinion, the following: (1) collection or accumulation of insurance premiums (social 
taxes); (2) investing funds; (3) performance of social functions: from the provision of 
social services to the calculation of insurance benefits; (4) financing SSA. To solve 
these and other tasks in the practice of SSA, different levels and institutions are used. 
Classically, the SSA is carried out at the state level with responsibility in the status of 
ministries: finance and social relations (labor). In addition, social insurance can be 
partially or fully managed by additional social and economic institutions (partners, 
providers), acting state and non-state structures. There are also structures reflecting 
the interests of social participants: employers and workers. An approximate 
classification of SSA institutions with the functions they perform is presented in the 
Table below (Table 2). The presence of identical functions performed by different 
institutions in SSA determines the variability of its administration. Moreover, the 
same functions can be performed simultaneously by different institutions, for 
example, for different types of social insurance, and in different forms: as cash 
payments or the provision of social services, for example, medical care. 
47 
Table 2. The relationship between functions and institutions of SSA 
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Source: authors. 
If we consider such administration in the initial order, from the receipt of 
contributions (insurance premiums, social taxes), then they are collected, as a rule, 
in two main forms: tax, financial or insurance. In the first case, administration of 
the contributions is carried out by the tax (financial, treasury) services of the 
country, in the second – through insurance institutions (funds, cash desks) of both 
state and non-state forms. One of the common examples of tax administration of 
collection of payments is the United States, where social contributions for wages 
are accumulated by the Internal Revenue Service as branches of the Ministry of 
Finance (or the State Treasury of the country) and then distributed to social 
security funds (for pension insurance, loss of breadwinner, disability) and medical 
funds. Such funds are managed by the Treasury Department, in which all receipts 
to the funds are recorded and assets are accumulated. The balance of SSA under 
the law is invested in the country's securities, the additional income from which 
forms the accumulation of such funds. Social insurance is administered by the 
state Social Security Agency. Insurance payments, for example, pensions  
(a number of federal benefits) are made by such an Agency through individual 
social accounts that each recipient of such payments has. Thus, the SSA in the 
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United States is closely integrated into the tax system of the country. Among the 
countries that have a similar tax- and centrally-oriented SSA with some additions, 
it should be noted Iceland, Hungary, Canada, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, 
Italy, Ireland, Estonia, Latvia, Croatia, Romania, Albania, Montenegro, Russia , 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, China. At the same time, 
many countries, such as Russia since 2017 or China since 2018, have changed the 
insurance administration to the tax administration.  
In Germany, there is another option for the SSA with the central responsibility of 
insurance organizations (providers). The insurance contributions of employers 
and workers for all types of social insurance are collected (accumulated) by 
medical insurance organizations (sickness funds), which then transfer funds to the 
following areas: providers of medical and nursing care, health care facilities (for 
health insurance and long-term care insurance); federal employment agency 
(unemployment insurance); state accident and health insurance providers; to 
federal pension insurance; to the artist insurance fund. That is, the central link in 
the administration of social insurance in Germany is the public or parastatal 
organizations that collect insurance contributions, and taxes are levied by the local 
tax authorities. At the same time, medical insurance companies (about 132 
organizations in 2014), which administer the collection of insurance premiums, 
form a national association with broad powers. Such administration through social 
insurance (security) institutions is present in Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Georgia, Lithuania, most republics of the former Soviet 
Union, as well as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Brazil, Mexico, 
Uruguay. This is the so-called parallel option when tax and insurance administration 
of fees is carried out separately. 
There is also an alternative in the case of accumulative financing of pension 
insurance, an example of which is in countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Chile, 
El Salvador, Peru. Such funds, as a rule, accumulate contributions, manage 
investments and make payments. On the one hand, they are public institutions, but 
they also have much in common with private sector systems based on fund 
management (Barrand et al. 2004).  
Among the advantages of using tax agencies to collect social contributions are 
noted such as (1) synergies between organizations and their main functions; 
(2) possible reductions in administrative and regulatory requirements; (3) more 
efficient use of resources, reduction of administrative costs (infrastructure, IT 
labour costs), (4) improvement of intra-governmental coordination (Barrand et al. 
2004). At the same time, social insurance agencies in the form of insurance 
structures (funds, cash desks) are more targeted and focus on establishing 
individual rights to receive benefits and pay them to recipients. At the same time, 
there is some conflicting responsibility of such agencies for collecting 
(accumulating) insurance premiums and providing benefits to recipients of 
insurance payments (Rofman and Demarko 1999). 
The investment function in the SSA, its effectiveness is, in our opinion, one of the key 
reserves of its financial stability. The significance of investing in social funds is 
determined, firstly, by the expansion of individual accumulative and professional 
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(corporate) insurance programs as a result of the influence of demographic factors, in 
particular, for defined benefit plans, such investment requirements are unconditional. 
Secondly, unlike social support, which provides assistance in both monetary and 
non-monetary forms, social insurance, as a rule, provides for cash payments. In 
this connection, the cost of money is not only accumulated, but also paid, i.e. 
invested is important (Andersen 2012). Thirdly, social insurance funds are, in essence, 
a deferred part of employees' wages; these are, as a rule, compulsory savings made 
in order to receive ‘profitable’ payments in the future. At each moment of time, 
the balance in the individual retirement account belongs to the depositor as his 
personal ‘wealth’, even if he or she does not have the right to use it for purposes 
other than social security. This implies both the availability of these funds in 
absolute terms and their maximization, as well as long-term guarantees (Cichon 
et al. 2001). Fourth, social insurance funds are financial resources, in the monetary 
form of which the theoretical requirement of their investment and obtaining 
additional investment income has already been laid, and therefore the current 
deficit of such funds requires its placement in those types of assets that are in line 
with national interests. These and other reasons determine the accumulation by 
national social insurance systems of potentially significant amounts of money that 
are collected today to finance future obligations, especially in pension insurance. 
In this regard, questions arise of appropriate investment, financial planning, 
investment strategies, permitted types of assets, guarantees, i.e. generally 
appropriate investment policy. 
What institutions and approaches are common in the implementation of investment 
policies of social insurance and SSA? The investment functions of social insurance, 
reflected in Table 2, can be performed both by insurance structures (funds, cash 
registers) of state and non-state forms, and by financial and tax departments (services). 
Thus, institutions where the insurance fund is an independent organization with 
legislative (legal) powers and its own management service are present in Denmark, 
Finland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and as 
insurance offices in Austria and Germany. In contrast, a contractual insurance fund 
consists of a separate pool of assets without legal personality and is managed by 
a separate financial organization: a bank, insurance or management company. The 
governing body of the fund is usually present as the board of directors of such 
a managing financial organization. Examples of contracted pension funds include 
Spain, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Portugal, Slovakia, Turkey, and open-ended 
funds in Italy and Poland. The third common form: trust funds have both institutional 
and contractual (contractual) characteristics. Trustees legally owning the assets of the 
funds transfer them to management in the interests of the participants (beneficiaries) 
of the investments. Although the function of trusts is similar to the function of funds, 
trustees are not a legally significant part of such trust (trust), while there is fiduciary 
responsibility of both managers and proxies. Examples of such funds are present  
in the USA, Great Britain, Australia, and Ireland (Stewart and Yermo 2008). Thus, in 
the implementation of the investment function in the administration of social 
insurance, the leading role is assigned not to a specific institution (as in the case of 
collection of insurance premiums), but rather to the format of investment 
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management, investment strategies, state regulation of investment activities of 
social insurance funds (Tessaromatis 2013; Stewart and Yermo 2008; Cichon 
2004; Tamagno 2001). 
The social service in the SSA is carried out by various state and non-state 
institutions, the question of attracting the latter to participate in such public 
administration can be considered a definite and confirmed practice. Nevertheless, 
the presence in recent years, in particular after the 2008 crisis, of a contradictory 
tendency: both to strengthen the state position in social services, and to expand 
the participation of non-state providers in it, determine the current significance of 
this issue. Arguments in favor of engaging non-governmental, private institutions 
in the provision of social services include arguments such as a more effective 
assessment of moral hazard risks and adverse selection, often over-insurance in 
case of unemployment and disability insurance (Koning 2006; Dixon 2002). On 
the other hand, public administration is less costly than the costs of private insurers 
and provides a more uniform and universal social service. The compromise between 
the extreme positions is to allow a mixed model of public service, using the 
advantages and limitations of state and non-state forms with the state (government) as 
a regulator (Galazoulas and Tsetoura 2014; Vonk 2010; Koning 2006). 
Despite the more extensive options for public or private components in the 
provision of public services, there are currently no reliable empirical studies on 
the effectiveness of using one or another component. In our opinion, the social 
insurance service, because of its economic and social significance, is state-
oriented both in terms of providing services and their control. Social service 
provides for significant investments in infrastructure, research with a rather 
uncertain outcome in the future that is not able to finance private institutional 
structures. The need to provide universal social insurance services also determines 
the activities of state providers. Another fundamental factor in the state-
centralized social service is the receipt and use of information on the cost, 
recipients, conditions of social services, which may be limited in the case of 
private providers (Cichon et al. 2004). 
In general, as with the implementation of the investment function of insurance, 
there are substitution effects: the absence of state social service entails its 
implementation by non-state market structures and, conversely, broad state social 
services reduce the participation of private providers (Andersen 2012). 
The administrative expenses for social security do not directly correlate with any 
model of the welfare state, but are generally higher, for example, for the Scandinavian 
countries, i.e. administering more social redistribution. On average, in OECD 
countries, administrative expenses for social insurance ranged from 1% to 4.5% 
of GDP in 2016 (Stefan 2015). However, there are non-linear (but correlated) 
relationship between the amount or ‘wealth’ of social expenditures and 
administration cost per inhabitant (Table 3). It is worth to note that the most 
‘expensive’ in administration are the countries with insurance-based financial 
approach in opposite to tax-based. 
51 
Table 3. The comparison of social security expenditures and their administrative 
costs per inhabitant in the EU countries, 2017, % 
Country Administrative 











Switzerland 6,0 Norway 18 763 
Netherlands 5,0 Luxembourg 18 685 
Ireland 4,3 Switzerland 16 511 
Denmark 3,9 Denmark 15 338 
France 3,8 Sweden 12 428 
Germany 3,7 Netherlands 11 739 
Belgium 3,7 Finland 11 248 
Czechia 2,9 France 11 154 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 2,7 Austria 10 727 
Lithuania 2,7 Germany  10 716 
Slovakia 2,6 Belgium 10 071 
Poland 2,3 Iceland 8 940 
Italy 2,0 
United 
Kingdom 8 687 
Sweden 2,0 Ireland 8 660 
Romania 2,0 Italy 7 765 
Bulgaria 1,9 Spain 5 440 
Austria 1,8 Slovenia 4 467 
Turkey 1,8 Greece 4 438 
Norway 1,7 Portugal 4 394 
Serbia 1,7 Cyprus 4 279 
Spain 1,7 Malta 3 525 
Finland 1,7 Czechia 3 178 
Croatia 1,6 Slovakia 2 564 
Hungary 1,6 Poland 2 419 
Estonia 1,6 Croatia 2 392 
Slovenia 1,5 Estonia 2 383 
Latvia 1,4 Hungary 2 230 
Luxembourg 1,4 Lithuania 1 973 
Portugal 1,3 Latvia 1 765 
Cyprus 1,3 Turkey 1 420 
Malta 1,1 Romania 1 239 
Greece 0,9 Bulgaria 1 121 





Source: Eurostat, Social protection expenditure. 
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4. Conclusions
The variability of social security institutions and their forms determine both the 
complexity of the administration process and its mixed forms. Despite the 
trajectories of the institutional environment in the SSA and social insurance, the 
state remains in the role of the main guarantor of the standards of social services, 
social policy in general. On the whole, different administrative structures provide 
different purposes, state control, redistribution, and intermediation. Since the SSA 
has additional potential for improving of social security and social insurance, 
thanks to its use it is possible to make guarantees, benefits, and services more 
efficient and provide better quality for citizens. This article is one of the first 
attempts to focus on recent trends in the SSA with its role as a reserve in social 
sustainability; promising research in this area may be associated with a quantitative 
assessment of the relationship between different forms of administration and the 
resulting achievements for social security. 
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1. Introduction
Plenty of economic phenomena cannot be explained in the absence of family 
structure. For example, the immense changes in women's labor force participation 
are strongly affected by family structure: married women work less than  
single, and mothers work less than childless women (Greenwood et al. 2017).  
A significant share of these differences is a result of the family-specific design 
 of tax and social security systems (Borella et al. 2019). Family structure is also  
a natural framework for studying intergenerational mobility and parent-child 
correlations. More and more macroeconomics papers reconcile the importance of 
a family and explicitly model decisions within the household. In this paper,  
we propose a systematic overview of this stream of literature. 
We are not the first ones to review family economics in the context of 
macroeconomics, e.g. Browning et al. (2014). Doepke and Tertilt (2016) provide 
an excellent summary of advances in family economics and its successes in 
explaining classic macroeconomics phenomena. We extend their study by 
focusing on family-dependent policy interventions, the joint aspect of taxation, 
and the impact of labor market structure on fertility. What is more, an outstanding 
guideline of family economics models by Greenwood et al. (2017) pointed out 
several remaining research questions – concerning childcare subsidies, fertility 
policies, taxation, and within-family insurance. We prove that many of them have 
already received a satisfactory empirical and theoretical answer. 
The definition of family differs substantially across macroeconomics literature. 
However, we can systematize these definitions using two dimensions: the 
household structure and decision process. We can distinguish two types of 
households: the first consists of the parent(s) and child(ren), the second consists 
of husband and wife. The latter fits analyzing gender inequality, unequal tax 
treatment, or family-dependent components of social security. The parent(s) and 
child(ren) family structure is the most common and helps explaining human 
DOI: 10.34658/9788366287938.6
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capital accumulation, inequality, and fertility decisions. Both setups are employed 
to study different drivers of women's labor force participation. 
In terms of the decision-making process, we can distinguish unitary households 
and households based on game-theoretic bargaining models. The members of the 
unitary household maximize the so-called household utility function, which 
describes the joint interests of all household members under aggregated budget 
constraint. However, the formation, as well as the dissolution of a partnership, 
usually require decisions of the individuals involved. Thus, it always contains the 
possibility of conflict. Bargaining models better reflect this feature and describe 
household behavior as the cooperation of utility-maximizing individuals. Despite 
that, the unitary household is a typical framework, even in recent literature. 
Models with bargaining are mostly used to describe the formation and stability  
of marriage and recently to analyze fertility decisions. 
In the following part of the paper, we review both macroeconomics and family 
economics literature in the context of labor force participation, fertility choice, 
human capital accumulation, inequality and taxes, and social security. Depending 
on the policy in question, the literature proposes models with significantly 
different structures and features, e.g., types of heterogeneity, choice set, applied 
utility functions, and model timing. All of them contribute to the mechanism 
of the model and its fit to the data (Borella et al. 2018). We discuss below different 
model setups, with particular caution to policies' welfare effect. In this way, we 
provide a method guideline useful for future research. 
2. Working parents and fertility
The labor-force participation of women increased sharply during the twentieth 
century. Even a more considerable increase has been observed for married 
women. However, the employment rate of married women with and without 
children still differs substantially. The size of the gap varies noticeably across 
countries. Child-related transfers and family policies can account for a considerable 
part of this variation (Hannusch 2019). Childcare and parental leaves are essential 
tools for reducing labor market cost of motherhood and, therefore, more gender 
equality in the labor market. 
Almost all OECD countries offer paid leaves to parents of a newborn (parental 
leaves). However, systems differ significantly between countries both in terms  
of length of parental leave and the generosity of transfers. 
There is a consensus in the literature that parental leave has a positive impact 
on the labor market. Byker (2016) shows that the availability of parental leave 
increases labor-force attachment. Parental leave increases labor force participation 
as well (Blau and Khan 2016; Stichnoth 2019; Yamaguchi 2019). 
The welfare effects of parental leave are not unambiguous. Erosa et al. (2010) 
show that the introduction of paid parental leave benefits women substantially due 
to the redistribution effect and a stronger bargaining position on the labor market. 
The increase in women's welfare occurs at the expense of the welfare of men, and 
aggregate welfare effects are negative. However, Bastani et al. (2019) show that 
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parental leave leads to welfare improvement if we account for the fact that firms 
have to offer standardized contracts to all employers. Without parental leave, more 
family-oriented worker obtains a suboptimal level of contract flexibility due  
to asymmetric information or anti-discrimination legislation. 
The critical but absent ankle in researches mentioned above is household structure 
and, thus, insurance within a family. As Tominey (2016) shows, parental leave 
enables mothers to come back to work quickly if the father receives negative 
productivity shock, thus reduce the magnitude of a negative income shock. 
Blundell et al. (2018) obtain similar results. Lower-income risk comes at the 
expense of time spent with children. When negative income shock hits fathers, 
mothers work more, as residual earner model would predict. Due to the 
complementarity of leisure between wife and husband, working mothers spend 
less time with children and stay at home fathers do not compensate for that. Thus, 
if we take into consideration the welfare of the child, the effect is ambiguous. Both 
studies consider the US economy, where parental leave is unpaid. Paid parental 
leave would lead to a higher degree of insurance within the family because income 
smoothing may happen without cutting time devoted to childcare. 
Public childcare addresses the asymmetry in childcare burden. Doepke and 
Kinderman (2019) show that the fertility level across countries increases with the 
fraction of the childcare burden taken by fathers. Using a quantitative model of 
household bargaining, they show that policies targeted to help mothers, i.e., public 
childcare, increases fertility level and welfare more effectively than nontargeted 
policies (e.g., direct child transfers). Childcare helps limit the depreciation of 
mothers' human capital. Guner et al. (2020) analyze public childcare in a model 
where human capital is a direct function of labor force participation. More 
affordable childcare relaxes time constraints and thus increases labor force 
participation. Hence human capital and welfare increase as well. 
The natural alternative to maternal childcare is grandparental care. The access to 
grandparents' help increases mothers' labor force participation (see e.g. Posadas 
and Vidal-Fernandez 2013; Yu et al. 2019). However, it not necessarily leads to 
an increase in women's income due to lower mobility (Garcia-Moran and Kuehn 
2017). There is also plenty of empirical evidence of the positive impact of formal 
childcare on child development (Currie and Thoms 1995; Boca et al. 2016b). 
The marketization of childcare is a more and more important alternative to 
informal and public childcare as the gender gap shrinks, and income inequality 
grow. The marketization of childcare help explains why over the last 40 years, the 
US total fertility rate has been rather stable, while female wages have continued 
to grow. Rising relative wages increase women's labor supply and, due to higher 
opportunity cost, lower fertility at first. However, it also leads to a reallocation 
of home production and childcare from women to men and a marketization of 
childcare, which counteracts the first-order effect (Siegel 2017). 
The marketization of childcare may also explain why highly educated women no 
longer have fewer children, contrary to a standard assumption of strictly negative 




there are three possible explanations: group composition, medical advantages, and 
marketization of home production, including childcare. As more women get an 
education, more highly educated women enter marriages and build a family. 
Medical improvement enables highly educated women to realize postponed 
fertility. Finally, women with high education can reduce the time spent on 
childcare and purchase more services as substitutes. Bar et al. (2018) propose  
a theoretical framework to formalize this intuition. They assume that parental time 
investment is necessary to raise a child. However, parental time may be substitute 
by paid childcare. Due to increment in income inequality, the relative price of 
childcare drop for high-income households. They showed that changes in 
inequality could quantitatively account for much of the changing relationship 
between mothers' education and fertility over time. 
Not only fertility and family policies shape the labor market decisions of parents, 
but also the labor market condition affects fertility decisions. Wage uncertainty is 
an essential channel of this interaction. Having a child is a long-term commitment; 
thus, more insecurity regarding future income implies lower intended fertility rate 
and longer postponement of first birth (Sommer 2016). 
Guner et al. (2019) study how uncertainty created by temporary and open-ended 
contracts combined with the inflexibility of work schedules reduces the fertility 
level of women with higher education. In a life-cycle model with endogenous 
fertility, endogenous labor, and skill formation, they show that reduction of the 
labor market duality and inflexibility of work schedules increase the completed 
fertility of college-educated from 1.52 to 1.88. Due to reform, women have more 
children and have them earlier. The labor force participation of women increases. 
The employment gap between mothers and non-mothers shrinks. Lopes (2019) 
use a similar setup to study the effect of the decline of job security in Portugal  
on fertility. She shows that job security is especially crucial at first birth.  
For subsequent birth decisions, the income effect is relatively more important. 
Another significant stream of literature analyzes the interaction between fertility 
and income risk on the aggregate level. On the one hand, wages decline observed 
during recessions lowers the cost of having a child in terms of foregone earnings. 
Thus, fertility may increase during the recession. On the other hand, the presence 
of the borrowing constraints makes poorer households unable to cover the 
consumption cost of an additional child (Papagni 2006, Filoso and Papagni 2015). 
The above mechanism may be reinforced by the "added- worker" effect and even 
further by the gender asymmetry within the industries (Coskun and Dalgic 2019). 
Empirical studies show fertility decline during the Great Recession (Matysiak et 
al. 2018), the Great Depression (Sobotka et al. 2011, Jones and Schoonbroodt 
2016), the fall of the Berlin Wall (Liepmann 2018), and post-communist countries 
(Billingsley 2010). It suggests that the economic constraints and uncertainty 
channel are more important than the lower opportunity cost of having a child. 
Lower fertility, due to labor market uncertainty, should concern social planer. The 
stochastic character of fertility (see Wolpin 1984; Hotz and Miller 1993), implies 
that the total number of children depends not only on couples' intentions but also 




too high or too low fertility as an outcome. Imperfect contraception, combined 
with income risk, may lead to unwanted pregnancies. Abortions are important 
fertility control mechanisms, especially when unplanned pregnancy coincides 
with unfavorable income realization (Choi 2017, Miller et al. 2020). Income 
shocks cause postponing birth. Taking into account the decline in fertility with 
women's age, it may lead to suboptimal fertility realization. Both IVF and 
abortions help to overcome the market's incompleteness in the aspect of fertility 
and to close the gap between the desired and the realized number of children. 
 
3. Human capital accumulation 
With family structure, two channels are affecting human capital accumulation of 
the young generation – characteristics of parents and parental investments. In light 
of rising inequality, one needs to realize that human capital investments are the 
vehicle for social mobility. Since education also generates positive externalities 
(e.g., peer group effect, exchange of ideas), there is also a strong inducement for 
governments to promote investments in human capital. Moreover, market 
imperfections distort private investment choices, making room for policy 
interventions. Since they are very costly, it is necessary to quantify their effects. 
There is extensive empirical literature on this subject (Acemoglu and Angrist 
2001; Krueger and Lindahl 2001; Heckman and Mosso 2014). 
The inability to finance human capital investments through financial markets (and 
because of their imperfections) is often listed as the leading cause of policy 
intervention (Keane and Wolpin 2001). However, in an excellent overview  
of human capital policies, Heckman and Carneiro (2003) estimated that "only 8% 
of American youth are credit constrained in the traditional usage of that term". 
Still, despite empirical skepticism towards intergenerational borrowing 
constraints hypothesis (Mulligan 1999; Heckman and Mosso 2014; Boca et al. 
2016a), the literature widely employed Becker and Tomes (1986) model for policy 
analysis. A key feature in their approach is that parents cannot borrow for human 
capital investments against the future income of their children. Recently, their 
two-period framework expands in a way that parents can invest in the human 
capital of their children along the multiple life stages, which is also in line with 
empirical result (Cuhna et al. 2006).  
Challenging previous findings, Caucutt and Lochner (2019) investigate the role of 
borrowing constraints in a life-cycle model with two stages of human capital 
investments. Later on, they extend the analysis into a dynastic framework.  
To provide a tool for quantitative analysis, they equipped their model with 
earnings shocks that allow wages to variate within education classes. Also, their 
borrowing constraints depend positively on the future human capital of an 
individual. They find that almost half of the young parents and 12% of old parents 
face borrowing constraints. Increasing the borrowing limit of the young parents 
by only half of the average monthly income improves early human capital 
investments by 11% and college graduation rates by 10%. These effects are more 
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significant for college-educated parents because they are the ones facing credit 
constraints for offspring's human capital investments. 
Koeniger and Prat (2018) combined both characteristics of parents and parental 
investments with a parental decision on bequests. They employ a dynastic model 
featuring hidden stochastic abilities and ex ante heterogeneous productivity 
persistent across generations. First, they find that parental human capital 
investments should be decreasing in bequests. It stems from the fact that receiving 
inheritance translates to the increase in wealth and hence to the decrease in labor 
force participation (see also Holtz-Eakin et al. 1993). Second, because the abilities 
of children are positively correlated with parental earnings, publicly provided 
human capital investments should be increasing in parental labor income and 
decreasing in their wealth. Third, the optimal policy is to tax bequests and 
subsidize human capital accumulation. The risky human capital investments and 
hidden abilities of children are the driving force of this result. The study also 
provides a compelling argument in the discussion about the persistence 
of earnings across generations. According to the paper, the intergenerational 
earnings elasticity observed in data is close to the social optimum. 
4. Inequality and taxes
The importance of inherited wealth and parental background has recently attracted 
much attention in the academic literature (Boserup et al. 2018; Abott et al. 2019; 
Fogli and Guerrieri 2019). With the development of finite-horizon models,  
it becomes possible to study intergenerational interactions in the macroeconomic 
framework – for example, in the context of taxation and other policies supporting 
equity. Even though the intergenerational mobility seems to be stable over the last 
decades (Chetty et al. 2014), with rising inequality providing the equality 
of opportunities assumes growing importance.  
A standard approach in taxation literature is to judge against two criteria of equity 
and efficiency. While equity is hard to measure and its evaluation requires 
explicitly defined criteria, the efficiency indicate minimizing distortions  
to economic output. Until recently, Chamley (1986) and Judd's (1985) result 
suggested optimality of zero capital income tax rate (ergo taxation on wealth, 
bequests, or any accumulated factor). It stems from the fact that tax on capital 
income generates distortion on intertemporal choices. However, Straub and 
Werning (2020) show that when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less 
than or equal to one, the long-run optimal tax rate is positive. For elasticity higher 
than one, the tax rate converges to zero, but it might stick to positive values for 
ages before so. They were not the first ones to challenge the zero tax rate result 
(Piketty and Saez 2013). By relaxing assumptions about the model, i.e., accounting 
for idiosyncratic labor income shocks (Krueger and Ludwig 2018) or accidental 
bequests (Blumkin and Sadka 2004), the result of untaxing capital can be overturned. 
Intergenerational transfers can take the form of passing estates, inheritance, 
accidental bequests, and inter vivos (during lifetime) gifts. All of them might 




be (Kopczuk 2013; Piketty and Saez 2013; Saez and Stantcheva 2018). The 
rationale behind it is that taxes on transfers are highly progressive, and they level 
the wealth concentration. Koeniger and Prat (2018) find that at the social 
optimum, the wedge for human capital is much lower than the wedge for bequests. 
Hence, human capital investments are often subsidized, whereas bequests should be 
universally taxed. However, there was no agreement on this matter for a long time.  
To understand those conflicting results, one should focus on model choices that 
drive the differences. Curiously enough, the motivations behind bequeathal 
decisions are also crucial in determining the efficiency of taxation (Gale et al. 
2001; Cremer and Pestieau 2006). 
Becker and Tomes (1979), followed by Davies (1986), show that in dynastic 
framework with idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks, the rise in estate tax 
increases long-run inequality and deteriorates welfare. They model pure dynastic 
altruism and, in their setup income of subsequent generations, directly enter the 
utility function of the current generation. This model choice causes two 
amplifying effects. Firstly, the higher the taxes on bequests, the lower the 
averaging labor productivity luck in a lineage. This inheritance effect alters "how 
much luck" is passed from the previous generation on to the present and 
consequently changes current income. Secondly, the rise in taxes leads to a drop 
in government revenues through redistribution effect. As a result, the lump-sum 
transfer from the government to households is lower, causing inequality to 
increase. However, the direction of the redistribution effect changes with the 
employed utility function.  
Under the warm-glow or joy-of-giving motive, bequest taxation has an equalizing 
effect. In this setup, bequest enters the utility function as a consumption 
expenditure in the last period of life. Further, with Cobb-Douglas preferences, 
taxation is neutral to average wealth and thus, by lowering the variance  
of bequests, indicates lower wealth inequality. As proved by Bossman et al. 
(2007), followingly by Wan and Zhu (2019), the redistribution effect dominates 
the inheritance effect. Redistribution reduces the variance of wealth while keeping 
the average wealth constant and consequently decrease the inequality, measured 
not only as a coefficient of variation but also as the Gini coefficient. This result 
also holds for different forms of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility 
function (Heer 2001; De Nardi and Yang 2016).  
As pointed out by Cremer and Pestieau (2006), there are two primary ways to tax 
intergenerational wealth transfers – with the estate and inheritance taxation. What 
is worth emphasizing, both taxes can implement the optimal allocation, but we 
refrain from a detailed review on this topic. However, drawing from the literature 
on optimality, one should stress that from a policy perspective, the inheritance tax 
is preferable. Firstly, the optimal formula of bequest taxation depends much not 
only on the magnitude of inheritance but also on the behavioral response of future 
generations (Piketty and Saez 2013). Hence, it seems reasonable to impose a tax 
on the donee rather than the donor (Kopczuk 2013). Secondly, when allowing for 
household heterogeneity in the number of children, it is not possible to derive 
optimal estate tax formula independent of the family size (Fahri and Werning 
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2010). At the same time, there exists the inheritance tax that implements the 
optimal allocation. Furthermore, when heterogenous households treat their 
children unequal with their share in a bequest, a social optimum may require 
progressive inheritance taxation rather than estate taxation that is calculated on 
the aggregate (Cremer et al. 2011). Nevertheless, the existing wealth transfers 
taxation schemes are very far from the optimal formulas derived in the literature. 
For more details on optimality, see Chari and Kehoe (1999), Golosov et al. (2003), 
Kocherlakota (2005), Fahri and Werning (2010), Piketty and Saez (2013) and 
Stantcheva (2020).  
By incorporating family structure into macroeconomics models, it becomes 
possible to study another aspect of taxation – separate versus joint taxation.  
With separate household taxation, each earner's marginal tax rate increases only 
in his own income; in systems of joint taxation, one earner's marginal tax rate 
increases not only in his own income but also in the income of someone else. Thus, 
it heavily influences the labor supply within the household, and consequently 
partially explains gender differences in labor force participation (Apps and Rees 
2004; Kaygusuz 2010; Guner et al. 2012; Guner et al. 2014; Bick and Fuchs-
Schündeln 2017; Borella et al. 2019). Moreover, it is also significant from the 
perspective of optimality. Wu and Krueger (2020) demonstrate that when 
accounting for joint taxation and idiosyncratic wage shocks, the optimal degree of 
tax progressivity is substantially lower than what suggest one-earner models.  
It stems from the fact that in one-earner models, the progressivity, precautionary 
savings, and social security are the only sources of insurance against idiosyncratic 
shocks. To capture this mechanism, one should account for endogenous labor, 
or alternatively residual, or binary labor supply for the secondary earner in two-
earner models.  
Using a model with binary labor supply for the secondary earner, Kleven et al. 
(2009) portray the household decision as a multi-dimensional screening problem. 
Brett (2007) and Cremer et al. (2012) also employed this approach. In their setup, 
the decision-makers are heterogeneous with respect to marital status, abilities, and 
taste for work. Those parameters are unobservable by the principal (government 
or tax authorities) who wants to maximize social welfare. Those studies build 
extensively on the literature solving one-dimensional screening problem in the 
spirit of Mirrlessian optimality (Apps and Rees 2011; Alesina et al. 2011). In fact, 
optimal taxation calls for negative jointness. It means that the tax rate on the 
secondary earner should be decreasing in the earnings of the primary worker.  
It results from a social planner's interest in redistribution from two-earner 
households to one-earner households with low primary earnings. Surprisingly, 
many tax-transfer schemes in Europe feature negative jointness, which is driven 
by many family-based governmental transfers (Kleven et al. 2009). However, 
reforms that lower the tax burden on the secondary earner in the household are 
welfare improving through the labor supply channel. 
The negative jointness as an optimal tax scheme also results from the study by Gayle 
and Shephard (2019). Their approach includes a marriage market equilibrium and 




Introducing joint versus separate taxation is welfare improving, but those gains  
are relatively small. However, the welfare gains are increasing as the gender wage gap 
is growing. 
 
5. Family and social security 
There are three main reasons why accounting for families is essential in the social 
security context: the design of the pension system, insurance within the family, 
and the pension-fertility link. 
First, family structure affects retirement incentives and, thus, decisions. Pension 
benefits design implies a high implicit tax and discourages the labor supply of the 
secondary earner. Borella et al. (2019) show that elimination of survivor benefits 
and spousal pension would increase labor force participation of married women 
by 10-20 percentage points. A similar magnitude of labor force reaction has been 
presented by Guner et al. (2012). Sánchez-Marcos and Bethencourt (2018) 
replicate those results in a model that accounts for human capital loss due to 
nonparticipation. Groneck and Wallenius (2019) and Kaygusuz (2015) use  
a simpler model with a less elastic labor supply. They account for a 6% increase 
in women labor force supply due to the elimination of the family dependent 
components. Nishiyama (2019) shows that labor market effects are much smaller 
if one accounts for utility from home production. Survivor benefits and spousal 
pension imply redistribution mostly to single-earner married households and thus 
favor married women over singles — such redistribution calls welfare concerns in the 
context of the rising share of single mothers. In all of the mentioned papers, 
elimination of family dependent components of the pension system increases welfare. 
The design of pension benefits also leads to coordination in couple’s retirement 
decisions, see Coile (2004), and Casanova (2010) for the US. However, couples 
use to retire together, even if the pension system does not generate such strong 
incentives as US spousal pension, see Hospido and Zamarro (2014). The potential 
reason may be couples' preferences, namely leisure complementarities between 
spouses and assortative mating. If couples enjoy spending leisure time together, 
the marginal utility of retirement would be higher if the spouse is already retired. 
Similarities in preference for leisure can explain retirement at a similar time. 
Michaud et al. (2019) show evidence of complementarities in partners' leisure and 
a positive correlation between partners' labor supply preferences. However, the 
first channel dominates. Even if the reason behind joint retirement is not well 
understood yet, the spillover effects of pension system reform are huge and cannot 
be ignored. For example, Coile (2004) finds that the omission of spillover effects 
biases the estimated effect of policies aimed to enhance longer labor force 
participation by 13% to 20%. Thus, there is a need to replace the individual model 
of retirement by a collective model of multi-person households while studying 
pension system reform.  
Second, the family helps mitigate wage risk. When negative income shock 
realized, a single individual can adjust their labor and savings. For individuals 
living in couples, there is an additional channel of insurance; namely, the labor 
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supply of both partners can be adjusted. De Nardi et al. (2019) show that in 
the US, family insurance plays a more critical role than the one offered by the 
government. On the other hand, in countries with more generous welfare states 
like the Netherlands, family insurance was "crowded-out" by government transfer. 
Nakabayashi (2019) proposes a model to explain the differences in the size of 
government support across nations. A more extended welfare state is likely to be 
chosen in civil law countries, like Germany or Japan, whose family law arranges 
a higher duty of support within the family. Thus, government insurance is higher 
in countries that use to have a high level of family insurance. 
Family and government insurance works differently for different income levels of 
individuals. Income risk is the highest for impoverished and wealthy households, 
i.e., the first and the last decile of earnings. The common pattern across countries
is that family risk-sharing plays a more prominent role for high-income 
individuals, and government insurance is mostly addressed to poor households, 
see De Nardi et al. (2019). However, even after government transfer, in the US, 
the standard deviation of income remains the highest among the first decile of 
earners. Those households are also more likely to be run by a single individual  
(or single parent) and thus have limited access to family insurance, see Watson 
and McLanahan (2011) and Schneider et al. (2019). 
Third, there is plenty of cross-country evidence that fertility level is negatively 
correlated with the size of pension system. The observed pattern is in line with the 
Boldrin and Jones' (2002) model of fertility decisions. In contrast to Barro and 
Becker's (1989) model where children are a consumption good, Boldrin and Jones 
(2002) assume that children serve investment purposes and ensure parental 
consumption in the after-work periods. As the size of the old-age support offered 
by the government increases, the incentives to have children shrink. Boldrin et al. 
(2015) show that the size of the pension system accounts for 55-65% of the 
observed difference in the US-Europe fertility rate. Fenge and Scheubel (2017) 
use the introduction of Bismarck's pension system and show the negative impact 
of public pensions on fertility. Billari and Galasso (2014), based on the pension 
benefits cut in 90-ties in Italy, show that even in modern societies, investment 
motive prevails, and benefits cut implies a rise in fertility rate. 
The fertility rate is not only lower but also too low in the presence of the pension 
system. Schoonbroot and Tertilt (2014) show that the lack of property rights for 
children's future income implies too low child-related investment. The public 
pension system operating on a PAYG basis offers a contract between parents and 
unborn children and forces born children to support retireed parents, thus 
complete the market. However, the standard PAYG pension system links the 
aggregate income of future generations, therefore the average fertility rate, with 
the pension benefits on today's parents. Hence children generate private cost and 
public benefits. Fenge and Meier (2009) and Fenge and von Weizsäcker (2010) 
show that the socially optimal fertility rate may be obtained by the mix of standard 
PAYG system and individual fertility-related pensions. Child-related subsidies 
may achieve the same allocation as a fertility-related pension (see Fenge and 
Meier 2009). Cremer et al. (2011) show that if endogenous human capital 
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accumulation is taken into account, one should consider subsidy education and 
tax the number of children. 
6. Conclusion and avenues for further research
The growing stream of macroeconomic literature acknowledges that the 
interactions within the family are vital in explaining many economic regularities. 
We propose a systematic review of this literature in the context of inequality 
and taxes, human capital accumulation, social security, labor force participation, 
and fertility choice. We concentrate on externalities and market failures that 
appear or escalate when one accounts for interaction within the family. We discuss 
the policy recommendations addressing these externalities and market failures. 
We put special attention to the welfare effect and critical elements of the models' that 
drive the results. Hence, we present a method guideline valuable for future research. 
Incorporating recent advances in empirical work on human capital accumulation 
is a major challenge for family economics. First, the literature neglects the 
interactions between siblings in family structure and different parental preferences 
towards children, depending on birth order or gender. Second, there is usually 
a complementarity in the accumulation of human capital in different stages of life. 
However, empirically, this is not the case. Even though the life-cycle models 
capture well the ongoing process of acquiring human capital, the early investments 
prove to be the most effective. Third, empirical literature stands clearly that 
income risk affects not only fertility decisions but also human capital investment. 
Since low-income individuals face high volatility of income, it would be to useful 
account for that feature in the context of social mobility. Lastly, in the vast 
majority of papers, the fertility is exogenous. However, the interactions between 
fertility timing and human capital investments are distinct. Investing in the quality 
of a child takes time and money – resources constrained for young parents. With 
fertility rates dropping below replacement rates, the analysis of policies in this 
framework may be crucial. 
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1. Introduction
Equality is treated as one of the effects of welfare state (Golinowska 2018,  
pp. 22-23) and at the same time as the key category of welfare economics (Blake 
2006, p. 3, 171ff.). Equality is considered in connection with distributive justice1, 
taking into account both normative (distributive justice defined through equality) 
and positive relations (distributive justice results in equality in a given area) 
between these two categories (Szarfenberg 2008, p. 71). Hence, equality is a relevant 
criterion in defining, operationalisation, implementation, control and assessment 
of social policy (Schmähl 2009, p. 122; Szumlicz 2015, p. 14).  
Analysis of the literature on the subject of equality in social policy shows an 
important cognitive weakness: the concept is seldom conceptualised and particularly 
rarely operationalised (Österle 2002, p. 46). At the same time, in literature on pensions 
we can observe remarkable chaos in terminology concerning equality. It is also 
characteristic that both researchers and decision-makers, when referring to pension 
provisions, usually cite distributive justice in its default sense, while literature 
mentions numerous definitions thereof.  
Equality as a principle of distributive justice in the pension system is usually 
referred to in two contexts: either as a constraint on or the goal of pension reforms 
(Howse 2007). In the former case, justice referred to equality is a criterion on the 
basis of which the character of proposed reforms is analysed, evaluated and 
selected.  It is assumed at the same time that their implementation cannot infringe 
justice in the pension system (e.g. excessively burden the generations which are 
financing the provisions), without explicitly defining the set of its qualities 
(referents/denotations). In the latter case, when justice is the goal of the reform and 
the premise of the changes undertaken in the pension policy, the reform is aimed at 
achieving defined referents of justice in the pension system (e.g. achieving inter-
generational justice). 
1 Distributive (allocative) justice refers to “distribution of something that people cannot 
provide to themselves sufficiently compared to their needs or demands” (Rysz-





Pension system is one of the most important institutional platforms for the fulfilment 
of distributive justice principle. The base pension provision (i.e. common, obligatory, 
state-initiated and often state-delivered), which primarily amounts to the volume of 
collected and transferred financial means, constitutes a significant area for distributive 
justice to take place.  
Equality in the pension system is usually taken into consideration in the description 
and assessment of pension systems. For instance, in the open method of co-
ordination of the EU pension systems equality is indicated directly as the aim of 
modernisation and indirectly in the context of adequacy (e.g. the level of replacement 
rate) and financial stability of pension systems (Żukowski 2010; Chybalski 2012, 
p. 79ff.). The World Bank approaches equality as one of the six criteria of pension 
systems assessment (Holzmann et al. 2008, p. 8ff.). It’s worth noting that intra-
generational equality in pension systems is by far less frequently analysed (Kohli 
2008, p. 196).  
Equality in the context of gender, understood as formally identified equal rights 
and treatment of both men and women is a crucial premise in the EU legislation 
and activities (Śledzińska-Simon 2011). Research of pension systems from the 
point of view of gender equality encompasses mainly regulations and the benefit 
levels for men and women. The regulations refer to formal equality and are 
directed at the analyses of pension regulations in terms of the access to the 
provision and its amount. The latter are concentrated on the impact of regulations 
on actual access to a pension system and on estimation of provision amounts for 
men and women considering their differing biographies.   
The concern with analysis and especially evaluation of pension systems from the 
gender perspective is important for several reasons. Firstly, it stems from the 
increase in female activity on the labour market, especially starting from the 60’s 
of the twentieth century. Obtaining income from labour leads to individual 
pension entitlements in pension systems and this in turn inspires research of 
pension level differences between genders (Jefferson 2009; James 2011). Secondly, 
changes in the family model including a limited occurrence of the single 
breadwinner model seem to question the traditional forms of pension security for 
women based on derived entitlement in the form of a survivor’s benefit. Thirdly, 
pension reforms conducted in various countries are clearly directed at strengthening 
equivalence of the contribution and the pension, which has an adverse effect on 
pension amount received by females. This is caused by unstable or interrupted 
careers on the labour market as well as differentiation between retirement ages of 
men and women in some of the countries. 
The aim of the article is to operationalize equity with regard to one of the equity 
dimensions, i.e. the equity of desert within a generation in the pension system. In the 
next step the intergenerational (in)equity between women and men in the Polish 
(obligatory) pension system will be identified. The calculations will focus on the 
results of the descriptive microsimulation model, which bases on the female and 
male biographies and pension outcomes received from the new pension system. 
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2. Equality of desert – definition
The studies of literature and analyses of the available research findings indicate 
clearly that the category of equality is a key instrumental value of social policy 
and it determines another value, which is distributive justice. In the course of the 
research I assumed that the relations between these two categories are both 
conceptual and normative in character. A conceptual relation may be considered 
at least in two aspects (Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1. Conceptual relations between justice and equality 
Source: author’s own work. 
Firstly, equality may be understood as a principle which determines operation  
of other principles („the principle’s principle”, meta-principle) and understood 
as undiscriminating (treating equally) for all the subjects belonging to the given 
category. Secondly, equality refers to the criteria (distribution principles) which 
are implemented in (re)distribution of limited goods. In the adopted approach, 
equality is not limited to just one distribution principle i.e. equality of situation 
which leads to a narrowly taken egalitarianism. I have assumed that there is a set 
of distribution principles consisting of five criteria: desert, situation, needs, access 
and opportunities.  
The relation between equality and distributive justice may be normative in character. 
In such case the factual condition is the subject of description and evaluation from the 
point of view of an equality principle or a bundle of equality principles. Hence,  
a discovered inequality (as opposed to diversity or differentiation) may become the 
premise for activities directed at its limitation or even abolition.  
It should be emphasised that the paper discusses the subject of real equality (referred 




other things, to organise research findings on various aspects of equality which 
are / can be referred to as equality dimensions. In research so far, one could use 
three equality dimensions i.e. (1) a subjective one, giving the answer to the 
question who is the subject of equality, (2) an objective one, answering the question 
what is the object of equality and (3) a dimension of distribution principles, answering 
the question of how/on the basis of what / which? equality criterion a given good 
is distributed. I have used two additional criteria, which are: (4) the time 
dimension which answers the question when equality is examined and (5) the 
space dimension, which answers the question in which area of pension provision 
and where equality is examined. As a result, I have developed an original five-
dimensional matrix of equality dimensions (who? what? how? when? where?) and 
a set of features of these dimensions (denotations) with reference to the base 
pension provision (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Multidimensional approach to equality in a pension system 
Source: author’s own work. 
 
In this paper a real equality of pension provision between women and men in the 
first year of their receiving obligatory pension, which is distributed according to 
the principle of desert is used. 
Desert is an ambiguous term and it is sometimes used as a synonym for the term 
merit. However, “merit is a broader concept, the genus of which the desert is the 
species” (Pojman 1999, p. 86). Merit results from any feature or quality of a subject 
which is a base for the positive or negative (demerit) attribution of that subject 
even if the treatment is not undeserved. Desert is connected with the positive 




responsibility of subject for his or her action. The question remains, what is treated 
as a merit and for what is the individual subject responsible, so what is the desert 
exactly? Is the desert only the result of the action or should the effort be also taken 
into consideration? Furthermore, there is a question of how the desert should be 
transferred into the distribution of desired good. 
In the pension system, the term desert is noted twofold: (1) as an input into the 
pension system and (2) as a position.   
An input covers both financial and non-financial input. The first one is associated 
with a pension contribution, which is paid in the pension system (fund) directly, 
mostly on a base of individual earnings. As a result the final individual pension 
entitlements should reflect the previous pension contributions proportionally. It is 
also called individual pension equivalence, which means individual actuarial 
pensions (Disney 2006, p. 269). Pension reforms introduced in the last decades 
were at least partly aimed at individualization of pension entitlements and 
followed the individual pension equivalence (Holzmann 2013).2 The non-financial 
input is associated with the activities conducted in the private sphere. The decision 
about which of those activities are treated as an input into the pension system and 
how they are transferred into individual pension entitlements is a normative issue. 
There has been e.g. a criterion of positive external effects used, which are 
generated by the individual, family, generation or sex (Leisering 2004, p. 16 and 
f.). For the evaluation of the private activity in the pension system it is important, 
if an activity was performed instead of a paid-work or not. In other words, there 
is a question of a trade-off between paid and unpaid work or between financial 
and non-financial input into the pension system. If an unpaid activity (e.g. care) is 
done in a place of paid work, this activity can be evaluated on the basis of non-
performed paid work. It means that the individual pension entitlements refer to 
the level of contributions, which would be transferred to the pension system if the 
paid work was not stopped by the private activity. It is in line with the idea of 
pension insurance, which is a selective one and covers employed workers. The 
other approach is to treat the private activity (e.g. care) as  non-financial input 
even if the paid work is performed simultaneously. In this case the non-financial 
input is treated as a per se input into the pension system. Evaluation of such input 
can refer to the value of the positive external effects or increase in the GDP 
(Döring 1998, p. 2018). 
Position is treated in the pension system merely as a professional one and 
identified with a (public) service. There is an assumption that the service also 
involves the pension retirement phase and the old-age security is a part of the 
salary in a broader sense. Because of this a DB pension formula is very often used. 
From that point of view, the term ‘position’ in the pension system can be treated 
as a part of specific desert (Raphael 2003, p. 172; following Šimo 2009, p. 70).  
                                                            
2 It is true that individualization of the pension entitlements often follows the shift towards 
a private pension system, but the DC pension formula was also introduced without 
movement towards funding (Moshe and Ratajczak 2020). 
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3. Equality of desert – operationalization
In the operationalization of the equality of desert only the financial and non-
financial input is considered. Financial input refers to the individual contributions. 
In the pension systems which receive state subsidies (like in Poland), individual 
share of those subsidies could also be taken into consideration and counted as 
financial input. However, there are at least three difficulties in doing it: a) the 
amount of subsidy has been various in different years, b) the subsidy is covered 
by diverse tax revenues paid by the group which differs from the group of pension 
contribution payers, c) the contribution payers/ insured people pay different taxes. 
The non-financial input covers non-paid activities, which are recognized in the 
pension system and which increase the individual pension level. In this paper the 
non-paid activities include all care periods, for which pension contributions are 
paid by the third subject, e.g. the state. In Poland it includes especially (Ratajczak 
2019, pp. 83-86): (1) periods of maternity, parental, paternity and child care leave or 
long-term care for dependent children and (2) long-term care for dependent elders.   
The assessment of the relation between (financial and non-financial) input and 
output (pension provision) is related to actuarial equivalence. It is assumed, that: 
𝑃𝑉 𝑡 𝑃𝑉 𝑡  (1) 
where: 
𝑃𝑉 𝑡  – present value of the pension contributions of the n-contributor at the 
moment of retirement in the t-year, 
𝑃𝑉 𝑡  – present value of the n-beneficiary at the moment of retirement in the 
t-year. 
In the Polish pension system the present value of the pension contributions 
consists of the pension capital on the individual pension account and individual 
pension subaccount in the first pillar at the moment of retirement (at the moment 
of achieving the minimum retirement age).3 Because of that: 
𝑃𝑉 𝑡 𝐾 𝑡 𝐾 𝑡  (2) 
where: 
𝐾 𝑡  – pension capital on the individual account in the first payg pillar of the 
n-person at the moment of retirement in the t-year, 
𝐾 𝑡   – pension capital on the individual sub-account in the first payg pillar of 
the n-person at the moment of retirement in the t-year. 
The pension capital can be treated as a lump-sum contribution. From the actuarial 
point of view, pension payments are lifelong annuities, paid in advance (𝑎 , with 
a constant interest and payment: 
3 It was assumed, that there is no funded pillar and the total pension contribution is split 
between individual account and subaccount in the first, payg financed pension pillar. This 
assumption is justified, because the aim is to estimate the differences between sexes, so 
resigning from the funded pillar both for women and men should not influence the 
outcome of calculation. Furthermore, it could have some influence if the structure of 
women and men who belong to the first payg and second funded pillars differed, but there 
is no proper data concerning that issue. 
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𝑎 ∑ 𝑣 ∙ 𝑝  (3) 
where: 
x – age of the person who retires, 
𝜔 – top age limit (110 years old) of the person who retires, 
𝑣  – discount factor, 
𝑝  – probability of survival up to time k of a person at the age of x. 
It means, that: 
𝑃𝑉 𝑡 𝑎  ∙ 𝐸
 
𝑡 ∑ 𝑣 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝐸 𝑡  (4) 
where: 
𝐸𝑎𝑝 𝑡  – lifelong annuity of a males/females in the year t, 
𝑝  – sex (m – male, f – female).
For the calculation of the lifelong annuity uni-sex tables are used. It is consistent 
with the EU-recommendation. 
For the operationalization of the equality of desert a difference between the factual 
pension provision and lifelong annuity will be calculated. This difference will  
be called the indicator of pension equivalence 𝐸𝑒𝑝 𝑡  for the beneficiaries born in the 





∙ 100% (5) 
where: 
𝑝  – sex (m – male, f – female),
𝐸 𝑡   –  median of the pension provision of males/females born in the year t, 
𝐸𝑎𝑝 𝑡   –  median of the annuities of males/females born in the year t. 
As it was mentioned above, a decision about what is the non-financial input and how 
it is transferred into the pension entitlements is a normative one. In the next step of 
operationalization of the equality of desert the following assumption is made: every 
activity which is considered a non-financial input will be evaluated with the 
contribution calculated on the basis of the paid work. It means that the contribution 
base for every non-financial input will be the monthly salary (the average wage by 
sex and age). In the case of the Polish pension system the mentioned leaves because 
of child care or dependents as well as the non-activity periods caused by delivering 
care will be taken into consideration. As a result, the corrected indicator of pension 
equivalence 𝑆𝐸
 
𝑡  is proposed and calculated as following: 
𝑆𝐸
 
𝑡  ∙ 100% (6) 
where: 
𝑝 – sex (m – male, f – female),
𝐸 𝑡   – median of the pension provision of males/females born in the year t, 
𝐸′𝑎𝑝 𝑡  – median of the annuities of males/females born in the year t for the corrected 




The present value of the contributions for the corrected contribution base for the 
care periods 𝑃𝑉′ 𝑡  is calculated as: 
𝑃𝑉′ 𝑡 𝐾 ′ 𝑡 𝐾 ′ 𝑡     (8) 
where: 
𝐾 ′ 𝑡  – pension capital on an individual account in the first payg pillar of the n-
person at the moment of retirement in the t-year for the corrected 
contribution base for the care periods, 
𝐾 ′ 𝑡  – pension capital on an individual subaccount in the first payg pillar of the 
n-person at the moment of retirement in the t-year for the corrected 
contribution base for the care periods. 
The annuity for the corrected contribution base for the care periods 𝐸
 
𝑡  for 
women or men born in the year t will be calculated according to (4) and by 
consideration of the lump-sum net contribution.  
The indicator of the equality of desert is calculated as a weighted average mean of the 
difference in the indicator of pension equivalence according to gender 𝑅𝐸
 
𝑡  and the 
difference in the corrected indicator of pension equivalence according to gender 
𝑅𝑆𝐸
 
𝑡 , when the weight of both partial indicators amounts to 50%. 
 
4. Equality of desert in the Polish pension system 
Empirical analyses adopt a specially designed model which belongs to the 
category of micro-simulation descriptive models. The model makes it possible to 
obtain macro-aggregates of data (e.g. the median of female pension income) on 
the basis of projections of information about individuals (here – the participants 
of the pension system). Such models are applicable for studying redistributive 
effects of various policies (Bourguignon and Spadaro 2006; Żółtaszek 2013,  
p. 42ff.). It is worth emphasising that in Poland the microsimulation descriptive 
model has not been yet used for the analysis of the old age provision and  
the models which have been applied (SIMPL, EUROMOD sub-model and the 
Ministry of Finance model) are mainly connected with the subject of taxation and 
benefits. (Żółtaszek 2013, p. 8, 18ff.). Furthermore, the microsimulation method 
has only been partially used so far in pension system in Poland and mainly for 
estimation of inter-generational redistribution (e.g. Jablonowski and Müller 2013).   
The scope of the empirical study encompasses Poland and refers to a cohort aged 
18-25, affected by the new pension system of 1999 only and will reach retirement 
age in 2034-2046. While the estimates concerning the levels of provision were 
based on genuine data until the end of 2018, starting from 2019 simulations of 
career related and non-career related biographies have been absolutely necessary. 
A descriptive microsimulation model contained four modules: (1) earnings, (2) breaks 
in earnings (14 reasons for lack of earnings were distinguished); (3) family situation 
before reaching retirement age; (4) pension calculation. On these grounds, 
hypothetical individual biographies with annual frequency were generated, where the 
events affecting the value of the raised capital were selected at random. Each 
occurrence was modelled by means of categorical distribution, or for its possibly 
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exceptional case Bernoulli distribution. Probability for the distributions was 
calculated on the basis of authentic data. In total, I performed 20000 simulations for 
the cohorts born between 1974-1981 (more Ratajczak 2019, pp. 71-83).  
The regulations concerning the access to the obligatory pension system and pension 
provision (including minimum pension) as well as the pension calculations refer to 
2019. It was assumed, that the pension provision is acquired at the moment of 
achieving the minimum retirement age of 60 for women and 65 for men. 
For the measurement of the equality of desert in the pension system the pension 
provision covers both the individual pension and the survivor’s benefit. The reason 
for that is that the derived pension benefits constitute an important source of income, 
especially for older women (OECD 2018, pp. 233-254). 
The results of the calculation show that the median pension provision of male 
beneficiaries born in the years 1974-1981 is about 36 percent points lower than 
the median male actuarial annuity (Table 1). In the case of women the difference 
amounts to less than 4 percentage point, which means that their median pension 
provision only slightly differs from the actuarial one. When comparing the results 
between women and men it has to be stressed that there is an inequality against 
male beneficiaries and the level of this inequality (in percentage points) seems to 
be quite stable across all cohorts. 
Table 1. The indicator of pension equivalence 𝑬𝒆𝒑 𝒕  and the corrected indicator 
of pension equivalence 𝑺𝑬𝒆𝒑 𝒕  for beneficiaries born in the years 1974-1981 
Cohort 
born in 
the year t 
The indicator  
of pension 
equivalence 
𝐸 𝑡  (in pp) 
The difference 










𝑆𝐸 𝑡  (in pp) 






gender 𝑅𝑆𝐸  𝑡  
(in pp) male female male female
1974 –36,31 –3,58 –32,73 –37,34 –8,23 –29,11
1975 –35,98 0,00 –35,98 –36,68 –4,48 –32,20
1976 –36,29 –0,70 –35,59 –38,14 –6,10 –32,04
1977 –35,00 –0,32 –34,69 –35,81 –7,34 –28,47
1978 –35,70 –2,19 –33,51 –36,75 –7,40 –29,35
1979 –35,90 –2,29 –33,61 –36,86 –9,31 –27,54
1980 –35,49 –2,69 –32,80 –37,58 –8,84 –28,75
1981 –35,97 –1,43 –34,54 –36,64 –8,92 –27,72
Total –35,59 –3,83 –31,77 –37,62 –10,93 –26,69
Source: results of author’s own calculations based on the microsimulation model. 
If we assume that all periods of care for children and dependents (i.e. periods of 
maternity, parental, paternity and child care leave or long-term care) are evaluated 
for the pension provision as if  paid work was performed during the care and there 
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is no limitation for long-term care in treating those periods as contributory ones 
in the pension system4 the results show only a little difference for men. Their 
corrected indicator of pension equivalence increases by about 1-2 percentage 
points depending on the cohort. It is because care is mostly delivered by women. 
In their case the higher evaluation of care periods for pension provision causes 
their pension capital to increase by about 4-7 percent. Consequently, the median 
female ‘care corrected’ pension provision is lower than their actuarial annuity by 
about 11 percentage points. 
As a result the indicator of equality of desert in the obligatory pension system 
amounts to 29 percentage points and according to the partial indicators is negative 
(Fig. 2). It means that the inequality of desert is the male case and their median pension 
provision differs from the actuarial annuity much more than the female one. 
Fig. 3. The indicator of equality of desert (in pp) in the Polish pension system 
according to gender for the beneficiaries born in the years 1964-1981 
Source: results of author’s own calculations based on the microsimulation model. 
5. Conclusions
It has been stressed that what has been measured is the level of inequality of desert 
in the pension system between women and men only. It means that the main focus 
is on is the difference between sexes and not the absolute level of various indicators. 
Secondly, the purpose of the paper was to operationalize and estimate the equality of 
desert and not to ask why some pension regulations were introduced. 
The pension reform of 1999 was aimed at strengthening the link between 
individual contributions and pension provisions and following the justice 
understood as an equality of desert. To achieve this goal the defined contribution 
pension formula has been introduced. In this paper the desert was defined as both 
4 If the contributions for long-term care were paid in the Polish obligatory pension system, 
they are limited up to the period required for acquiring the minimum pension (20 insurance 
period for women and 25 for men). 
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financial and non-financial input into the pension system, which differs from the 
previous research. Furthermore, the pension provision from the obligatory pension 
system was simulated on the basis of real biographical data and not given 
biography scenarios.  
The results of this research show that there is a large inequality of desert in the 
obligatory pension system in Poland. It seems to contradict the leading principle 
of individual equivalence.5 This inequality is especially to men’s disadvantage. 
The reasons for this situation can be a field of further research. One of the 
explanations could be the establishment of a minimum pension from which 
women benefit more often than men.  Furthermore, the interest rate taken for the 
calculation plays a role, too.6 Lower interest rate (for a given cohort and 
mandatory retirement age) increases lump sum contribution needed for a given 
level of pension provision and consequently lead to lower annuities. As a result, 
if the lower interest rate was taken for the calculations, inequality drops down or 
even reverses. On the other hand, the spotlight  in this research is on the difference 
in equality between women and men. The assumed interest rate is the same for 
both sexes, so it should be less important for the results. Another issue is that uni-
sex tables lead to higher life expectancy for men and lower for women than in the 
case of single-sex tables. However, this factor does not seem to be crucial (Malec 
2017) especially, because uni-sex tables were consistently applied both in the 
calculations of pension provision and annuities. 
It has to be stressed, that higher evaluation of non-paid care input into the pension 
system causes reduction of the inequality by about 5 percent points. Therefore a 
question arises about the possible recommendation of this approach for policy 
making sake. However, these recommendations should follow the decision 
concerning the desired direction of achieving equality of desert (if we assume it 
as a goal at all): should it be achieved by reduction of non-paid work rewarded in 
the pension system or its evaluation for the pension purposes (which will lead to 
higher inequality indicators among women) or should we broaden the non-
financial input into the pension system by rewarding activities which are much 
more typical for men than for women (which will lead to lower inequality among 
men)? This normative question, however, goes far beyond the scope of this paper. 
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1. Objectives and methodology of this study
The objective of this paper is to describe the gender gap in the contributive 
retirement pensions in Spain and to analyze the impact of the maternity 
supplement in this gap. This is done through an empiric study using data from the 
Continuous Working Life Sample (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales or 
MCVL in Spanish) corresponding to the year 2017. 
The MCVL is a tool provided to the researchers by the Spanish Social Security 
institution. The sample gathers the whole working life of people having any kind 
of relationship with the Social Security (i.e. active, unemployed subsidized or 
pensioners). Dada is taken from a 4% of the population in the files of the Social 
Security. With this size, the results taken from the MCVL are representative  
at country level. The estimates for the whole population result from applying  
a weighting factor of 25. 
The analytical unit in this study is the “individual pensioner” getting a retirement 
contributive pension from the Social Security, even though they may 
simultaneously have more than one contributive pension, usually a pair 
“retirement pension and widowhood pension”, but also two retirement pensions 
from different regimes, like the general and the self-employed workers. The 
methodology used here differs from what is common in other studies, like the 
Social Security statistics and others, where the analytical units are the pensions. 
The population observed in this study is that of the pensioners having obtained 
a retirement pension during the year 2017 and still receiving it in December that 
year. Pensioners from all the Social Security regimes are included (general, self-
employed and other special regimes). Anyhow, people in particular circumstances 
are excluded; these are the pensioners receiving part of their pension from abroad 
–the Spanish part available from the sample does not show the total amount of
their pension–, pensions linked to “survivor pensions” and those receiving the so 
called “SOVI pensions” which comes from an extinct social protection regime. 
1.1. The “new retirement pensioners” in 2017 
The retirement pension amount for the “new” pensioners tends to be higher than 
that received by previous year’s retirees. This results from both the salary increase 
tendency and the greater proportion of qualified jobs. However, the pensions 
DOI: 10.34658/9788366287938.8
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reforms undertaken in 2011 and 2013 did cut back the salary increase effect –more 
years are used to calculate the regulatory base of the pension and one needs more 
contribution years to obtain the maximum pension. 
The figures obtained at the end of 2017 in the Social Security show a total of 
252,650 “new pensioners with retirement pension”, 60.8% of these are men and 
39.2% are women. The percentage of new pensioners having, concurrently,  
a retirement and a widowhood pension is a 5.48%, but the proportion is higher for 
women, with a percentage of 11.3% meanwhile in men is 1.7%  see Table 1). 
Table 1. Percentage of pensioners by group of pensions 
Males Females  Total 
Number of new retirement 
pensioners in 2017 
153,650 99,000 252,650 
% having only retirement pensions 98.26% 88.71% 94.52% 
% having both retirement, widowhood 
pensions 
1.74% 11.29% 5.48% 
Source: Author's development based on data from MCVL 2017. 
1.2. Some economical magnitudes of the “new” retirement pensions 
The difference between the average pension of men and that of women is quite 
significant. The median pension highlights its imbalance. While 50% of men 
receive a pension equal o lower to 1,410 euro per month, 50% of women receive 
a pension equal o lower to 1,021 euro per month. Figure 1 shows the pensions 
difference between men and women in all the population deciles. They become 
equal on the higher stretch because the Spanish regulation establishes a maximum 
limit to the pension amount an individual can receive. The limit for 2017 was 
2,573.70 euro per month. 
Fig. 1. Total pension amount percentiles. New retirement pensioners in 2017 
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2. The gender gap in the contributive pensions
Some reports evidence persistent differences between levels of pension income to 
men and women in all EU countries (Bettio et al. 2012). This results from past 
developments on the labor market and changes in the pension systems. Both areas 
have seen significant changes in recent years. The number of women active on the 
labor market has increased, so they now contribute proportionately more towards 
their future pensions. Reduction in the ratio between pensions and wages has often 
resulted from changes in the pension systems, frequently targeting an improved 
fiscal sustainability of pensions. Many countries have also introduced closer 
correspondence between lifetime earnings and pension entitlement. This means 
that labor market differences, particularly between men and women, are 
accentuated into pension differences. 
2.1. The gender gap in Spain 
The gender gap in pensions mainly results from differences on the labor market 
and the educational levels in the past and the present. Life-long accumulation of 
pay inequalities converts into a pension gap and women’s poverty in old age. 
Spain is the ninth country in the European Union where the gender gap in 
retirement pensions is more accentuated. Table 2 shows that, in 2017, its gender 
gap for the contributive pensions as a whole is above the mean of the EU countries. 
Also, the decreasing tendency observed until then turns into an increase in 2018, 
which puts the Spanish pensions gender gap over that of surrounding countries 
like France, Italy or Portugal. 
Table 2. Gender GAP in pensions. Total contributive pensions (age 65 or over) 
2015 2016 2017 2018 
European Union – 28 : -31.5% -30.8% -30.1% 
Spain -33.7% -32.5% -31.2% -32.4% 
France -34.1% -33.4% -31.6% -29.7% 
Italy -32.2% -32.5% -32.1% -32.0% 
Portugal -31.5% -31.2% -31.6% -31.4% 
Source: Eurostat. EU_SILC. Extracted 11-02-2020. 
2.2. The gender gap in the current retirement pensions 
A report by “Pensions Policy Institute” (Jethwa 2019, p.7) shows that most 
damage to women’s pension wealth is done while in their thirties – the general 
age when women are taking time off work to care for their families. 
The pensions of the women that retire nowadays show the consequences of the 
traditional “family” concept and the social policies effective when they were 
raising their children. The dominant ideology by then looked at the family like  
a economical unit where the man was the main monetary support while the role 
of the women was that of housewife and family carer (children, husband, parents, 
in-laws and other relatives). So, woman undertakes an “invisible” not paid social 




In the framework of the traditional family when a woman opted, or was obliged, 
to work, either because she had no family burdens or because she had to contribute 
to the family economy, her employer used to consider that she had to be in low 
responsibility and less important tasks (secretary, office assistant, switchboard 
operator), in a factory she had assigned routine and low paid works (labourer, 
weaver), in commerce she carried manual tasks (saleswoman, needlewoman, 
hairdresser) and in other professional fields, jobs not requiring higher studies, like 
nurse or teacher. Quite often, in order to combine housework with labor work, she 
took part-time or temporary jobs. Furthermore, in the sixties and seventies of the 
XX century “home working” boomed but as an invisible not declared work; many 
work hours poorly paid. 
By that time, many women did not contribute to the Social Security. Some 
returned to the labor market after the children upbringing period, but they had  
a shorter working period ahead. That’s why pensioner women usually have less 
years of contribution than men and lower pensions, as shown later. At the old age, 
women that did not contribute should live from her husband’s pension –economic 
dependency– unless they have other sufficient means. 
 
2.2.1. Inactivity rate evolution 
Table 3 shows inactivity rate data for some of the last century eighties-nineties, 
children raising period for the women currently retiring. It can be seen that women 
represent between 70% and 75% of the inactive population. In the specific 
housework inactivity cause, almost all of them are women. This is an evidence  
of the inequitable distribution of the domestic chores between both genders   
(see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Inactivity rate (age between 16 and 60) 
 Year Males Females Total Housework 
/General 
(%) 
 (*) (%) (%) (thousands) 
Housework inactive 
people 1982 
0.0% 100.0% 7,472.4 55.2% 
General inactive people 24.4% 75.6% 13,538.6   
Housework inactive 
people 1986 
0.0% 100.0% 7,145.5 49.3% 
General inactive people 27.1% 72.9% 14,496.1   
Housework inactive 
people 1990 
0.4% 99.6% 6,148.2 41.7% 
General inactive people 30.2% 69.8% 14,738.3   
 (*) 4th quarter data 
Source: Author's development based on data from the Spanish Statistical Institute (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística). 
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3. Gender pension gap in pensioners with retirement pensions
In this paper, the analysis unit is the “pensioner” who can receive one or more 
pensions. In most cases, pensioner receives one retirement pension but in other 
cases he/she could receive retirement and widowhood pensions at the same time. 
In order to analyze pensions gap, it is distinguished two terms: the theoretical 
pension and the total amount of pension. 
Theoretical pension is the pension earned by the person along years of 
contribution to the Social Security. It varies according to the number of years paid. 
Formula: Average bases of contributions x percentage of years. 
Total amount is the pension received by the pensioner. 
Formula: theoretical pension + supplements (+/-) pension caps + annual 
revaluations + especial increase for severe invalidity people. 
 Supplements. Minimums supplement and maternity supplement. The former is 
to guarantee a minimum amount of pension. The later is a “plus” to the female 
pensioners who have had two children or more. 
 Revaluation. It is an increase to compensate for the variation in the cost 
of living. 
3.1. GAPs of the pensioners with retirement pensions 
Table 4 shows the results of the different interpretations of the gender gap. 
 GAP in the theoretical retirement pension. The result is 27.61%. It means that 
women would receive on average 420 euro per month less than men. 
 GAP in the amount on retirement pension. “Only” pensioners with retirement 
pension. The result is 19.02%. It means that the effect of the supplements, as 
well as the ceiling on the amount of the pension, reduces the theoretical GAP 
by 8.6 percentage points. 
 GAP in the total amount of pension of pensioners with "concurrent" pensions. 
The resulting GAP is 14.82%. This means that pensioners with “concurrent” 
pensions reduce the GAP by 4.2 percentage points compared to those who only 
receive retirement pensions. Also, it means that the effect of the supplements, 
as well as the ceiling on the amount of the pension, reduces the theoretical GAP 
by 12.8 percentage points. 
 GAP in all pensioners with at least one retirement pension. The GAP in the 
total pensioners is 16.80%. If this GAP is compared with that of the 
“theoretical retirement pension”, it is observed that the set of measures used to 
increase or decrease the “theoretical pension” lowers the GAP by almost 11 




Table 4. Gender GAP in pensions. New retirement pensioners in 2017 
 Average pensions amount (monthly euros) 
  Males Females Total GAP 
Theoretical retirement pension 1,586 1,148 1,415 -27.61% 
  
People having only retirement 
pensions 
1,529 1,238 1,422 -19.02% 
People having both retirement, 
widowhood pensions 
1,855 1,580 1,633 -14.82% 
Total pensioners 1,535 1,277 1,434 -16.80% 
Source: Author's development based on data from MCVL 2017. 
 
4. Maternity supplement. Impact on gender retirement pensions gap 
The maternity supplement consists of a supplementary percentage (between 5 and 
15% of the pension) added to the women’s contributory pensions of retirement, 
permanent disability or widowhood if they have had two or more biological or 
adopted children. This measure started to apply in 2016. 
The Government justifies this measure "for the mission of contributing 
demographically to the Social Security system" but, in reality, the purpose is to 
reduce the gender gap in pensions. Spain is one of the countries with a gender gap 
above the average of the European Union. 
In the EU, only Cyprus and Lithuania have “pluses” that benefit only women. In 
most countries neutral mechanisms have been established to compensate for the 
time spent caring for children, although sometimes establish preferential clauses 
for women. For example, Germany, France, Italy, Czech Republic and Greece 
among others. (European Commission 2019). 
 
4.1. Number of beneficiaries and average monthly amount  
       of the maternity supplement 
The amount of the supplement is 5% when there are two children, 10% if there 
are three children and 15% if there are more than three children. In the event that 
the woman has two contributory pensions and one of them is that of retirement, 
the percentage is applied to it, and if neither of the two pensions is a retirement 
pension, it is applied to the most favorable pension. In the event that the amount 
of the pension plus the maternity supplement is greater than the "cap" of the 
pension, half of the amount exceeding is added. 
There were 316,989 women who received the supplement of maternity in 2017, 
figure that represents more than half of the women pensioners who became 
retirement pensioner of the Social Security in that year.  
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The average monthly amount of this supplement is 59.93 euros (57.76 euros 
according to Social Security Statistics). The distribution of pensioners according 
to the percentage applied is the one shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Maternity supplement. New retirement pensioners in 2017 
Type of supplement 




5% 60% 42.72 
10% 27% 78.38 
15% 12% 103.57 
TOTAL 59.93 
Source: Author's development based on data from MCVL 2017. 
4.2. Some controversial aspects on the retirement pensions 
“Maternity supplement” opens a debate about its opportunity and fairness. The 
main controversial aspects are outlined by some authors (Balaguer 2016; 
Montserrat 2015). 
 Family planning is not done thinking about the plus that the woman can receive 
after thirty or forty years when she retires, 
 The maternity supplement is contradictory to the objective defined in the Law. 
In fact, it does not intend to compensate -exclusively- family care contribution 
defects since, also, it is granted to the beneficiaries of widowhood pensions of 
which are not linked to the effective work of women, 
 The maternity supplement is not universal and excludes means-tested pensions 
as well as pensioners who had retired before 2016, 
 Discriminatory measure by gender. It contradicts Directive 79/7 of the 
European Union. The Justice Tribunal of the EU in the light of the demands 
made on this issue considers that the situation of a father and a mother can be 
comparable in regard to the care of children (CJEU 2019). 
4.3. Impact of the supplement of maternity reducing the gender gap 
The maternity supplement has reduced the gender gap by 2.11 percentage points 
in the new pensioners of 2017  (see Table 6). 
Table 6. Impact of the maternity supplement on the gender gap 
Pension average (monthly euros) 
GAP 
Males Females  Total 
Excluding the maternity 
supplement 
1,535 1,244 1,421 -18.91% 
Including the maternity supplement 1,535 1,277 1,434 -16.80% 




However, the fact that the maternity supplement does not apply to all women 
pensioners with two or more children means that the reduction of the gender  
gap in the total of pensioners with retirement pensions is only 0.38% (of 22, 11%  
to 21.73%). 
 
5. Items that affect women’s pension 
Factors such as the duration of working life, education, tax benefits, among others, 
have an effect on the pension gap. 
 
5.1. Impact of maternity leaves 
In Spain maternity leaves do not have an impact on the pension amount. It is 
included as contribution periods, the breaks in employment for mothers/fathers 
for the care of children under the age of six and for mothers due to the birth of 
their children. So, the gender gap in pensions mainly results from differences  
on the labor market. 
 
5.2. The number of years of contributions to Social Security by women is lower  
       than for men 
According to the sample data, women have a shorter working life than men.  
On average, women have contributed 7.6 years less than men. The upbringing of 
children, difficulties in rejoining the labor market, part-time work and the 
"temporality" of many of the jobs affects the duration of working life. The GAP 
in the number of years contributed to Social Security is 18.84%  (see Table 7). 
Table 7. Years of Social Security contribution. New retirement pensioners in 2017 
  
Number of years 
(average) 







Source: Author's development based on data from MCVL 2017. 
 
5.3. Educational levels and pensions 
A high percentage of women who are currently retiring did not had access to 
higher education only a percentage slightly higher than a third (36%) of the total 
of this level educational. Instead over fifty per cent (53%) of new pensioners  
in 2017 with graduate or technical education level were women. In the rest of the 
educational levels, women represent approximately one third of the total group. 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between educational levels and the theoretical 
retirement pension. It is observed that the gender gap is more pronounced in the 
lower educational levels (between 35% and 40%) than in the higher educational 





Fig. 2. Theoretical retirement pensions by education level. New retirement 
pensioners in 2017 
Source: Author's development based on data from MCVL 2017. 
 
6. Policy debates 
To reduce future pensions’ gender gap, policies should focus on closing related gaps 
in employment and wages as well as promoting actions to develop infrastructure and 
credits for childcare, promoting measures for working-life balance, reducing gaps  
on educational levels and so on. For the pension system itself, policies should include 
appropriate compensatory measures. Some proposals from different reports: 
 Encourage greater employment levels throughout women's entire life at 
working age. This includes facilitating smooth school-to-work transition and 
reduction of risks that lead to lack of employment at the start of the labor 
market path. 
 Strengthen reconciliation of work with family life. Such as, access to high 
quality and affordable child-care facilities in addition to supporting care for 
adult family members in need of care owing to age or disability. This would 
allow women improved access to the labor market during prime working age. 
 Extend working lives, offering access to Age Management Medicine and 
lifelong learning to encourage development and updating of skills to 
accommodate the changing needs of the labor market.  
 Tax and social policy incentives aimed at broadening women’s participation 
in the labor market could lead to productivity gains. Furthermore, wider access 
to high-quality care services (e.g. childcare and long-term care) should ensure 
more opportunities for women to enter or stay in employment and so reduce 
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7. Conclusions
The Spanish maternity supplement is not the most appropriate measure to reduce 
pensions gap. It is a “plus” that is granted at the time of retirement but does not 
provide any solution to reduce the gender gap in the future. It is not a universal 
benefit and penalizes women pensioner before the creation of this supplement.  
It is also a discriminatory measure by gender. 
To reduce future gender pensions gap, policies should focus on closing related 
gaps in employment and wages as well as promoting actions to develop 
infrastructure and credits for childcare, promoting measures for working-life 
balance, reducing gaps on educational levels and, in general, promoting women’s 
participation in the labor market. 
References 
Ballester M.A., (2016), El comprometido complemento de pensiones por maternidad en 
España y su improbable acomodo a la normativa y jurisprudencia antidiscriminatoria 
de la Unión Europea. Lex Social 2016, 6(1), 72-93. 
Bettio F., Tinios P., Betti G., Gagliardi F., Georgiadis T., (2012), The Gender Gap in 
Pensions in the EU. European Network of Experts on Gender Equality. 
CJEU – Court of Justice of the European Union (2019). Judgment of the Court (First 
Chamber) 12 December 2019 in Case C‑450/18. Available at:  
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=221515&doclang=EN 
EEC – European Communities (1978). Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 
on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women in matters of social security. Official Journal of the European Communities. 
Available at:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31979L0007&from=EN 
EIGE – The European Institute for Gender Equality (2017). Gender equality index 2017. 
Measuring equality in the European Union 2005-2015. Available at:  
https://eige.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/20177277_mh0517208enn_pdf.pdf 
European Commission (2016). Strategic engagement for gender equality 2016-2019. 
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/strategic_engagement_en.pdf 
European Commission (2018a), Barcelona objectives, Justice and Consumers. Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/bcn_objectives-report2018_web_en.pdf 
European Commission (2018b), The 2018 Pension Adequacy Report: Current and future 
income adequacy in old age in the EU. Available at:  
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/f0e89c3f-7821-
11e8-ac6a-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-83413151 
European Commission (2018c), Country report, Spain 2018. European semester. 
Available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2018-european-semester-country-report-spain-
en.pdf 
European Commission (2019), Report on equality between women and men in the EU. 
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/strategic_engagement_en.pdf 
93 
Jethwa C., (2019), Understanding the gender pensions gap. Pensions Policy Institute. 
Available at:  
https://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/media/3227/20190711-understanding-the-
gender-pensions-gap.pdf 
Montserrat J., (2015), El Gobierno premia a las mujeres pensionistas que hayan tenido 
hijos. Agathos: Atención sociosanitaria y bienestar, 15(4), 2015, 46-54. 
OECD (2017). Preventing Ageing Unequally. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
OECD (2019). Pensions at a Glance 2019: OECD and G20 Indicators. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/b6d3dcfc-en. 
Tinios P., Bettio F., Betti G., (2015), Men, women and pensions. European Commission – 
Directorate-General for Justice. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/150618_men_women_pensions_en.pd
94 
INTRA-FAMILY FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT FOR PENSIONERS: SHARE SURVEY 
RESULTS IN 19 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
Olga Rajevska 
University of Latvia 
olga.rajevska@lu.lv 
1. Introduction
The initial concept of three pillar model first delineated by the World Bank in 
1994, was further developed by the pension experts and extended to include two 
additional pillars: a zero pillar (universal non-contributory social assistance 
pensions) and a fourth pillar that included the broader context of social policy. 
The so called “fourth pillar” was added because a large part of retirement 
consumption may be derived from sources that are not formally defined as 
pensions, such as homeownership, interfamily financial transfers and family 
support, personal savings, and social programs other than pensions (Holzmann 
and Hinz 2005; Holzmann et al. 2008).  
The present paper is based on the data of the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in in Europe. The process of selecting and preparing the data for the 
analysis is outlined in section 2, as well as major descriptive statistics of the 
questionnaire respondents.  
The author hypothesized that the probability to give / receive financial and non-
financial support may depend on the individual socio-demographic characteristics 
(age, gender, living single or in a couple, having children, relative income level), 
as well as reciprocity practices in family and macro-level country specific 
characteristics (spending on old-age pensions, income inequality, at-risk-of-
poverty rates). Section 3 discusses the results of the study, presenting the obtained 
proportions of intrafamily transfers in different European countries, as well as 
crude and adjusted regression coefficients. 
The paper concludes with the section summarizing the main findings. 
2. Selection and preparation of the data for the analysis
SHARE questionnaire contains a group of questions in which respondents are asked: 
 if they have given / received financial gifts of EUR 250 or more to/from 





possible to mention up to 3 such persons stating the respondent’s relationship 
with them and up to three more persons without specification)1, 
 if they have given / received help to / from separately living family members 
(or other persons) during the preceding 12 months (similarly, it is possible to 
mention up to 3 such persons)2. 
This group of questions is not asked in all countries in all waves. Therefore, in 
order to obtain sufficient amount of data, three most recent waves of SHARE – 
wave 5 (2013), wave 6 (2015) and wave 7 (2017) – have been included into 
analysis. Previous research (Ostrovsky-Berman and Litwin 2019) demonstrated 
that intra-family support patterns significantly changed during the recession years, 
therefore earlier waves (up to 2011) were not taken into consideration.  
The data from 19 countries was used for the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
As SHARE is a longitudinal study, same persons participate in subsequent waves. 
For the participants who had answered this group of questions in more than one 
wave only the latest wave answers were used for the analysis. In result, 30.5%  
of cases are taken from wave 5, 35.2% – from wave 6, and 34.3% – from wave 7.  
10 countries participated in all three waves; Estonia, Israel, Luxembourg and 
Slovenia asked this group of questions to their participants only in waves 5 and 6; 
Greece and Poland – in waves 6 and 7; whereas in three countries these questions 
were asked only once during the last three waves – the Netherlands (wave 5), 
Portugal and Croatia (both in wave 6).  
In total, 30,688 cases were analyzed. Number of cases per country ranged from 
311 (Croatia) to 2,436 (Czech Republic). 
Only respondents whose status is “old-age pensioner” were included, irrespective 
of their age. Median age was 73 years (Q1 = 67; Q3 = 80). 59.5% of respondents 
live in households with a couple, where both are respondents, 31.5% live in 
households consisting of one person, 8.6% – in a household with a couple and one 
                                                            
1 The exact wording of the questions: „Some people provide financial or material gifts, or 
support to others such as parents, children, grandchildren, some other kin, or friends or 
neighbours, and some people don't. Now please think of the last 12 months. Not counting 
any shared housing or shared food, have you or your partner given (received) any financial 
or material gift or support to any person inside or outside this household amounting to 
EUR 250 or more? By financial gift we mean giving money, or covering specific type of 
costs such as those for medical care or insurance, schooling, down payment for a home. 
Do not include loans or donations to charities.” 
2 The exact wording of the questions: “We are interested in how people support one 
another. The next questions are about the help that you may have given to people you 
know or that you may have received from people you know. Thinking about the last 12 
months has any family member from outside the household, any friend or neighbour given 
you or your partner personal care or practical household help? In the last 12 months, have 
you personally given personal care or practical  household help to a family member living 
outside your household, a friend or neighbour? Please exclude looking after grandchildren.” 
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non-responding partner, while the rest 0.4% – in other household types (consisting of 
several singles or several couples, etc.). In total, 31.8% of the respondents are singles 
and 68.2 have a partner. 
Ranking into income quintiles was made within countries and within waves 
separately and also within singles and couples separately, as the income is 
reported at household level. 
50.2% of respondents were women. 90% of all respondents have child(ren). 
3. Results
Major recipients of financial gifts from pensioners are their children – 67.2%, 
followed by grandchildren – 15.5%. 
Major donators of financial gifts to pensioners are also their children – 57.6%, quite 
unexpectedly followed by the parents of the respondents (including step- and in-law-
parents) – 19.5%. Provided that the respondents themselves are old-age pensioners, 
their parents should be in quite old ages. The last ratio, however, varies very much 
among the countries: in Italy, Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium and Czech Republic 
more than 30% of financial gifts originated from pensioners’ parents, while in 
Germany, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Croatia – less than 10%.  
7% of all financial gifts were given to non-relatives, and 7.6% were received from 
non-relatives. 
The majority of European pensioners neither received nor gave any financial gift, and 
there are more donators than recipients. The share of recipients varies from 1.9% in 
Spain to 15.5% in Poland, donators – from 10.9% in Spain to 37.9% in Luxemburg 
(Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1. Shares of respondents who gave and received financial gifts 




Proportions of the respondents who gave and received non-financial assistance were 
higher – on average, 21.5% gave help to and 25.5% received help from non-members 
of their households. Spanish pensioners were the least active in providing help to 
others – 6.5%, while 41.4% of Danish respondents answered positively. The most 
frequent recipients of non-financial help live in Czech Republic 42.9%, whereas only 
14.5% of Portugal pensioners receive non-financial help from people not living in 
their households (see Fig. 2).  
 
 
Fig. 2. Shares of respondents who gave and received non-financial support 
Source: author’s computations on SHARE data. 
Research on intergenerational relations often discusses whether the exchange of 
support between family generations is based on reciprocity (Leopold and Raab 
2011on SHARE data; Hämäläinen and Tanskanen 2019 on Finnish survey data). 
Research on both receiving and providing support tends to demonstrate a positive 
relationship between them, i.e. those who provide support are more likely to receive 
support. Similarly, a recent study on a questionnaire from the Panel on Health and 
Aging of Singaporean Elderly (Verbrugge and Ang 2018) demonstrated that strong 
reciprocity exists between receiving and giving support, both tangible and intangible.  
 
Table 1. Reciprocity in receiving and giving help from/to non household members 
(odds ratios with 95%CI) 
Receive help 
Give help 
Give financial gifts Give non-financial help 
Receive financial gifts 3.179*** (2.890-3.496) 1.860*** (1.672-2.070) 
Receive non-financial help 1.029 (0.971 – 1.092) 1.366*** (1.282-1.455) 
*** p < 0.001, else p > 0.05 
Source: author’s computations on SHARE data. 
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As demonstrated in Tab. 1, those who received financial gifts were significantly more 
often also giving financial gifts, as well as (although to a lesser degree) more often 
were providing non-financial help to others. Those who received non-financial help, 
were also more often giving non-financial help, but the effect is far less pronounced. 
The relationship between receiving non-financial help and giving financial gifts is  
not in place. 
Fig. 3. Share of financial donators in countries with different AROPE 65+ rates 
Source: author’s computations on SHARE data and Eurostat. 
Another goal of the research was to evaluate possible relationship between the 
observed rates of donators and recipients of support and macroeconomic 
indicators in the respective countries – such as at risk of poverty and social 
exclusion (AROPE) rates and indicators of income inequality in old age groups. 
The research hypothesis suggested that the countries with high inequality and high 
risk of poverty among the elderly would have higher proportions of respondents 
who receive help from people outside their households. 
The hypothesis, however, has not been confirmed – no relationship was detected. 
However, macroeconomic indicators show some signs of association with proportions 
of donators: higher S80/S20 ratios were found in  those countries where pesnioners 
less frequently provided non-financial help to others (Spearman’s rho = -0.523, 
p = 0.026, n = 18), while in the countries with more poverty and social exclusion the 
respondents less frequently gave financial gifts (Spearman’s rho = -445, p = 0.064,  
n = 18) – see Fig. 3.  
The observed proportions of donators-recipients do not allow to group countries 
into any sort of clusters according to their welfare state regimes. Probably, more 




Further analysis of the factors, potentially influencing the outcome variable 
(binary variables “gave financial gifts”, “gave non-financial help”, “received 
financial gifts”, and “received non-financial help”) was made taking all countries 
together, using binary logistic regression. 
Crude odd ratios (Tab. 2 and Tab. 3) demonstrate that women receive financial 
gifts more frequently than men, while men are slightly more frequent donators. 
Women also more often receive non-financial help, but there was no statistically 
significant difference in giving such help between men and women. Singles 
receive financial and non-financial support more frequently while give support 
less frequently than those who live in couples. 
 
Table 2. Factors (crude odds ratios with 95%CI) 
 
Give help 
Give financial gifts Give non-financial help 
Gender (F/M) 0.918**  (0.872 – 0.966) 1.024 (0.967 – 1.085) 
Couple / Single 1.555*** (1.468 – 1.648) 1.202***(1.130 – 1.277) 
Has child(ren) (Yes/No) 2.230*** (2.009 – 2.477) 1.264***(1.143 – 1.397) 
Income (QU5/QU1) 3.083*** (2.823 – 3.366) 1.757*** (1.598 – 1.931) 
** p< 0.01,  *** p < 0.001, else p > 0.05 
Source: author’s computations on SHARE data. 
 
The most expressed difference was detected among income groups: in financial 
intrafamily exchanges, higher income quintiles are more both more active 
providers and more active recipients (probably, due to the threshold set at EUR 
250 per one transaction; should this threshold be lower or no present at all – like 
in Singaporean questionnaire – lower income quintiles would possibly appear 
among recipients and donators of financial gifts at a similar rate as  higher income 
quintiles). As considers non-financial support, higher income quintiles were more 
frequent providers but less frequent recipients of help from others. 
 
Table 3. Factors (crude odds ratios with 95%CI) 
 
Receive help 
Receive financial gifts Receive non-financial 
help 
Gender (F/M) 1.330*** (1.209 – 1.463) 1.550***(1.471 – 1.633) 
Couple / Single 0.823*** (0.746 – 0.908) 0.339*** (0.322 – 0.358) 
Has child(ren) (Yes/No) 2.200*** (1.776 – 2.725) 0.976 (0.896 – 1.063) 
Income (QU5/QU1) 1.279*** (1.104 – 1.483) 0.704*** (0.649 – 0.765) 
*** p < 0.001, else p > 0.05 
Source: author’s computations on SHARE data. 
 
Having children increased odds to give both financial and non-financial support 
to non-members of the respondents’ household. It also increased the odds to 





Table 4. Multiple binary logistic regression models (adjusted odds ratios) 
 
Give help Receive help 
financial  non-financial financial  non-financial  
Gender (F/M) 0.959 0.963 1.272*** 1.275*** 
Couple / Single 1.455*** 0.994 0.659*** 0.429*** 
Has child(ren) 
(Yes/No) 
1.939*** 1.234*** 2.079*** 1.259*** 
Income (QU5/QU1) 3.036*** 1.536*** 0.884 0.743*** 
Income (QU4/QU1) 2.660*** 1.511*** 0.806* 0.785*** 
Income (QU3/QU1) 1.998*** 1.318*** 0.822* 0.805*** 
Income (QU2/QU1) 1.519*** 1.211*** 0.821* 0.918 
Age 0.987*** 0.934*** 0.982*** 1.058*** 
Received (given) 
financial gifts (Yes/No) 
3.067*** 1.581*** 3.005*** 1.185*** 
Received (given) non-
financial help (Yes/No) 
1.207*** 1.858*** 1.464*** 1.909*** 
Nagelkerke R2 0.088 0.094 0.068 0.143 
** p< 0.01,  *** p < 0.001, else p > 0.05 
Source: author’s computations on SHARE data. 
 
At the last stage, all predicting variables were included into regressions at one 
time (Enter method). The results are presented in Tab. 4. When adjusting for other 
variables, in giving both financial and non-financial help gender has no statistical 
significance, while all other factors do. However, the overall predictive power  
of the models was rather low.  
The author attempted including of macroeconomic indicators into the model 
(S80/S20 ratio, pension expenditure as share of GDP and in euros per capita), but 
the results were quite controversial and mostly statistically insignificant. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The variables considered show a great variety of intra-family support patterns in 
different European countries. The overwhelming majority of pensioners can cope 
on their own without any significant support from their separate living relatives. 
The major source of their financial support is their children, but the second major 
supporters are their parents. There is the evidence that those in harder financial 
situation (lower income quintiles) get more financial help, which supports the 
importance of that informal “pension pillar” in redistribution of incomes and in 
improving their material situation. This is also true for receiving of non-financial 
support – lower income groups receive more informal family support from outside 
their households complementing formal social assistance and care systems. As 
concerns giving support – both financial and non-financial – those who have better 
financial resources more frequently give gifts and help to their relatives.  
Reciprocity is important: those who give help more frequently receive help from 
others and vice versa.  
101 
It seems that the significance of individual factors varies from country to country, 
but due to the small number of recipients/donors it is impossible to construct  
a statistically significant model. 
The author plans further work on the model and interpretation of the results. 
Hopefully, more countries participate in answering the financial block of 
questions in the 8th wave, which will allow for another attempt to verify the 
association of intrafamily support patterns with welfare state regimes. 
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1. Introduction
1.1. Popowice Laboratory 
The paper presents findings from the “Open Popowice” [“Otwarte Popowice”] 
meeting that took place  in September 28th, 2018. “Open Popowice” meeting in 
Wroclaw, Poland was organized as part of the inauguration of the Popowice 
Laboratory [Laboratorium Popowice]. This event was the first of the planned series 
of meetings and workshops with the inhabitants of Popowice as part of the Popowice 
Laboratory, ProPoLab in short. It was to examine the needs of residents, mostly 
seniors, in relation to public services and the involvement of Popowice district 
residents in the activities of the Popowice Laboratory (ProPoLab 2018b, p. 3). 
ProPolab is a visible part of pilot called Co-housing of Seniors. The pilot challenge 
is to implement the concept of senior co-housing using the tools used in the co-
creation model. The experiment takes place in Popowice district, part of Wroclaw 
municipality, where involving local residents – seniors – local leaders, we (project 
implementers) want to develop the space to implement joint plans and meet the 
diagnosed needs (ProPoLab 2018a, p. 6). 
What will the laboratory look like will be decided by the stakeholders (municipality, 
housing cooperative, developers, residents, social and church organizations, others) 
involved in the project. As project implementers, we encourage the main stakeholders 
to develop their own definitions, tools and model of the JOINT PUBLIC SERVICES 
creation, which will be a huge step in changing public awareness in Poland, 
including thinking about public services. 
The project is therefore a combination of theory and practice. The University of 
Wroclaw  provides theoretical tools and diagnoses that allow them to be used in 
practice as a "living laboratory". The Active Senior Foundation [Fundacja 
Aktywny Senior], local non-government organization, is responsible for the  
** Co-creation of Service Innovation in Europe (CoSIE). This project has received funding 
from the European Union`s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant 
agreement No 770492. 
The content of the publication reflects the authors` views and the Managing Agency 





practical issues related to the ProPoLab and seniors. After all, seniors functioning 
in their place of residence know best what their needs are. The project will help 
them to realize their needs. 
Co-housing of Seniors along with other eight individual (but interlinked) pilots 
form up EU CoSIE project. CoSIE is an acronym for Co-creation of Service 
Innovation in Europe. CoSIE is an consortium of 24 partners from 10 countries. 
According to the CoSIE, public service innovations can be achieved by creating 
collaborative partnerships between service providers and service beneficiaries. 
During the implementation of CoSIE (2017-2020), the collaborative partners will 
test and develop the diverse methods of co-creation in the field of public services 
(Sakellariou 2018, p. 8). 
 
1.2. Theoretical framework of the research 
Population is aging. Mainly as a result of increasing longevity and low fertility 
rates. According to the data the world's share of persons aged 65 years and over 
will increase from 8% in 2015 to almost 18% by 2050. In developed countries, 
the aging of population is even more severe. For example, in the countries of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) ratio will 
increase from 16% to 27%. Moreover, in the OECD countries the share of the 
population aged over 75 in 2050 will be similar to the share of the population aged 
over 65 years right now (OECD 2015, p. 8). 
This issue leads to a serious challenge in terms of economic, social and political 
sense. Challenges are so important and contemporary that European Commission 
has announced 2012 the European year for active ageing and solidarity between 
generations. Therefore, one can find studies which deal with the issue taking into 
account various points of view. 
Economists may be interested in economic changes or in building “appropriate” 
pension system. One can recall here the works of Stiglitz (1986); Barr (1992); 
International Labour Organization (1993); World Bank (1994); Szumlicz (1994); 
Golinowska (1995); Żukowski (1997); OECD (1998); Góra (2003); Blake (2006); 
Jakubowski (2013); Chłoń-Domińczak (2016). 
Financiers can examine fiscal costs linked to pensions, health care and long-term 
care; trade off between adequacy and sustainability as well as investment 
efficiency and rate of return of pension funds. Here among others one can find 
works of Queisser (1999); Davis (2001); Ambachtsheer and Ezra (2001); Yermo 
(2002); Stańko (2003); Willmore (2004); Dybał (2008); Chybalski (2012); 
Bielawska (2015); Szczepański (2016); Makarski et al. (2017); Rutecka-Góra 
(2017); European Commission (2018); Marcinkiewicz (2018). 
Sociologist on the other hand may dispute over the quality of life of seniors. Here 
one can recall the works of Nussbaum and Sen (1993); Golini (1997); Długosz 
and Kurek (2006); Gałuszka (2006); Daszkowska (2007); Długosz, Kurek and 
Kwiatek-Sołtys (2011); Milkowska (2012); Mollon and Gil (2014); Błędowski 
(2014); Janiszewska (2015). 
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Co-housing is example of co-creation which could be defined as a process in 
which people who use services work together with professionals to design, create 
and deliver services (SCIE 2015). Therefore, co-housing means co-creation of 
social housing policy for elderly people, which is a heart of Popowice Labolatory. 
Here one can recall the works of Osborne (2006); Kim (2006); HAPPI Report 
(2009); Durrett (2009); Zaniewska (2011); HAPPI2 Report (2012); Zralek (2012); 
Alves (2013); Best practice report (2013); Voorberg et al. (2014); Killock (2014); 
Sundberg (2014); Labus (2015); HAPPI3 Report (2016); Osborne (2018); 
Brandsen et al. (2018); Wiktorska-Świecka (2019). 
Since co-housing is not so widespread in literature like co-creation or co-production, 
we put trust that this paper could be an valuable addition to it. 
1.3. Research methodology 
The paper presents mainly findings from the “Open Popowice” meeting. The 
meeting took place in the Open Space formula. This American method has been 
chosen because of the freedom and decision-making nature it gives its participants 
(Owen 2008). 
The form of the meeting was chosen so that the guests could freely talk to each 
other about the issues affecting the neighborhood. The meeting in its formula was 
to be OPEN to all interested parties, including socio-economic entities that have 
a real influence on changes. The inclusion of stakeholders in the discussion with 
the residents is in our opinion necessary to jointly create solutions tailored to the 
residents. In our opinion this meeting method fully supports co-creation process 
of co-housing (Spotkanie 2018). 
Open Space is a method for convening groups around a specific question or task 
or importance and giving them responsibility for creating both their own agenda 
and experience. Therefore, our key task was to identify the question that brings 
people together: How do we (seniors) live in Popowice now and how we want it 
to be in the future? 
The answer for this question one may find in next section of the paper. In the 
following step we compared data from Open Popowice meeting with the 2017 
Wroclaw social diagnosis – report on sociological research over the city's 
inhabitants (Kajdanek and Pluta 2017). The findings from this comparative 
analysis one may find in other subsection.  
To sum up research object are residents (mostly seniors) of Popowice district 
(sensu stricto) and Wroclaw inhabitants (sensu largo). Research subject is quality 
of life of seniors. Research aim is to identify needs of residents in relations to 
public services. To achieve the goal  following research tasks has been 
implemented: 
 find out answer for the question how do we (seniors) live in Popowice now 
and how we want it to be in the future? 




The research years cover mainly 2018 with the feedback of 2017. In the paper 
following research methods has been used: analysis of scientific literature and 
normative documents, open space methodology, comparative analysis, statistical 
analysis. 
 
2. Analysis of the research results 
2.1. Research context 
As mentioned at the beginning, the paper presents findings from the “Open 
Popowice” meeting that took place in September 28th, 2018. This event was the 
first of the planned series of meetings and workshops with the inhabitants of 
Popowice as part of the Popowice Laboratory (ProPoLab). It was to examine the 
needs of residents, mostly seniors, in relation to public services.  
ProPoLab is supported both by University of Wroclaw (theory provider) and 
Active Senior Foundation, local NGO with valuable contacts  and achievements 
with senior residents of Popowice estate. Jointly we form Polish team and its pilot 
called Co-housing of seniors. Together with other eight pilots we represent  
EU consortium CoSIE (Co-creation of Service Innovation in Europe) under the 
Horizon 2020 programme.  
In ProPoLab we wanted to reach as many people from Popowice district as 
possible, who are not indifferent to the housing estate which they live in and want 
to participate in the process of its development. We believe that a sustainable 
change in public services can be achieved, among others by stimulating the 
inhabitants as to their values and current needs. We also believe that it is worth 
discussing surrounding problems in order to work out solutions together. 
In our project, our supreme goal is to involve the widest possible groups of 
residents to jointly design social activities. The concept of co-creation has been 
emphasized in such a way that all possible interested social groups can jointly 
implement various or different projects in the field of social activities. Our sub 
goal is to activate the inhabitants of Popowice to engage in social life and change 
the surroundings. It is also about encouraging to get to know each other better and 
build neighborly bonds, and above all to co-create future together. Co-creation is 
a joint action aimed at improving the quality of life and the usefulness of the 
activities offered to society (public services). It occurs at every stage of 
development of these services. Co-creation manifests itself in the constructive 
exchange of various types of resources (ideas, competences, experience, knowledge, 
goods, etc.) that increase the value of public services, both individual and collective. 
In our opinion the advantages of co-creation are associated with increased prosperity, 
a shared vision of the common good, strategies of action and the emergence of new, 








2.2. Research process 
The "Open Popowice" meeting was organized on 28 September 2018 as part of 
the inauguration of the Popowice Laboratory, which is part of the EU CoSIE 
project. This event was the first of the planned series of meetings and workshops 
with the residents of Popowice. The meeting was held in one of the hall of the 
local church. The event started at 10 AM and lasted until 4 PM. Motto, and at the 
same time the introduction to the conversation, was a simple question: How do 
we live in Popowice now and how we want it to be in the future? There was more 
than 70 participants and around 16 stakeholders such as developers, Popowice 
housing association management, architects, representatives of municipal 
authorities, NGO`s, European Parliament local office representatives, media, etc. 
During the meeting 23 topics were raised and 128 cups of coffee were drunk. 
After the participants took the seats, the rules of the meeting were presented by 
Zawisza from the DO Foundation. According to the open formula of the meeting, 
each participant could submit any topic for discussion in a smaller group and 
invite other participants to the conversation. Immediately after the opening, the 
interested parties began to submit specific, important topics for them, including 
living conditions, neighborhood relations as well as leisure and cultural 
entertainment. Each submitted topic has been saved on the appropriate card. And 
the person reporting it himself, on a specially prepared wall for this purpose, chose 
the time and space for further discussion in the area of interest. In this way, the 
participants of the meeting independently created agenda, which served them as a 
list of topics and contents discussed, available at all times. Participants of the 
meeting divided themselves into smaller groups, corresponding to the thematic 
areas, which were discussed. It is worth noting that during the meeting the 
participants chose in which areas they want to participate and on what topics they 
want to talk about (Spotkanie 2018). 
The result of thematic meetings in smaller groups was a set of notes prepared by the 
participants. Notes are publicly shared and could be reach at http://propolab. 
f-as.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/otwarte_popowice_materialy.pdf 
During the break, participants of the meeting could eat a tasty meal. During the meal, 
discussions and conversations of the participants continued in an unrestricted and 
relaxed form. During the summary of the meeting, everyone present could express 
themselves. They could tell in a few sentences about their expectations about the 
meeting, the conclusions drawn on it, and the impressions and feelings after the 
meeting. All present listened to each other with great attention (Spotkanie 2018). 
The Open Popowice meeting gave its organizers valuable material, allowing  
to determine the expected directions of changes, indicated by the participants.  
At the same time, it was the first meeting in many years, during which, in an open 
atmosphere, residents were able to freely exchange views and outline visions  
of their expectations and future changes. The findings from the meeting and 
comparative analysis with 2017 Wroclaw social diagnosis report one may find  
in next subsections. 
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2.3. Open Popowice findings 
The result of thematic meetings in smaller groups is a set of notes prepared by  
the participants. One may find here http://propolab.f-as.pl/wp-content/uploads 
/2018/10/otwarte_popowice_materialy.pdf all notes written by the Open 
Popowice meeting participants. According to the data we have 23 topics raised.  
Due to the raised subjects we can divide all topics into 5 main parts: 
 infrastructure; 
 safety;  
 environmental protection;  
 participation in a social life, personal development, culture;  
 social security, health protection. 
It is worth saying that infrastructure topic was most welcomed by the participants. 
Probably due to the highest visibility of the topic. In this section participants 
quoted following subtopics: 
 most beautiful Popowice housing estate;  
 lighting of Popowicka clearing;  
 development of inter-block space to improve the living comfort of people 
(seniors mainly);  
 platforms for wheelchairs and strollers on ground floors in buildings at Jelenia 
street;  
 benches in greater quantity;  
 monument 17 00'00 '' meridian on Popowicka clearing; 
 "hostling” issue. 
As one can see people did not only complain about infrastructure but also passed 
their general feeling that they are satisfied with the estate. Mostly due to spacious 
green areas, clearings, parks, Odra river bank access, good logistic. Nevertheless 
participants pointed out several activities that could improve comfort of living, 
mostly seniors. Residents also mentioned “hostling” issue – renting private 
apartments for short stay without any required permission. 
Security was another raised topic. Here inhabitants quoted following subtopics: 
 not enough local police;  
 local police officers are not know by the residents;  
 not enough municipal police;  
 dangerously on the streets in the evening;  
 drinkers destroy well-kept parks;  
 no one pays attention to the devastating people;  
 graffiti on the walls, destroyed lawns and shrubs. 
From the above list and discussion on the meeting one can draw following 
conclusions. Residents feel that there is not enough law enforcement, especially 
during evenings and in parks. As a result public goods are devastating and 
inhabitants do not feel save.  
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Environmental protection topic was third most welcomed by the participants.  
In this section participants quoted following subtopics: 
 ecology in Popowice;  
 caring for greenery;  
 cutting out dead trees;  
 cutting out mistletoe;  
 development of general space;  
 construction of parking lots destroys greenery;  
 limiting trimming of bushes on lawns;  
 more trees and shrubs. 
From the above list and discussion on the meeting one can draw following 
conclusions. Residents are environmentally conscious and they know that 
environment should be protected even for the price of technical inconvenience 
(longer route to the parking lot). 
Second to last topic was quiet broad because covered issues like: participation in 
a social life, personal development, culture. In this section participants quoted 
following subtopics: 
 creating a community: integration, cooperation, kindness;  
 sport and integration;  
 schools should become centers of activity of the local community (in the 
afternoons);  
 intergenerational integration – activities of young people and the elderly;  
 communication between residents and the Council of Popowice estate;  
 construction of a Culture House;  
 creation of the Culture Center in the part of the clinic building. 
From the above list and discussion on the meeting one can draw following 
conclusions. Residents are eager to meet new persons and learn/develop new 
skills. The problem is communication and integration but could be solved through 
sport, proper used of already existed constructions or developing new ones.  
The elderly could also share their invaluable experience. 
Last but not least topic was dedicated to social security and health protection.  
In this part participants quoted following subtopics: 
 security broadly understood; 
 security on the estate; 
 day care home for seniors + volunteering; 
 issue of rescue silence; 
 issue of loneliness. 
From the above list and discussion on the meeting one can draw following 
conclusions. Residents, mostly seniors feel lonely but know what supposed to be 
changed. They require a space where can prepare meals, develop skills and 
interests, see the movies, organize a library, meetings and lectures, offer 
volunteering and experience 
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2.4. Comparison with 2017 Wroclaw social diagnosis report 
According to the 2017 Wroclaw social diagnosis report respondents are pleased 
with its living conditions. To be precise 73.7% of respondents are pleased living 
in their homes/apartments, 83.8% are pleased with living estate conditions and 
83.1% are pleased living in Wroclaw (Kajdanek and Pluta 2017, p. 56). Moreover, 
residents of Popowice estate are the most satisfied from all survived estates.  
So we can confirm our findings from “Open Popowice” meeting that Popowice 
inhabitants are satisfied with its estate. 
Diagnosis says that the most troubling problems of spatial and ecological order in 
the place of residence are, above all, those generated by cars and their drivers / 
owners. Almost 2/3 of respondents notice the problem of incorrectly parked 
vehicles, and more than half the problem of cars moving at excessive speeds. 
About 1/3 of respondents pay attention to the issues of throwing unsorted garbage, 
vandalism and property devastation as well as illegal throwing and tossing 
garbage to neighbors. Problems noticed by a minority of respondents are primarily 
the phenomena of destruction and devastation of greenery and tree felling (20%), 
driving cars emitting high emissions (13%) and burning poor quality fuel at home 
(10%) (Kajdanek and Pluta 2017, p. 61). It is worth to mention that also during 
“Open Popowice” meeting problems of infrastructure and environment were 
raised and said as a crucial one. 
The second category of problems raised in 2017 Wroclaw social diagnosis report 
was the disruption of public order and a sense of security. Residents of Wroclaw 
included the most troublesome phenomenon of soliciting for money and begging 
(nearly 1/3 of them). Roughly every tenth Wroclaw citizen pointed to problems 
of fights and beatings near their place of residence, also among neighbours,  
as well as thefts and burglaries (Kajdanek and Pluta 2017, p. 64). It should be 
noted that participants of “Open Popowice” meeting also mentioned security as 
an important issue.  
According to the 2017 Wroclaw social diagnosis the most important issues to ensure 
a good quality of life in the estate are: the availability of parking spaces (43.4%); 
condition of streets and pavements (40.7%); air purity (39%); the number and 
condition of green areas close to home (37.5%); access to public transport (25.6%); 
availability of furnished public places where you can meet, sit down and talk (21.6%); 
availability of furnished playgrounds for children and recreation places for adults 
(16.5%); the ability to supply food and necessities for the home (15.2%); mutual 
kindness of residents (12.2%); availability of pubs and restaurants, cafes (8.5%); 
offers of cultural events (7.0%); availability of kindergartens and nurseries (5.8%); 
social activity of inhabitants (2.7%) (Kajdanek and Pluta 2017, p. 68). It is worth 
saying that majority of above issues was raised during “Open Popowice” meeting. 
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3. Conclusion
Research aim of the article is to identify needs of residents in relations to public 
services. To achieve the goal  following research tasks has been implemented: 
 find out answer for the question how do we (seniors) live in Popowice now 
and how we want it to be in the future? 
 compare above answer with 2017 Wroclaw social diagnosis report. 
According to the data, Open Popowice meeting participants raised 23 topics 
structured into 5 main parts: 
 infrastructure;  
 safety;  
 environmental protection;  
 participation in a social life, personal development, culture;  
 social security, health protection. 
It is worth saying that infrastructure topic was most welcomed by the participants. 
Inhabitants did not only complain about infrastructure but also passed their 
general feeling that they are satisfied with the estate. Mostly due to spacious green 
areas, clearings, parks, Odra river bank access, good logistic. Nevertheless 
participants pointed out several activities that could improve comfort of living, 
mostly seniors. Residents also mentioned “hostling” issue – renting private 
apartments for short stay without any required permission. 
According to the data, Popowice residents feel that there is not enough law 
enforcement, especially during evenings and in parks. As a result public goods are 
devastating and inhabitants do not feel save. Participants of “Open Popowice” are 
environmentally conscious and they know that environment should be protected 
even for the price of technical inconvenience (longer route to the parking lot). 
Moreover, residents are eager to meet new persons and learn/develop new skills. 
The problem is communication and integration but could be solved through sport, 
proper used of already existed constructions or developing new ones. The elderly 
could also share their invaluable experience. Last but not least, residents, mostly 
seniors feel lonely but know what supposed to be changed. They require a space 
where can prepare meals, develop skills and interests, see the movies, organize 
a library, meetings and lectures, offer volunteering and experience. 
Findings from the “Open Popowice” meeting are supported by the 2017 Wroclaw 
social diagnosis report.  Diagnosis says that the most troubling problems are 
related to spatial and ecological order as well as the disruption of public order and 
a sense of security. 
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1. Introduction
Slovak pay-as-you-go pension scheme has been organized as a point system where 
the pension benefits depend partly on the life-long income of an insured person. 
Since 2005, part of the paid social insurance contributions is redirected into the 
funded pension scheme, where the savers can choose the pension fund as a vehicle 
for their pension savings. The financial crisis has forced government to lower the 
part of social insurance contributions flowing into the funded pillar and introduce 
balancing mechanism, where the statutory retirement age is tied to the life 
expectancy of a retiring population. The automatic adjustment to the retirement 
age was introduced in 2012 as a part of stabilization measures for public finances 
and came into force in 2017. Rising retirement age on average by two months 
annually swiftly became a nutrient medium for a political populism that turned 
out into reform reversal regardless the long-term consequences on pay-as-you-go 
pillar balance and expected pension benefits. In 2019, Slovakia abandoned the 
mechanism of automatic adjustment to the retirement age based on the life 
expectancy of retiring population and Slovak national parliament constitutionally 
introduced retirement age ceiling at 64 years for men with further bonification of 
half-year for a raised child up to three children for women. If no correction 
mechanisms are implemented, this reform reversal would have significant impact 
on future pension expenditures as well as on the level of pensions received not 
only from the pay-as-you-go scheme but also from the funded pillar as pointed by 
CBR (2018b). Seeking for the stabilization measures, introduction of the notional 
defined contribution (NDC) scheme emerged as a possible solution, which is 
being investigated by Ministry of Finance of Slovak republic.  
DOI: 10.34658/9788366287938.11
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In this study, by applying microsimulation pension model supported by statistical 
and administrative data on Slovak population, we analyze the fiscal and 
redistributive consequences of retirement age ceiling and impact of NDC scheme 
introduction on the Slovak pay-as-you-go pillar fiscal balance and expected 
pension benefits. However, we work with some limitations on the NDC set-up 
according to the preferences defined by the governmental institutions.  
The paper is organized as follows: The second section discusses current knowledge 
and existing papers dealing with pension reform, reform reversals supported by 
rising pension populism and existing experience with the introduction of NDC 
schemes. Third section presents more details on Slovak pension system and 
elaborates details on the research objective, data, and methodology with the 
presentation of no-policy change set-up as well as NDC scheme set-up. Fourth 
section presents the research results of the fiscal and redistribution implications of 
the policies examined and discusses the findings and potential challenges that need 
to be further elaborated if the NDC scheme should be implemented, especially the 
poverty risk for low-income cohorts and minimum retirement income granted to 
a retiring person regardless the level of paid contributions. 
2. Theoretical background
There is a vast amount of literature analyzing the pension reform reversals, either 
permanent or transitory, after financial crisis with special attention to the central 
European countries, which introduced multi-pillar pension systems. When inspecting 
existing research on this topic, two different approaches towards pension reforms 
reversals emerge. While the typical reduction in contributions flowing into the 
funded schemes could be connected to the need of financing pay-as-you-go 
pension deficits and overall problems with the public finances, the second group 
of reform reversals could be characterized as driven by political populism 
transformed into the pension system. The first group of pension reversals is 
analyzed by many studies, where for example Price and Rudolph (2013) examine 
the impact of the financial crisis on privately funded pensions in the Europe and 
Central Asia region. Following their report, Chłoń-Domińczak (2018) estimated 
the reform reversals on the individual pension value and confirmed negative 
impact of these steps financial balance of PAYG pillars. Especially for Slovakia, 
reform reversals starting in 2012 gave rise in implicit liability of PAYG pillar. 
Székely and Ward-Warmedinger (2018) associate reverse steps in pension system 
reform and populist intervention with the financial crisis and the fact that the 
transitional period to a multi-pillar system reduced PAYG pillar revenues 
financed mainly from public debt growth. These conclusions can be found also in 
the study of Sivák et al. (2011). Other studies covering the impact of pension 
reform reversals with focus on Slovakia include Beblavý (2011) end especially 
Drahokoupil and Domonkos (2012), who confirmed that unresolved problems in 
the implementation of previous reforms are associated with the financing of the 
transition costs. At the same time, they show that not only fiscal constraints, but 
also political conditions have shaped the changes in the pension systems. More 
radical ideas on the reasons and following expected consequences of fiscal crisis 
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on achieved pension reforms could be found in the paper of Casey (2014),  
who claim that the need to comply with the EU wide rules on fiscal discipline, 
the easiest way was to treat the funded pension savings as “piggy banks” and seize 
the transitional cost reserves. This has opened the door for interventions into 
the pension systems, which in turn became unstable and unpredictable regarding 
future development. The need to finance public finance deficits immediately thus 
motivated shortism and political populism in the pension system in these countries. 
This new wave of reverse steps can no longer be associated with the need for fiscal 
consolidation. They are mainly associated with political populism, which increases 
the spending of the PAYG pillar and the rate of intergenerational redistribution in 
order to gain political preferences. These interventions can be explained by classical 
political economics, where focusing on the median voter means a shift in orientation 
to the older generation due to demographic change in population structure.  
Absence of automatic balancing mechanisms that effectively limit political 
populism in the pension system, the PAYG pillars would face interventions by 
politicians that tend to increase fiscal imbalances and shift the burden to future 
generations. Brooks and James (1999) unveil the background of pension system 
reform from the perspective of political economy and point out that it is precisely 
the legacy of the past and the fragmentation of political views supported by 
different interest groups that hinder effective and long-term financially stable 
pension reform. Later, James (2002) concludes in his study that setting up the 
interaction of institutions covering different pillars in the pension system is in 
many cases more political than a professional issue. Both studies indirectly point 
to the need to perceive the existence of political risk, which is linked to 'politics' 
and not directly to 'policy' in the pension system. The existence of political 
populism in the pension system was pointed also by Baroni (2007). At the same 
time, Galasso (2008) points out that the apparent deviation of the pension system 
from long – term fiscal equilibrium provides distorted expectations of economic 
agents during their working career, which in turn increases the political risk and 
instability of the pension system. 
The basic pension scheme in Slovakia takes the form of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
scheme with a strong intergenerational redistribution of income. The PAYG 
scheme is based on a point system where for each fully worked calendar year, an 
individual earns one point and at the same time, its value is determined by 
a personal wage point representing the ratio of wages to the average wage in the 
economy for a given year. At time of retirement, the accumulated points are 
multiplied by the average personal wage point throughout the entire career. The 
accumulated points are then multiplied by the current pension value, whose value 
changes according to the change in the average wage in the economy over the last 
two years. The point system set in this way would be fully merit. Therefore,  
an element of solidarity is introduced into the system, which increases the 
pensions granted to low-income individuals and reduces the entitlements for 
medium and higher income cohorts. By this adjustment, the Slovak PAYG scheme 
deviates from merit and reduces the relationship between paid contributions and 
the old-age pension, which leads to intra-generational redistribution. 
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In terms of financial stability, Slovak pension scheme shows a tendency towards 
imbalances and increasing deficits due to an increasing dependency factor, despite 
the fact that an automatic mechanism for increasing the retirement age based on 
the life expectancy of the retiring population was active since 2017 (CBR 2018a; 
2018b; Porubský and Novysedlák 2018; Šebo et al. 2017). On top of this, there 
came a radical reform reversal in 2019, where the Slovak National Council 
amended the Constitution by removing automatic stabilization mechanism of 
flexible retirement age and introduced constitutionally fixed retirement age at 64 
years. When inspecting the shift from the flexible retirement age based on the life 
expectancy of retiring cohort to the fixed retirement age from the political 
economy, one can see that support for this move was obtained from the older 
population and labor unions even if these groups would not gain any additional 
benefits (CBR 2018a). Council for Budgetary Responsibility, as well as researchers, 
unsuccessfully asked for the calculations of the fiscal impact on PAYG pillar as 
well on the benefit ratio to be performed and presented to the general public before 
final voting in the parliament. At the same time, there were no stabilization 
measures accepted that would limit the negative impact on the PAYG pillar 
deficits and decreased benefit ratio.  
To reduce the financial and political pressure on intergenerational redistribution, 
NDC schemes were implemented. The model of NDC scheme is a pay-as-you-go 
system that mimic FDC (financial defined contribution) scheme. This means that the 
pension depends on the amount of contributions paid and virtual returns (Chłóń-
Domińczak et al. 2012; Holzmann et al. 2012). Contributions are evaluated by  
a fictive return that reflects the financial health of the pension system. The account 
balance is called notional (non-financial, fictious, virtual) because it is used  
only for keeping evidence. It means that the system does not invest funds on 
the financial markets and contributions are immediately redistributed to the 
pensioners. When an individual reaches retirement age, accumulated virtual 
capital is recalculated into an annuity, which considers the life expectancy of the 
concerned cohort, indexation, and technical interest rate. This theoretical return is 
based on statutory parameters such as the GDP growth, average wages, change in 
amount of contributions paid or labor costs (Alonso-Garcia a Devolder 2016). 
NDC schemes were implemented in various countries including Sweden (Holzmann 
2017), Italy (Belloni a Maccheroni 2013), Poland (Chłoń-Domińczak and Strzelecki 
2013), Russia (Eich et al. 2012) or Latvia (Dundure and Pukis 2015). Generally, 
the amount of the future pension depends on the duration and amount of paid 
contributions in every NDC scheme. However, additional factors which reduce 
this dependency and increase redistribution are also implemented. These additional 
factors, mostly motivated by political preferences, change internal financial stability 
of NDC schemes (Holzmann et al. 2012). Implementation of any policy measure 
and changes in policy parameters will have an impact not only on the balance 
sheet of the pension schemes but also on redistribution between and within 
generations. Sivák et al. (2011) show that intergenerational equality cannot be 
achieved in the long – term without cardinal changes of the parameters in PAYG 
scheme because of the ageing population. Many authors who examine redistribution 
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in public policy systems assert that the level of redistribution in pension systems 
in OECD countries has been decreasing over two last decades (Fenge and Werding 
2003). According to Fenge and Werding (2003) and Werding (2003) the ageing 
process in many countries is a result of imbalances in redistribution between 
generations. As a result, we can see a significant financial burden of future 
generations in pension systems.  
2. Methodology and data
The aim of the paper is to examine fiscal and redistribution impacts of the pension 
reform reversals undertaken in 2019 and estimate the impact of NDC scheme 
introduction on the fiscal sustainability of PAYG scheme. Secondary, using the 
example of several previous studies oriented on the NDC scheme introduction, we 
estimate the redistribution impacts of NDC scheme compared to the no-policy change 
scenario with automatic balancing mechanism of flexible retirement age tied to the 
life-expectancy of retiring cohort and pension reform reversal policy of fixed 
retirement age introduced in 2019. Overall, we test the fiscal and redistribution 
impacts of the following policies:  
1) No policy change (NPC) scenario with an automatic adjustment of the retirement
age according to change in life expectancy of the retiring population.
2) Pension reform reversal policy of fixing retirement age at 64 years.
3) Implementation of the NDC scheme with a fixed retirement age at 64 years.
For modeling pension policy and examining their impacts, we use a cohort-based 
dynamic microsimulation model. The model contains four basic modules:  
(i) macroeconomic module which simulate future economic development (wage 
growth, unemployment, asset prices, and inflation), (ii) demographic module which 
simulate future population structure from 2017 to 2080 according to data from Slovak 
Demographic Centre, (iii) microsimulation module which contains individual 
attributes (characteristic) of individuals according to a transition matrix for individual 
conditions, and (iv) pension policy module. In its baseline the model is built on 
individuals across the population and individual status attributes are determined on 
models that determine probability distribution of status attribute values within a cohort 
based on empirical data estimates. The model shifts the population over time and the 
pension system is exposed to random economic development, using a moving-block 
bootstrap method to stochastically simulate future economic developments while 
maintaining the relationship between macroeconomic variables. 
We work with the main assumption that the education of an economic agent is  
a permanent determinant of his/her income and has a significant impact on the 
course of life-long income function (Šebo et al. 2017; Balco et al. 2018). Our 
approach is based on the initial study of Šebo et al. (2015), who focused on 
modeling the age and education specific life-cycle income function for individuals 
in Slovakia. We modify the model published by Šebo et al. (2017) that estimates 
the annual changes in the earnings. The dependent variable is the income (𝑦  of 
an economic agent at the age of x year (xm when the age is expressed in months) 
of the given education cohort j. Modeled real age-education specific life-cycle 
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income function, using longitudinal data from USA (Julian and Kominski 2011) 
supplemented by data from Statistical Office of Slovakia about income structure 
of population presented by Fodor and Cenker (2019), has the following form: 
𝑦 ; 𝑎 𝑏 𝑥 𝑐 𝑥 𝜀    (1) 
Estimated coefficients are then applied to the cross-sectional average earnings of age-
educated cohorts for each year from 2008 to 2016 obtained from the Statistical Office 
of the Slovak Republic (2018). Thus, the real lifelong income function of an individual 
has a concave shape that corresponds to the results of Guvenen et al. (2016) and an 
estimate made by Fodor and Cenker (2019) on data for the Slovak republic.  
According to Cooper (2014) and Guvenen et al. (2016), if an economic agent 
drops out of the labor market for a certain period, his wage departs from a full 
uninterrupted income function, since the skills, working habits, and experience 
during the period of unemployment don´t improve. Once the economic agent 
returns to the labor market, he can expect to have a lower wage than the same-age 
economic agents who have a full career. However, his pay after taking up 
employment follows at least the inflation growth, and so we can say that the wage 
of the economic agent has the same real value as in the period before unemployment. 
However, accepting the concavity of the life-cycle income function, this does not 
apply over the whole working career. We have solved the problem of incorporating 
inflation into the equation (1). Given the existence of unemployment risk and 
inflation, the nominal wage (w) of a given education cohort could be expressed as: 
𝑦 ;
𝑦 ; ;  𝑡 1
𝑦 ; ⋅ 1 𝜏 ; 𝑈 1, 𝑡 ∈ 1, 𝑇
𝑦 ; ⋅ 𝑦 ,; ;
∗ ⋅ 1 𝜏 ; 𝑈 0, 𝑡 ∈ 1, 𝑇
 (2) 
Where 𝜏  represents the inflation in time t, U means the employment at time t. 
𝑈 1 means that the economic agent is unemployed at time t, while 𝑈 0 
means that the economic agent is employed at time t. If an economic agent is 
employed (𝑈 0), his income function depends on the development of inflation 
and the increased labor capital over time. In the case that the economic agent is 
unemployed (𝑈 1), his lifetime income function changes over time only by the 
impact of inflation and the labor capital remains constant. 
In unemployment period (𝑈 1), wage development is influenced only by 
inflation (𝜏 ). We can say that cohorts with lower education (lower income level) 
are at higher risk of unemployment (Guvenen 2009). This fact reflects educational 
and age-specific probability of unemployment based on the data of the Statistical 
Office of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of the labor, social affairs and 
family of the Slovak Republic for the period 2003-2017.  
The model shifts population by months while incorporating the impacts of the 
macroeconomic indicators on the labor market and population to the level of an 
individual. The output of the model is a population status and status of each 
individual according to defined age-educational cohorts on a monthly basis. With 
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this approach it is possible to examine the impacts of selected policies at micro-
level (level of individual with specific status parameters).    
The amount of paid contributions during an individual’s career (𝐶 ) can be 
determined as:   
𝐶 ∑ 𝑦  , ⋅ 𝑐 ,  (3) 
We assume that each individual retires after he/she reaches retirement age. A 
rational explanation of this assumption can be found in the existence of a policy 
that allows concurrence of work income and pension benefits. At the same time, 
the model works with a different life expectancy according to gender and 
education level of individuals (Holzmann and Palmer 2006; Van Sonsbeek 2010; 
Hummer and Hernandez 2013; Porubský and Novysedlák 2018; CBR 2018b). 
Differences in life expectancies according to education are determined according 
to data of Slovak Demographic Centre of the Slovak Republic.    
All individuals are retired at the same year (exception of the NPC scenario), which 
means that they enter in labor market in a different year depending on their 
educational attainment. This means that higher education cohorts spend less time 
on the labor market than cohorts with lower education.  
2.1. No policy change scenario (NPC scenario) and scenario 
with fixed retirement age 
For the purposes of examining the impacts of the considered policy measures, we 
formulate a baseline scenario without policy change (NPC scenario). The NPC 
scenario is an adjustment of the pay-as-you-go pension system parameters based 
on the current legal status, with the entitlement to pension is granted according to 
the currently valid formula with solidarity and the retirement age is linked to a life 
expectancy. Pensions are valorized according to a level of inflation, but at least  
2 percent per year.     
If an individual earns an average personal wage point (POMB) at level 1, throughout 
his/her working career, he/she has been paid at the level of the average in the 
national economy. During the calculation of the expected pension, the model 
works with solidarity that effectively increases POMB to those, who have 
achieved POMBs below 1 during their career. Also, the solidarity decreases 
POMB for those, who have achieved the POMB higher than 1,25 during career.  
The effect of solidarity (𝑢𝑃𝑂𝑀𝐵 ) can be determined as:       
𝑢𝑃𝑂𝑀𝐵
𝑃𝑂𝑀𝐵 ;   𝑎𝑘 𝑃𝑂𝑀𝐵 ∈ 〈1; 1,25〉
𝑃𝑂𝑀𝐵 0,2 ⋅ 1 𝑃𝑂𝑀𝐵 ;      𝑎𝑘 𝑃𝑂𝑀𝐵 ∈ 〈0; 1〉
1,25 0,68 ⋅ 𝑃𝑂𝑀𝐵 1,25 ;        𝑎𝑘 𝑃𝑂𝑀𝐵 ∈ 〈1,25; 3〉
  (4) 
The calculation of the first granted old-age pension for each individual can be 
determined as:   





𝑅𝐼   –  first granted pension from PAYG scheme;  
𝐴𝐷𝐻   –  actual value of pension point for the period, in which agent leaves 
the labor market for retirement;  
𝑁   –  number of years of pension insurance at the time of retirement;  
𝑢𝑃𝑂𝑀𝐵   –  personal wage point of an individual modified by solidarity. 
When considering the scenario with fixed age, the key indicator explaining 
potential increase of fiscal burden can be presented using the load factor, which 
compares the number of retirees and contributors within the PAYG scheme.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Load factor for PAYG scheme 
Source: Own calculations, 2020. 
 
The load factor is higher in scenario with fixed retirement age and NDC scheme 
scenario than in NPC scenario due to fixed retirement age at 64 years. For  
the NPC scenario, we could expect to have approximately 55 retired individuals 
for 100 contributors in 2060. But for the scenario with fixed retirement age at  
64 years we could expect to have 68 retired individuals to 100 contributors in 
2060. Earlier retirement age increases the number of retired individuals and 
reduces number of contributors, as confirmed by Porubský and Novysedlák 
(2018) respectively CBR (2018b).       
 
2.2. Introducing the NDC scheme 
We modify a point system of Slovak pension system to a notional defined 
contribution scheme (NDC scheme) with a fixed retirement age at 64 years. The 
aim of the NDC schemes is to imitate structure of funded defined contribution 
schemes while maintaining fiscal stability. As any pension scheme, in NDC 
scheme individuals goes through two phases which correspond to the time when 
he/she is active at labor market and the time when he/she receive his/her pension. 
During the first phase paid contributions (𝐶 ) are assigned to a virtual account in 
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NDC scheme, which is often called a net present value of notional pension wealth 
(NPW). In NDC schemes every individual’s account has a value that varies yearly 
according to the chosen indexation coefficient (appreciation). For the individual, 
this development can be described as (Auerbach and Lee 2011):        
𝑁𝑃𝑊 𝑁𝑃𝑊 1 𝑟 𝐶 (6) 
where: 
𝑟  – indexation rate (appreciation of existing positive balances of individual’s
notional pension wealth generated from paid contributions);
𝐶   – amount of paid contributions during the period t;
𝑁𝑃𝑊   –  notional pension wealth at time t. 
NPW is notional value of assets and the indexation rate is based on internal rate 
of return of scheme, which is often derived from the labor market performance in 
the economy. At the time when individual retires, granted pension is based on the 
value of NPW. Thus, indexing of NPW should copy performance of the labor 
market in the economy, not just average wage (w) but also number of workers in 
each economy (n). However, the Swedish system uses indexing based on changes 
in average wage (g) instead indexing based on labor market performance 
expressed as changes in labor force (Δn) and changes in average wage (g)  
or alternatively based on individually expressed rate of return (𝑟 ). This 
mechanism of NPW indexation in its economic meaning and mathematic 
modification is equal to mechanism in Slovak PAYG scheme where the 
mechanism of indexation is based on annual reevaluation of the actual value of 
pension point (ADH) which is linked to the change of average wage in economy 
(g). At the same time individual accounts of living individuals are modified by 
account balances of death individuals of specific age cohort. This means that the 
indexation of NPWs of the specific cohorts as a whole (r) is equal to g, where 
𝑟 𝑔 𝑟 . The net present value of notional pension wealth (NPWt) in Swedish 
NDC scheme is based on the current mortality and predicted indexation rate of 
NPW is set at 1,6 percent, e.g. g = 0,016. The superscript t represents age cohort 
which reaches retirement age at year T. Granted pension (𝑅𝐼  according to 
Swedish type of NDC model, for individual who is going to retire at year T, we 
can describe as:      
𝑅𝐼
∑ ,
    (7) 
where:  
𝑁𝑃𝑊   – net present value of notional pension wealth at year of retirement, 
𝑃 ,  – survival probability from year T to year s, evaluated in year t for all
population which will retire at year T,
D  – maximal life expectancy according to mortality tables.
In subsequent years, if the value increase (falls) above (below) the value 0,016, 
the individual’s pension is valorized according to changes in average wage (g), 
and hence rt = 1+ gt. We can assume that, if the wage growth is at the level of  
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1,6 percent then the level of granted pension (RI) will be constant during the whole 
life of retired individuals (Auerbach and Lee 2009).   
Although the Swedish system is relatively stable system, a balance mechanism 
was implemented into system. This mechanism slows growth rate of net present 
value of notional pension wealth in case of threatening financial stability of NDC 
scheme through smoothing coefficient (b):  
𝑏 (8) 
where:  
F  –  financial assets of NDC scheme, 
C  –  expected pension contributions which are equal to three-year moving  
     median from pension contributions and three-year moving average of 
     turnover date (average of expected duration of contributions and benefits),  
NPWNDC – aggregated net present value of notional pension wealth of current 
contributors,  
P  –  expected liabilities to current beneficiaries. 
This balance mechanism in Swedish NDC scheme is also called “a brake”. The 
aim of the balance mechanism is to prevent excessive accumulation of debt but 
not of assets. This mechanism is activated only if NDC scheme is under-funded 
(the value of the coefficient (b) falls below 1). During the period when is this 
balance mechanism active these two factors are affected:     
1) Pension assets of cohort are not accumulated with a rate equal to 1 𝑔  but
with rate equal to 1 𝑔 𝑏 , where 𝑏  is smoothing coefficient,
2) The rate of valorization of granted pensions (RI) adjust pension benefits which
are equal to 1 𝑔 𝑏 , what means bigger probability of declining for each
cohort because real income growth equals to 
,
. 
The balance mechanism stays active until the smoothing coefficient (b) reaches 
a value bigger than 1,0. If balance mechanism falls for the first time below 1,0 
in year t, the balance mechanism shall be applied until year s, where 
s 𝑡 𝑎𝑘 ∏ 𝑏 1,0 (Auerbach a Lee 2011). This balance mechanism 
prevents debt accumulation through the maintenance of lower pension benefits. 
2.3. Indicators used for evaluation of redistribution and fiscal stability  
       of PAYG scheme 
Redistribution and fiscal impacts of analyzed policies are examined using three 
indicators:  
1) individual replacement ratio (IRR) which is an individualized indicator of
adequacy expressed as the ratio of the amount granted reduced pension (𝑅𝐼 )





2) PAYG scheme deficit. It is a relative indicator that represents financial balance of
PAYG scheme on a cash basis. PAYG scheme deficit is expressed as ratio of total
amount received contributions (𝑐  ⋅ 𝑛 ) of age-educational cohort k
(∑ 𝑐  𝑛∈ ) and total amount of paid pensions (𝑑  ⋅ 𝑛 ) of age-educational




3) The last indicator is designed as a solution to the discussion of number of
papers (e.g. Auerbach a Lee 2009; Chłóń-Domińczak et al. 2012; Holzmann et
al. 2013; Alonso-Garcia a Devolder 2016; Godínez-Olivares et al. 2016;
Holzmann 2017), which are discussing about the optimal setting of
contribution rate for PAYG scheme and funded scheme which are linked
schemes and they are sharing one common contribution rate. We formulate an
indicator of effective contribution rate (𝑐 ), which express required
contribution rate to cover deficits of PAYG scheme (𝑓 ) in two-pillar
contribution system, e.g.: 𝑐 .    
For each policy, we ran 3600 simulations. The results of simulations are classified 
into percentiles according to performance of economic for whole simulated period. 
This method increases the interpretability of the results as the results can always be 
interpreted in relation to a specific percentile according to economic performance. In 
our study results are presented on 50th percentile of all simulations.    
3. Results and discussion
The individual replacement ratio (IRR) of pension system examines the adequacy of 
the pension system at individual level, as opposed to aggregate replacement ratio 
which examines adequacy of benefits compared to average wage in economy. IRR 
represents the impact of selected policies on individuals with different status 
characteristics. As the NDC scheme considers the amount of paid contributions to the 
system, we can assume that pensions will be lower compared to other policies. Figure 
1 shows IRR of individuals with different educational cohorts.   
Implemented fixed retirement age at 64 years reduces IRR compared to an NPC 
scenario due to shorter working career. Implementation of NDC scheme with fixed 
retirement age at 64 years will reduce the expected IRR further. The NDC scheme is 
suitable for individuals with long working career, where the effect of compound 
interest has a significant impact. In contrast, pointing system evaluates each paid 
contribution equally. At the same time, NDC scheme increases equity in pension 
system in a contrast with current system where the IRR of individuals with lower 
educational level are increased by solidarity.     
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Fig. 2. Individual replacement ratio (IRR) of an average earner 
Source: Own calculations, 2019. 
Notes: 0 – No-policy change scenario; 3 – Policy with fixed retirement age; 5 – NDC scheme 
As presented by Janíčko and Tsharakyan (2013), reduced number of contributors due 
to the aging population and increased life expectancy causes problems with funding 
of PAYG scheme. Therefore, the increasing number of retired individuals caused 
by the policy of fixed retirement age at 64 years should increase the PAYG scheme 
deficit.  
Fig. 3. PAYG scheme deficit 
Source: Own calculations, 2020. 

























































































































We confirm that implementation of NDC scheme has significant stabilizing effects 
on PAYG scheme even if the retirement age is fixed at 64 years, which is consistent 
with study of Holzmann (2017). However, even the NDC scheme introduction cannot 
fully neutralize the deficits caused by the policy of retirement age fixation. The policy 
of flexible retirement age is therefore considered as an effective stabilization 
mechanism for the PAYG scheme.  
The last indicator, effective contribution rate, presents what level of contribution rate 
should be needed to fully stabilize the PAYG scheme. In other words, the figure below 
presents the fiscal burden shifted to the working population.  
Fig. 4. Effective contribution rate  
Source: Own calculations, 2020. 
Notes: 0 – No-policy change scenario; 3 – Policy with fixed retirement age; 5 – NDC 
scheme 
The NPC scenario would have a long-term stabilizing effect on the contribution 
rate, while a fiscal pressure on working population would show up after the year 
2050, where a strong population cohorts would start leaving the labor market. 
However, fixing the retirement age would significantly increase the fiscal burden 
and the contribution rate would need to increase from 22% in 2015 to almost 34% 
in 2060. Introduction of the NDC scheme would lower the fiscal burden, however, 
on the expense of significantly lower replacement ratio.  
3. Conclusion
Fixed retirement age enacted by a Constitutional law in the Slovak Republic has 
proven to have a negative impact on sustainability of the PAYG scheme and 
public finances that can lead to additional interventions in pension system.  
We have examined the redistribution and fiscal impacts of possible stabilization 
interventions in the form of widely discussed NDC scheme according to a Swedish 
model. Using a stochastic microsimulation model we estimated redistribution and 


































































































published research outcomes showing that the implementation of NDC scheme 
has stabilizing effects on PAYG scheme, but on the other hand lowers the 
individual replacement ratios of retired individuals. Introduction of NDC scheme 
could promote greater transparency in pension systems and provide better 
information for individuals about his/her pension entitlements from PAYG 
scheme. Future research should investigate the further redistributional impacts on 
various income cohorts.     
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1. Introduction
Social security systems are frequently considered as insurance mechanisms 
against poverty, especially at later stages in life. Provision of resources to be used 
at later stages in life can take two forms. One is the reallocation of resources 
between different sections of the society, especially between working young 
individuals and retired old individuals. This is the well-known pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) system.  
The second system focuses on the reallocation of the individual’s resources 
through one’s lifetime, with state supported compulsory or voluntary mechanisms. 
This is the funded system. Either way, retirement aspect of social security systems 
includes transfer of resources and has implications on income distribution. Thus 
the redistribution implications of these systems and the implied clash for resources 
are often debated in both academic and policy circles. If one considers pensions 
as a claim on output, along the lines of Barr (2002); then the struggle for claim on 
output becomes evident. Debating the Polish pension reforms, Gora (2013) 
implicitly connects such a struggle to the class conflict and points that the  
21st century may see the rise of a new group on the political scene. This portion of 
the society is retired, but not old enough to withdraw from the daily life, and have 
an interest in the distribution of output with political implications.  
This redistributive mechanism has important implications for old age poverty. 
In advanced ages, labour income is hardly an option and pensions become  
a crucial income source. Especially for those with limited alternative income 
sources, pensions may end up as the only protection against poverty. Hence the 
poverty reduction role of pensions in advanced ages is a frequently visited 
research area.  
The already existing, or expected, poverty of the retired is already creating new 
dynamics. For the case of Germany, feeling the lack of sufficient resources, 
pensioners are emigrating out (“Germany’s other migration wave” 2020). Such 
movements had already been identified by Holzmann et al. (2016). The 





in the second half of 2019 through protests and strikes in Europe and Latin 
America.  
Given the importance of retirement related debates, it becomes important to 
examine what pensions entail as income sources. Especially the impact of 
pensions on poverty reduction is important. Building upon this opinion, the aim 
of this study is to analyse the impact of pensions on elderly material well-being 
for the Turkish case, with an emphasis on poverty alleviation. The task is of an 
empirical nature that addresses two basic research questions. Firstly,  
we investigate the importance of diverse income sources for elderly 
individuals. Secondly, the impact of pensions on the poverty of elderly is studied.  
The paper proceeds with a literature review on measuring the elderly income 
sources and empirical works on poverty. Following section presents the data  
and the adopted analysis approach. The observations from the data are presented 
and the paper is concluded by a summary of the findings.  
 
2. The Literature 
Analysis of poverty is a broad topic. The research focus ranges across different 
portions of the society, as the researcher focuses on segments of the society 
deemed disadvantaged or materially vulnerable. Focus on elderly poverty is 
shaped by similar concerns. Leaving the work force, an old person is generally 
expected to become retired and to receive pension income. The question is then 
whether this pension income is sufficient to maintain a decent life.  
The concern is actually quite intertwined with social security system reforms.  
The introduction of private pensions in 1990s and 2000s is especially important.  
As the World Bank (1994) recipe on social security system design spread, 
privatised social security with a funded aspect began to supplement or replace 
public PAYG (pay-as-you-go) systems. This inevitably gave way to whether 
pensions, public or private, aided in eliminating the reduction of poverty among 
older households or individuals.  
There is an established expectation in the literature that stronger public pensions 
lead to reduced poverty and income inequality, due to the stronger solidarity 
feature of PAYG public pensions compared to the private, funded systems (Been 
et al. 2017, pp. 1081-1082; Sarıca 2019, pp. 488-489; d’Agostino et al. 2020; 
Narayana 2019; Verbic and Spruk 2014). Thus a considerable amount of effort 
has been spent on examining the impact of different pension system configurations 
on elderly or pensioner poverty.  
The related research literature quite frequently employs various survey data 
available for a number of countries. Hauser (1999) considers the economic well-
being of pensioners in 14 developed economies using the Luxembourg Income 
Study, but does not consider explicitly the effect of pension income (or lack 
thereof) on the position of retirees in income distribution. Behrendt (2007) states 
that ageing carries the potential to create new conflicts with respect to resource 
sharing and erode the social contract; therefore, proceeds to examine income sources 
of the elderly in 15 industrialized countries mid-1990s using the Luxembourg 
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Income Survey. An analysis of the re-distributive impacts of public and 
supplementary pensions reveals that total pensions as sum of private and public 
pensions significantly reduces elderly income distribution variation across the 
sample of countries. However, no significant pattern is identified with regard to 
poverty risk of the elderly. One possible pattern is that countries with basic income 
implementation have lower poverty risk.  
Employing a number of measures of income and consumption poverty for Canada, 
Milligan (2008) examines how elderly poverty changes in Canada through time using 
headcount measures, i.e. Low Income Measure and Low Income Cut-Off provided 
by Statistics Canada. The author augments by introducing Elderly Relative 
Poverty Measure that compares the well-being of the population aged 65 and more 
to the benchmark case of the working age population. Milligan (2008, pp. 85-88) 
identifies a correlation between the fall in elderly poverty in 1980s and the 
increases in real income provided by the Guaranteed Income Supplement 
program, an income-tested pension for individuals aged 65 and more.  
Rajevska and Rajevska (2018) consider the Latvian system and conclude it to be 
lacking in providing income security for the elderly. Rather than diving into the 
micro data they consider the Latvian case against the backdrop of a European 
average.  
Hwang (2016) examines the income inequality impact of pensions for South 
Korea. Gini coefficient is used to trace the path of elderly poverty through time, 
with the observation that income inequality among the elderly is higher than that 
of the overall population. Higher education is observed to increase the likelihood 
of being a pensioner, compared to the cohort. Lower income quantiles are 
observed to be more reliant on assistance, public or private. Gini decomposition 
reveals that public pensions actually increase income inequality among the 
elderly, a result the author attributes to the institutional characteristics of South 
Korea where rapid expansion of the public pension system in the 1990s favoured 
the elderly with better socio-economic characteristics (Hwang, 2016: 94-95).  
Ku and Kim (2018) examine the evolution of old age poverty in South Korea and 
highlight the important, yet insufficient, role of public pensions in reducing old 
age poverty.  
Some studies focus on country groups with aggregate data availability. Using 
OECD Social Expenditure data, Been et al. (2017) confirm for a dataset that 
covers 17 European countries for the time span of 1995 to 2011 that stronger 
public pensions imply lower elderly poverty and that a higher weight of private 
pensions in the pension mix has adverse effects on elderly poverty. Also working 
on the OECD countries, Jang (2019) investigates whether private pensions impact 
elderly poverty taking into account the institutional design of public pensions.  
It is stated that the coverage is an important factor, with high coverage implying 
reductions in income inequality. In another OECD focused analysis, Caminada  
et al. (2019, p. 24) report that fiscal redistribution reduces poverty, with pension-
like transfers playing a non-negligible role.  
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The focus sometimes shifts to less developed countries as well, as long as the data 
permits it. But addressed research concerns diversify. Consider, for example, 
Mohd et al. (2018). They use Household Income Surveys to assess the evolution 
and determinants of elderly poverty in Malaysia, focusing on individual 
characteristics through a logistic regression rather than the importance of existence 
(or lack of) pensions.  
For the Turkish case, Sarıca (2019) investigates the impact of different social 
payments including, but not limited to, pensions on the poverty of pensioners. 
Using year 2017 version of Survey of Income and Living Conditions, the author 
conducts the investigation for different age groups and genders. It is confirmed 
that pensions reduce elderly poverty. The provided tables imply that special 
attention should be paid in the case of widow and orphan transfers. These are 
observed to contribute greatly in eliminating poverty for women. It can be thought 
that since women do not participate in the labour market, they are not entitled  
to pensions themselves but benefit greatly from the pensions left by their spouses. 
Hence these transfers can be considered as a form of pensions for women and 
be included in the analysis in this regard. We agree with this and include widow 
and orphan transfers in our analysis.  
2. The Method and the Data
Although some studies of elderly poverty employ aggregate data for a group of 
countries (for OECD SOCX usage examples see Been et. al. (2017) and Jang 
(2019)), survey data is also used frequently for specific countries (Sarıca (2019) 
for Turkey; Hwang (2016) and Ku and Kim (2018) for South Korea; Mohd et. al. 
for Malaysia) or groups of countries (Hauser (1999) and Behrendt (2007) with 
Luxembourg Income Study). This paper presents a country specific analysis 
through the Household Budget Survey (2016) conducted by the Turkish Statistical 
Institute.  
The survey is applied on a sample of households1. The sampling procedure starts 
with the National Address Database that includes the address based registrations of 
all the citizens. From this database, blocks are formed by probability proportional to 
size sampling, with the household living at the identified address being the final 
sample unit. The sampling method is the stratified two-stage cluster sampling method. 
Population projections are used to weight the population of the survey.  
The analysis conducted here is of a descriptive nature and does not use 
econometric analysis to identify the determinants of old age poverty. An old 
individual is generally regarded to older than 55 years of age, which does not 
exactly confirm to the 60 or more age cut off chosen in the literature. The reason 
1 For details on the design and the implementation of the Survey by Turkish Statistical 
Institute, visit http://www.tuik.gov.tr/MicroVeri/HBA_2016/english/index.html 
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is the early retirement phenomenon in Turkey. In early 1990s, legislative changes 
introduced 25 years of premium payment for men (20 for women) as a condition 
to earn the right to retire. If an individual enters the workforce at the age of 18, 
retiring at age 38 for women or 43 for men becomes possible. This early retirement 
opportunity was removed from the legislation in 1999, but its impact on the retiree 
demography persists. One can quickly browse the passive demography tables  
of Annual Statistics of the Social Security Institution to see that the number 
of retired individuals peaks in the 50 to 60 age group.  
We supplement this with the requirement that the individual must receive  
a positive pension income. The pension income is available in the used dataset. 
However, we expand the pension income to include survivor benefits, especially 
widow and orphan benefits designed for female survivors. The reason is that women 
in Turkey are at a considerable disadvantage in the labour market with low labour 
force participation rates. Thus they struggle to become eligible for pensions. Widow 
and orphan benefits remedy this lack of advanced age income considerably, as pointed 
out by Sarıca (2019). Hence these are included in the definition of pensions as well.  
The focus of the study is the old individuals, defined as individuals aged more 
than 55 and receiving positive pension income, where pension income is defined 
as the sum of pension income variable in the database, plus survivor benefits in 
the form of widow and orphan pensions. For comparison purposes, a benchmark 
group of worker individuals is also created. A worker individual is assumed to be 
in the 18-60 age group, with positive labour or capital income.  
The study does not include private pensions, despite their existence in Turkey. 
The system is relatively young, having begun to function in 2003. It is currently 
difficult to consider it as a viable source of supplementary income for retirees. 
Değer (2019) considers three criteria regarding the Individual Pension System in 
Turkey. Firstly, the level of saving remains low and the accumulated funds fail  
to provide considerable resources for investment in physical capital. Secondly, 
they are observed to fail as long term saving plans. Thirdly, they are reported  
to fail significant pension incomes to partakers. Out of the 42625 individuals in 
the dataset, only 22 observations with positive income from the individual pension 
system exist. Hence private pensions are excluded from the analysis.  
No cleaning of the data is done. However, given the diversity of the income 
variables available in the dataset, three distinct income groups in addition  
to pension income are identified to ease the exposition. First one is labour income, 
consisting of wage income and bonuses. Second one is capital income that 
includes entrepreneurial income, agricultural income, real estate income, bank and 
bond income and share-cropper income. Third is the sum of the transfer incomes 
excluding pensions. These transfers all originate from the state and include old 
age benefits, state housing aid, health aids, veteran benefits, scholarships, 
unemployment payments and agricultural supports.  
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Basic descriptive statistics have been calculated and are available in Appendix 
Tables 1 to 5. Appendix Table 1 presents the number of observations in the old 
and worker groups. For worker individuals, the number of females is nearly half 
of the males, reflecting the low labour force participation by females. The ratio 
improves slightly when one considers the old individuals, most likely due to the 
impact of survivor benefits. Regarding income sources, Appendix Tables A2 and 
A3 underline the gender gap in earnings, heavily in favour of males especially 
with regards to capital income. This gap appears to persist in pension incomes,  
as can be observed in Appendix Tables A4 and A5.  
The analysis of the data starts with visually examining the shares of these income 
items within the aggregate incomes of old, retired individuals. We then proceed 
to present Gini coefficients for these individuals, with and without pensions 
to quantify the impact of pensions on income distribution. Lastly, headcounts below 
and above the poverty line, drawn at 50% of the sample median income are presented. 
All the calculations are done in R (R Core Team 2018), using the Rstudio (Rstudio 
Team 2016) interface and additional R libraries as they become necessary.  
3. Analysis
As stated, we firstly consider the relative importances of different income 
sources for the elderly through Figures 1 to 3. Figure 1 presents the shares of 
different income sources in the total incomes of old individuals, in percentage 
units. First observation is the falling importance of labour income. Transfers do 
not appear to account for significant portions of older individuals’ incomes. The 
last panel of the figure clearly shows the rising importance of pensions as the 
individual gets older.  
The analysis is repeated for men and women in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. 
The findings are robust to gender. The variation in the number of observations 
in Figures 2 and 3 are evident. The sample includes 2778 old men and 1453 old 
women, where old is defined through age and pension income. This is because 
pension recipients are mostly men and has strong implications for further 
research as to why women are not receiving pensions, which remains outside 
the scope of this text.  
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Fig. 1. Share of income from different sources (%), both genders 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Fig. 2. Share of income from different sources (%), men 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Fig. 3. Share of income from different sources (%), women 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
In order to further investigate the shares in income, Figures 4 and 5 have been 
prepared to present average shares of different income sources for ages 55 to 84, 
with six different five-year age groups. As a supplement, Table 1 shows standard 
deviations of labour and pension incomes. The fall in volatility from labour 
income is apparent from Table 1. But the fall in the number of observations as the 
age category progresses could also be playing a role in this reduced volatility. 
Volatility regarding pension income, however, does not display as strong a falling 
trend through age categories.  
Figures 1 to 3 imply that capital and transfer income take a backward seat  
in advanced age income provision. Especially for women, the capital income item 
has practically no role in old age income provision. Hence Figures 4 and 5 leave 
out capital income while representing average shares in income for different age 
categories. These figures confirm the importance of pension income at older ages, 
with falling importance for labour income and negligible importance of transfer 
payments. Taken together, Figures 1 to 5 and Table 1 confirm the importance  




Table 1. Standard deviations of income sources by age group and gender, TL 













55-59 15932 (299) 6512 (507) 4825 (35) 7582 (223) 15236 (334) 16896 (730) 
60-64 13144 (374) 6306 (796) 10329 (48) 6762 (295) 12848 (422) 6530 (1091) 
65-69 14406 (227) 5667 (612) 3613 (27) 7148 (272) 13680 (254) 6377 (884) 
70-74 3805 (102) 6158 (356) 2028 (14) 5886 (231) 3637 (116) 15087 (587) 
75-79 4809 (52) 4294 (273) 5515 (2) 5706 (191) 4806 (54) 5128 (464) 
80-84 0 (16) 7822 (147) 57 (3) 5379 (126) 22 (19) 7128 (273) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Number of observations in each cell is reported next to the 
provided standard deviation. 
 
 























Fig. 4. Mean share of income from different sources by age groups (%), women 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Fig. 5. Mean share of income from different sources  by age groups (%), men 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 2. Gini coefficients
Full sample Elderly Elderly, less 
pensions 
Both genders 0.4589 0.3364 0.5979 
Men 0.4137 0.3173 0.5874 
Women 0.5145 0.3009 0.6039 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Secondly we consider Gini coefficients. The coefficients are calculated in R using 
the ineq, Inequality Measures, package (Zeileis and Kleiber 2014). Results are 
presented in Table 2. For the whole population, the coefficient is calculated  
as 0.4589. This is higher for women, implying a less equal distribution of income 
for women.  
For the sample of old individuals, the parameter falls to 0.3364, 0.3173 and 0.3009 
for both genders, men and women respectively. The income distribution is more 
equal across all subsamples of elders. An interesting point to note is that the 
distribution is more equal among women. When pensions are removed from the 
income definition, elderly are observed to display an income distribution that is more 
unequal than the full sample’s distribution. Women, once more, display a more 
unequal income distribution. This points to a strong re-allocative function undertaken 
by pensions towards the elderly and, to a lesser degree, women.  
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Finally headcounts of individuals that satisfy a certain poverty criteria are 
considered. The headcounts present the percentages of individuals that fall below 
a poverty line, drawn at 50% of the median income calculated as the median of 
the total incomes of all the individuals in the sample. The relevant numbers 
are available in Table 3. The first row and the first column of the Table shows 
that for the full sample 68.28% of the individuals fall below the poverty line.  
Of these individuals below the poverty line, men account for 22.53% and women 
represent 77.47%.  
The second column presents the same figures for the sample of retired individuals. 
Only 2.17% of elders are below the poverty line. For the elders, the poor are 
almost all women; the share is 96.74%. Old men under the poverty line are only 
3.26% of the individuals below the poverty line. The third column of Table 
3 shows the headcount with elderly incomes net of pensions. Now, 67.17% of the 
elders are below the poverty line; pointing out the role of pensions in moving 
elders out of poverty. The split between men and women is more even, 
highlighting an equalizing role of pensions in favour of women.  
Table 3. Poverty headcounts (%)












68.28  2.17  67.17  6.61  78.64 
Men’s share 
in poor 
22.53  3.26  55.49  7.14  59.51 
Women’s 
share in poor
77.47  96.74  44.51  92.86  40.49 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The fourth column adopts another poverty line, based on the incomes of workers 
where a worker is defined to be aged 18 to 60 with positive labour or capital incomes. 
This new poverty line is calculated as 50% of the median of the incomes of these 
working individuals. Fourth column of Table 3 shows that with this new poverty line, 
6.61% of the retired individuals are below the line. As expected, poverty increases 
with the new income definition. Once more, the poor are predominantly women. 
Last column deducts pensions; share of the individuals below the poverty line 
is now 78.64%. The split between men and women has closed.  
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4. Conclusions
This paper examines the income sources for the old, retired individuals in Turkey. 
The analysis extends to the role of pensions in alleviating poverty and reducing 
income inequality. The analysis is employs the Household Budget Survey data 
from the Turkish Statistical Institute, year 2016. The analysis is a descriptive 
nature and is conducted using the R statistical computing language.   
A visual inspection of the income sources of individuals by age reveals that as age 
progresses, the importance of pension income increases. Based on Gini 
coefficients, it is observed that the income distribution is more equal among 
the elderly population. For the full sample the distribution is more unequal  
for women but for the elders it is more unequal for men. When pensions 
are dropped from the income definition, income inequality worsens especially 
against women. This points to a strong redistributive function by pensions that 
favours elders and women. 
Surprisingly low number of old individuals are below the poverty line, and nearly 
all of these are women. When pensions are excluded, the share of elders below 
the poverty line dramatically increases and men and women converge in poverty 
headcounts; pensions favour women in poverty elimination. A new poverty line 
is drawn based on the incomes of working individuals. The new line confirms  
the previous findings.  
The analysis confirms the importance of pensions as income sources for higher 
ages. Further, the poverty preventing and inequality reducing roles of pensions 
is confirmed. Along the gender dimension, the pensions in Turkey are observed 
to favour women.  
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Table A1: Number of observations 
Worker Old 
Male  7867 2778 
Female  3277 1453 
Total 11144 4231 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Household Budget Survey, 2016. Worker individuals are 
defined to be in the 18-60 age group with positive labour or capital income. Old individuals are 
defined to be aged 56 and more with positive pension income or positive survivors benefits in the 
form of widow and pensions benefits.   
Table A2: Desciptive statistics, worker male individuals, Turkish Liras 
Labour income Capital income Transfer income Pension income 
Mean 20 588 40 375 166 1178 
Std Dev 17 957 36 321 1842 4663 
Median 16 800 29 750 0 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Household Budget Survey, 2016. Worker individuals are 
defined to be in the 18-60 age group with positive labour or capital income. Old individuals are 
defined to be aged 56 and more with positive pension income or positive survivors benefits in the 
form of widow and pensions benefits.  
Table A3: Desciptive statistics, worker female individuals, Turkish Liras 
Labour income Capital income Transfer income Pension income 
Mean 16 929 8 075 71 476 
Std Dev 17 087 813 567 2 908 
Median 12 900 8 075 0 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Household Budget Survey, 2016. Worker individuals are 
defined to be in the 18-60 age group with positive labour or capital income. Old individuals are 
defined to be aged 56 and more with positive pension income or positive survivors benefits in the 
form of widow and pensions benefits.   
Table A4: Desciptive statistics, old (retired) male individuals, Turkish Liras 
Labour income Capital income Transfer income Pension income 
Mean 4 825 32 391 242 16 863 
Std Dev 13 487 31 403 1 145 6 181 
Median 0 25 305 0 15 600 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Household Budget Survey, 2016. Worker individuals are 
defined to be in the 18-60 age group with positive labour or capital income. Old individuals are 
defined to be aged 56 and more with positive pension income or positive survivors benefits in the 
form of widow and pensions benefits. 
146 
Table A5: Desciptive statistics, old (retired) female individuals, Turkish Liras 
Retired 
female 
Labour income Capital income Transfer income Pension income 
Mean 2 588 8 204 42 13 227 
Std Dev 7 102 NA 492 6 631 
Median 0 8 204 0 12 300 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Household Budget Survey, 2016. Worker individuals are 
defined to be in the 18-60 age group with positive labour or capital income. Old individuals are 
defined to be aged 56 and more with positive pension income or positive survivors benefits in the 
form of widow and pensions benefits. 
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1. Introduction
Adequacy of pension benefit is very important for retired people in the aim  
to maintain their previous standard of living. The issue of inadequate retirement 
pension has a significant impact on the polish social support system as well.  
In Poland, the size of elderly population is 21% of population in 2018 (Gus 2019,  
p. 210) and it is expected to rise to 27% in 2035 due to increased life expectancy.
Additionally, in 2018, 28,4% of pensioners (ZUS 2019, p. 40) received less than 
40% of average income, which can be assumed as a poverty risk. 
Hence, it is crucial to understand how different kind of decision in the socio-
economical and demographical field can influence on the level of pension benefit. 
Especially interesting can be answer how much time should be spent on education, 
how long stay in work, when we should to retire or how many children is advisable 
to have. This kind of knowledge can be useful to stimulate an individual foresight 
of each future pensioner and helps them to work out a high enough retirement 
pension yourself. 
This paper aims to show consequences of life decisions for the level of retirement 
benefits. We accomplish it by investigation of individual career paths which leads 
to adequate pension benefit, men and women, in the Polish Pension System.  
We examine, by using sequence analysis, the impact on the level of pension 
following variables: time of education, seniority and retirement age, and the 
number of children. 
2. Data, Variables and Method
Data come from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe – 
SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2019). We used unique data that were collected during 
the seventh wave of SHARE which is called SHARELIFE. This wave was 
conducted in 2017 and took place in 28 countries of EU. It provides detailed 
information about person individual income, pension income, as well as retrospective 
information about individual work-family trajectories starting from early 
adulthood until retirement. Data collection of SHARE is based on a probability 
sample and face-to-face interviews (Bergmann et al. 2019).  
First we chose 5499 people who come from Poland. Secondly we restricted our 
sample to 2650 people who were retired. They were born between 1915 and 1967. 
DOI: 10.34658/9788366287938.13
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Than we identified pensioners who had given information about their first pension 
benefit and about the last income or last wage. For those 813 pensioners, the 
individual replacement rate (RR) was calculated (Borella and Fornero 2009;  
EU 2018; Chybalski 2016a; OECD 2018).  
The replacement rate is a relation of pension benefit to a preretirement income. 
The RR was used as the measure of pension adequacy, although there are several 
methods for estimating pension adequacy (Chybalski and Marcinkiewicz 2016; 
Bajtelsmit et al. 2013).  We chose RR because it is the easiest measure to calculate 
and interpreted by every person and more over "the replacement rate is a complete 
measure, good enough to use it to make a synthetic assessment of the adequacy  
of pension systems" (Chybalski 2016b, p. 27). In the last step we focused on the 
group of 409 people who achieved adequate pension benefit. As an adequate  
RR we assumed 70%, according to previous researchers (Czepulis-Rutkowska 
2000; Palmer 1989, 1994; Duncan et al. 1984; Moore and Mitchell 1998). During 
the last decade in Poland the pension benefit received from the ZUS was over 60% 
of last income as well (ZUS 2019). This level of the benefit can be considered 
sufficient to maintain the previous standard of living.  
The group of pensioners with adequate pension benefits was divided by gender 
finally. Table 1 provides an overview of sample taken into analyses. 
Table 1. Sample size by gender and the level of pension benefit 
Pension Benefit Men Women Total 
Adequate 197 212 409 
No Adequate 192 212 404 
Total 389 424 N=813 
Source: own calculation on SHARELIFE data. 
Among 813 pensioners in the Polish Pension System, there were 409 (50.3%) 
people who had achieved an adequate pension benefit. Adequacy varied very 
slightly by gender. There were 50.0% of men with an adequate pension benefit 
and 50.6% of women.  
“Literature on pension system describes a vast range of factors potentially affecting 
the adequacy of pension benefit. Among them are factors directly affecting the level 
of pension benefits such as expected earnings’ growth (Cocco and Lopes 2011), 
retirement age, and seniority (Ponomarenko 2016). Other factors  may affect the 
individual level pension benefit indirectly. These include various socio-economic 
factors, such as gender, education period, or the number of children (Aisenbrey and 
Fasang 2010; Madero-Cabib and Fasang 2015)” (Jajko-Siwek 2018).  
In this paper we focus separately on three variables connected with adequacy 
of pensions and with work-family life: time of education, time of work and retirement 
age and number of children. We assigned each pensioner a states from the dimension 
shown in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Dimension of states in adequate pensioner’s trajectories  
Variable Sign State 
Education 
0 No Education 
1 In Education 
Work 
0 No Work 
1 In Work 
Number of children 
0 No children 
1 1 child 
2 2 children 
3 3 children 
4 4 children 
5+ 5 or more children 
Source: own calculation on SHARELIFE data. 
Regarding education we focus on the period between 15th and 30th birthday  
for our analyses; regarding employment we take into accounting age between  
20 and 65 years, and regarding number of children we concentrate on age between 
20 and 45 years old. 
As the method of study of retirement decisions we applied sequence analysis, 
which provides a comprehensive look at the whole course of one’s life. It also  
allows us for an identification of typical trajectories of the life course (Abbott and 
Forrest 1986; Sackmann and Wingens 2003; Brzinsky-Fay et al. 2006). An 
ordered sample of units we called a “sequence”. Next, separate elements of 
sequences are called “states” and the focus is on the trajectories of transitions 
between states in the life course of an individual. To create sequences of states we 
treats individual life as a chain of discrete time units and assigns a number.  
Sequence analysis is a method very popular in different social research such as 
motherhood (Rybińska 2014), family life course (Struffolino et al. 2015), 
determinants of vulnerability in late careers (Madero-Cabib and Kaeser 2016) or 
life course regimes (Möhring 2016). 
3. Results
The results of the sequence analysis are presented on percentage plots, exactly 
there are in Figs. 1 – for education, 3 – for children and 5 – for work. 
Table 3-5 summarizes the most common sequences for every variable. Modal 
plots – Fig. 2, 4, and 6, show the most popular sequence for a whole group. 
3.1. Education 
As we see from the set of most common sequences in Tab. 3, 73% of women and 
80% of men with adequate pension benefit spend some time on education. 
Noteworthy, the 26% of women and 19% of men do not continue education after 
15th birthday. Less than 1% of analysed people continue education after 30th the 
age of 30 years (Fig. 3). We can see from the index plot (Fig. 3) that by the age  





Women      Men 
Fig. 1. Distribution of states connected with education across the life course 
Source: SHARELIFE data and own calculation in STATA. 
 




Frequence Percent Cum. No.
Sequence 
Elements 
Frequence Percent Cum. 
Women Men 
1 1 0 154 0,7264 0,7264 1 1 0 158 0,8020 0,8020 
2 0 57 0,2689 0,9953 2 0 38 0,1929 0,9949 
3 1 1 0,0047 1,0000 3 1 1 0,0051 1,0000 
Source: SHARELIFE data and own calculation in STATA. 
 
There is no visible difference between the two groups, by gender, in the length  
of the period of schooling (Fig. 2). On average, men spend just 0.3 years more  
in education than women. 
 
 
Women      Men 
Fig. 2. Modal plot of states connected with education  
Source: SHARELIFE data and own calculation in STATA. 
 
3.2. Number of children 
Fig. 3 shows state distribution plot for women, connected with number of children 
across the life course. As we can see 35% of women followed the most common 
sequence which mean to have two children (Tab. 4). The second most common 
















































of women. The third path includes 10% of pensioners and mean having just one 
child. Another paths are less common. 
Women Men 
Fig. 3. Distribution of states connected with number of children across the life course  
Source: SHARELIFE data and own calculation in STATA. 
In men’s case 42 % of people goes the same, most popular trajectory which lead to an 
adequate pension. This part of people have two children. The second and third popular 
way leading to an adequate pension, is connected with decision about having many 
children – three or four. Around 11% of men have just one child. 5-6% of women and 
men with adequate pension benefit have no children. 









1 0 1 2 74 0,3491 0,3491 1 0 1 2 83 0,4213 0,4213 
2 0 1 2 3 41 0,1934 0,5425 2 0 1 2 3 37 0,1878 0,6091 
3 0 1 21 0,0991 0,6415 3 0 1 2 3 4 30 0,1523 0,7614 
4 1 2 14 0,0660 0,7075 4 0 1 21 0,1066 0,8680 
5 1 2 6 0,0283 0,7358 5 0 12 0,0609 0,9289 
6 0 10 0,0472 0,7830
Source: SHARELIFE data and own calculation in STATA. 
As it was said women most often have 2 children: first one with average age about 
24.2, and second one around 27.3 years. While men also most often have 2 children, 
but around two years later than women, it means: first one with average age about 















































Fig. 4. Modal plot of states connected with number of children 
Source: SHARELIFE data and own calculation in STATA. 
3.3. Time of work 
The biggest differences among men and women can be observed in employment 
histories. Men and women spent different time in work and leave labor market  
at the different retirement age.  
99% of women and 93% of men with adequate pension benefit after some time 
of working, retired. Only 1% of women remain in employment after the standard 
retirement age, while 6% of men continued working after that age (Fig. 5). 
Additionally, there was no person, who achieve adequate pension and did not work at 
all in whole life course.  
Women      Men 
Fig. 5. Distribution of states connected with time of work across the life course  
Source: SHARELIFE data and own calculation in STATA. 




Frequence Percent Cum. No.
Sequence
Elements
Frequence Percent Cum. 
Women Men 
1 1 0 210 0,9906 0,9906 1 1 0 185 0,9391 0,9391 
2 1 2 0,0094 1,0000 2 1 12 0,0609 1,0000 
Source: SHARELIFE data and own calculation in STATA. 
All sequences


















































On average women worked for 34 years, while men worked for 4 years longer. But 
the most common time of working is much higher for men and equal 43 years, while 
for women is the same as average.  
Furthermore, women stop working earlier than men – on average and modal at the age 
54, while men finish employment around 55, with modal value 59.  
Women  Men 
Fig. 6. Modal plot of states connected with time of work  
Source: SHARELIFE data and own calculation in STATA. 
3. Conclusion
This study investigated the effects of life decisions connected with time 
of education, time of work and the number of children on pension adequacy using 
the sequence analysis. 
The results show that 50% of people in the sample have adequate retirement 
income. Furthermore we determined the standard adequate retirement paths  
by using sequence analysis.  
The results indicate no significant differences between retired people, by gender, 
in the field of education and in number of children, while the patterns of seniority 
and leaving the labor market are different.  
First of all, pensioner with adequate pension benefit remain in education rather 
short time, only till 19th birthday. The second conclusion is that men spent more 
time labor market and retire later than women. In addition, a little number 
of person stay on labor market after retirement age. Noteworthy, every person who 
achieved adequate pension benefit worked while his course life.  
Two children is definitely the most favorable number of children which leads 
for achieving adequate pension. 5-6% of people had not children at all. 
For future studies of pension adequacy, using the multichannel sequence analysis 
and logistic regression are recommended. 
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1. Introduction
The realization of pension reform leading to the creation of a “zero” pillar (a uniform 
means-tested pension) and the strengthening of the first pillar’s motivational role 
aimed at extending the period of an individual’s productive engagement in the 
professional markets is now on the agenda in the Czech Republic. This approach is 
getting significant support in the ongoing reforms in Austria. 
The discussions on the given topic have been very dramatic. Four opinion groups 
have arisen from them: 
– The conservative part of the public supported by some left-wing oriented
politicians who have endeavoured to cast doubt on the necessity of any reforms
in the area of the pension system. They concede only the need for some
parametric modifications oriented towards greater egalitarianism and the more
distinctive adjustment of pensions even at the cost of them being partially
funded from taxes. However, in no way do they concede the need to extend the
retirement age. They argue, amongst other things, that the existing demographic
development is favourable and that the pension system is sustainable until at
least 2030,
– The group of experts who proceed from the principle of preliminary caution
and the fact that to the pension system is distinguished by a significant amount
of inertia. They propose an across-the-board extension of the retirement age
(to more than 67 years) in association with the change in the predicted life
expectancy of the citizenry. This is a relatively unpopular proposal, but it is
also supported by part of the state administration which has so far used any
excesses in the pension system to finance other government expenditure. The
pension account is now separate, but any excesses can still be used as resources
in the budgetary system,
– Another group of experts which proposes reforms to motivate the individual
extension of the retirement age according to the specific physical and mental
state of each individual and the available job opportunities, just as this reform
was briefly characterised in the opening sentence.
– At present, they have got the support of the Minister of Labour and Social
Affairs and the Committee for Fair Pensions at the Ministry of Labour and





best elaborated concept for the gradual realisation of the reforms, but whose 
approaches and proposals are of course only partially acceptable for the 
ministerial Committee for Fair Pensions, is Vostatek (2020). Not all the 
representatives of this opinion group understand the wider context of resolving 
the problem of pension security and pension insurance in this way, 
–  The group of representatives from the financial sphere which would like to 
revisit the idea of introducing the second pillar. This existed in the Czech 
Republic for only a very short time. The option of arranging pension savings 
was established in the Czech pension system as of 1st January 2013 and it 
ended as of 31st December 2015. Given the negative experiences of our 
neighbouring countries, this group finds itself in a certain defensive position 
and its activities are associated more with a form of criticising the other 
approaches to the question of the future form of the pension system with the 
intention of laying the groundwork for reviving the variant of moving funds 
from the pay-as-you-go system into private funds. 
This situation offers great opportunities for any theory which can extract itself from 
the interest-group and ideological background of the clashes of opinions which are 
taking place very intensively in the expert and media environment and thus contribute 
to finding the most effective and socially just solution, while pointing to the risks of 
some of the approaches, quantifying some alternatives and indicating the wider 
context of the reform of the pension system which is not possible without  
a dispassionate theoretical view of the understanding of pension system reform. 
 
2. Subject, methods, literature review  
In this article, we have focused on showing the most significant benefits of the 
approach which motivates individuals to extend the period of their productive 
lives in the job markets, especially: 
–  its comparison with the approach which endeavours to introduce an across-the-
board extension of the retirement age and which has been met with negative 
reactions across the world (the Russian Federation, France) which are also  
a response to biological limits. Here, we have made use of an original graphic 
expression of the given issue. The across-the-board extension of the retirement 
age is recommended, amongst others, by the National Budgetary Council 
(NRR), which is an independent expert body whose main mission is to evaluate 
whether the state and other public institutions have adhered to the rules  
of budgetary responsibility set out in Act no. 23/2017 Coll. At the same time, 
the activities of the National Budgetary Council contribute to the sustainability 
of the public finances of the Czech Republic and reduce the risk of the  
state becoming excessively indebted; see the Report on the Long-term 
Sustainability of the Public Finances (NRR 2019, p. 50). Those in favour of  
increasing the motivational role of the pension system leading to the voluntary 
individual extension of the period of gainful engagement are against this and 
have pointed out that the across-the-board extension of the retirement age 
would weaken this motivational role (see Barr 2002; Montizaan et al. 2013; 
Šatava 2015; Vermeer 2015; Mertl et al. 2018; Nakazava 2019), 
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– the use of some options associated with the realisation of the “Austrian type”
of reforms proposed by Vostatek (2019), which provides the implementation
of a postgraduate extension of the pension system (also presented at PenCon
2018). Here we shall use the method of graphical expression of both
alternatives followed by the previously published numerical model presented
at PenCon 2018 and their interpretation by conceptual representation
of relevant phenomena and comparison of alternatives,
– the resolution of the issue of the “crowding effect” in the area of the pension
system, i.e. so that the extension of the retirement age does not reduce the
employment options for younger individuals. In this area, we have used the
results of the Analysis of Industry 4.0 project and the significance of creative
teams with an emphasis on interdisciplinary and intergenerational cooperation
(Říhová et al. 2019). The method used is to interpret the results of empirical
research carried out in the field of identifying the possibilities of extending the
productive time of persons of retirement age,
– the presentation of the wider context of the reform in the narrower sense
(the connection with the reform of health insurance) and in the wider sense,
the connection with the change in the character of economic growth (Valenčík et
al. 2015; 2017; 2019). The method used is the interpretation of previously
developed theoretical starting points in the area of possibilities and the importance
of extending the period of productive employment of persons of retirement age.
The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the focus on voluntary extension  
of productive employment by means of incentives incorporated into the pay-as-
you-go pension scheme can bring significantly greater effects than a general 
extension of retirement age, in particular when doing the comprehensive solution 
of this issue and in the long term creating conditions in the form of comprehensive 
reforms in the areas of social investment and social insurance. 
3. The across-the-board or individual extension of the retirement age?
The dispute on whether to secure the sustainability of the pay-as-you-go pension 
system by enforcing an across-the-board extension of the retirement age or by 
strengthening the motivational function of the pension system so as to achieve the 
voluntary extension of the period of gainful employment is currently one of the 
most intense disputes in the Czech Republic.  
A very valuable contribution to this discussion can be found in the study by Šatava 
(2015), who made following graph: 
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Fig. 1. Share of economic inactivity by age 
Source: Šatava 2015, p. 16. 
Age is on the horizontal axis, while the degree of inactivity as a percentage is on 
the vertical axis. The left-hand graph shows men and women are on the right. The 
blue curve pertains to citizens with a primary education, the red curve shows 
citizens with a secondary education and the green curve depicts citizens with  
a tertiary education. 
We will subsequently show several original graphs in which we clearly express 
what lies at the heart of the dispute about whether to compulsorily extend  
the retirement age for all by administrative means or whether to strengthen the 
motivational role of the pension system so that individuals are motivated to extend 
the period of their productive (gainful) engagement in line with their individual 
possibilities. 
The second case – the orientation towards the voluntary extension of the period 
of productive engagement – presupposes the strengthening of the solidarity 
between those who can and want to be productively active at a higher age and 
those who are unable to be productively active for various reasons. 
All the other published graphs are purely illustrative, which does not reduce their 
informative ability in any way. 
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Fig. 2. A comparison of the existing state of affairs with the proposal for an across-
the-board extension of the period of productive employment 
Source: Own creation. 
Curve (a)(b) describes the drop in the employment of people from a certain age  
as a consequence of aging. 
Point (b) is the administrative boundary of the existing retirement age (currently 
over 63 and with a ceiling of 65). 
Curve (b)(c) describes the status quo. The number of the gainfully employed 
individuals falls relatively quickly after reaching retirement age. This is more  
so in the Czech Republic than elsewhere. This means, amongst other things, that 
the motivation to remain gainfully active after reaching retirement age has been 
poorly set. At the same time, a certain percentage, albeit a small one, remains 
gainfully active until a high age. 
Curve (b)(d) describes the hypothetical status, if the retirement age was unlimited. 
Broken curve (b)(e)(f) describes what would happen, if the retirement age was 
extended across-the-board (for example, by two years). Initially, the number  
of gainfully active individuals would fall along curve (b)(d), i.e. less steeply than 
under the existing situation, up to the new retirement age, which is depicted by 
part (b)(e) of the curve, but then it would begin to rapidly fall as depicted in part 
(e)(f) of the curve. At the same time, this would be steeper than given the current 
retirement age. The across-the-board, enforced, administrative extension of the 
retirement age would reduce the individual motivation to prolong the period 
of productive engagement. The following figure describes the destructive 
influence on the loss of social efficiency. 
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Fig. 3. The status quo in comparison with the across-the-board, enforced, 
administrative extension of the retirement age  
Source: Own creation. 
The hypothesis that the area (b)(e)(g) is significantly smaller than the area (f)(c)(g) 
would surely be useful to test on expertly estimated data. It seems that the darker 
area (b)(e)(g) estimating the scope for a short-term effect from the increase in the 
number of persons due to the extension of the retirement period could take the 
following form: In a short period (for example, after an extension of two years – 
from today's 65 to a potential 67 years after 2035) this 'extended period' could 
bring about 24 contributions to the account of the pension account's income. Their 
number is estimated by the National Budget Council at up to 5% (NRR 2019,  
p. 45). This estimate is probably exaggerated, because the expected life
expectancy of people aged 65 (those concerned by the extension of retirement 
period) is different in the different regions of the Czech Republic by up to two 
years, which would undoubtedly be significantly reflected in the overall extension 
of the statutory retirement age (ČSÚ 2019). 
The overall effect of the extension of the retirement age would also probably be 
(but this needs to be further verified using indirect indicators) negative from 
a purely economic point of view. This would occur for a number of reasons. 
The across-the-board extension would only lead to the short-term possibility  
of taking part of the funds from the pension insurance system and transferring 
them to the budgetary system and as a result this would lead to the substantial 
weakening of the pay-as-you-go pension insurance system, which would have 
a highly negative impact on the stability of the social system and especially on the 
standing of individuals who are currently aged 15 to 30. 
It is possible to contrast this with the variant involving the voluntary extension of 
the period of productive engagement. 
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Fig. 4. The status quo compared with the extension of the retirement age based 
on increasing the motivational function of the pension system 
Source: Own creation. 
Curve (a´)(c´) shows the effect of increasing the motivational role of the pension 
system aimed at extending the period of productive engagement. The motivation 
to extend the period of productive engagement also works retroactively so that the 
number of productively (gainfully) active individuals is higher upon reaching 
retirement age. 
If we consider the earnings of individuals instead of their numbers, the effect 
would be even more distinctive, because the effects of the motivated extension  
of the period of productive engagement would especially apply to individuals with 
higher earnings. This therefore leads to the extension of both the horizon and the 
zenith of productive engagement.  
The difference between the across-the-board, enforced extension of the retirement 
age and the voluntary extension under the influence of motivation which has been 
built into the system is clearly expressed by the grey area in Fig. 4. 
The economic effect of increasing the motivational role of the pension system 
(which would be “smothered” by the across-the-board extension of the retirement 
age) not only enables the permanent sustainability of the pension system to be 
secured (on a voluntary basis), but also (especially) the creation of the economic 
base for financing those branches which enable the extension of the zenith and 
horizon of a person’s productive employment in the professional markets and 
as such enable the transition to a new type of economic growth based on the 
development of human abilities culminating in a substantial increase in the 
country’s innovative potential. This is precisely the type of innovative potential 
focused on radically saving natural resources (including those which result in  
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a “carbon footprint”) which is essential for establishing a permanent balance between 
man and the natural environment. Amongst other things, the commencement of the 
growth of the role of those branches which contribute to the acquisition, preservation 
and application of human abilities would shift curve (a´)(c´) on the Fig. 4 to the north-
east and further raise the influence of the motivational role of the pension system. 
3. The role of the incentive extension of pay-as-you-go pension system
in connection with the Austrian reform
The motivational role of the pay-as-you-go pension insurance system can be achieved 
in several ways. The Austrian system of monetary accounts, into which a pension 
entitlement calculated according to a monetary formula is paid every year with the 
adjustment of the pension entitlements in the pension accounts according to wage 
growth and with the indexation of the paid out pensions according to a legal scheme, 
would appear to be the most advantageous for the Czech Republic (Vostatek 2020).  
The new system is being implemented in waves in Austria – starting with new 
insured individuals and continuing with the ten subsequent years (of birth) and  
it will not be until the next wave that the system will be expanded to include the 
remaining clients, including individuals of pre-retirement age (Vostatek 2020).  
The postgraduate extension to the pension system (Mertl et al. 2018), which  
is fully compatible with the Austrian type of system with accounts, enables the 
strengthening of the motivational role of the pension insurance system in relation to 
individuals of the pre-retirement age or to involve them in the system at the time of 
their retirement or even afterwards. 
This would bring significant economic effects and enable the faster start of growth in 
the role of those branches which contribute to the acquisition, preservation and 
application of human capital, as shown in Fig. 5.  
Fig. 5. The effects of the service branches which contribute to the acquisition, 
preservation and application of human capital  
Source: Own creation. 
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The growth in income of gainfully active individuals of retirement age:  
A – the area of tax effects,  
B – the area of tax effects and the effects in the area of the income for the pay- 
       as-you-go pension system.  
The service branches contributing to the acquisition, preservation and application 
of human capital extend the zenith and horizon of productive engagement and 
increase the earnings of individuals of a post-productive age and therefore also the 
taxes and contributions to the pension system. This means, for example that the 
basic uniform pension in the zero pillar could be financed in the future from 
pension taxation without this in any way weakening the motivational role of the 
pension system to extend the retirement age. 
4. The role of creative intergenerational teams from the point of view
of the substitutional and complimentary effect of the extension
of the period of productive engagement
One of the most frequent objections used to cast doubt on the size of the effects 
brought about by increasing the motivational role of the pension insurance system 
to voluntarily extend the period of productive engagement the involves pointing 
to the “crowding effect” which this extension will have. In other words, that 
individuals of a higher age will remain in their jobs and in doing so limit the job 
access for younger individuals. This objection is relevant, but it leads to the fact 
that we must differentiate between the substitutional and complimentary effect of 
extending the period of productive engagement. 
More employment among older individuals not only has a “crowding effect”, but 
also the exact opposite effect. This applies in cases where a complimentary 
relationship is created between older and younger employees. One of the most 
important cases involves creative intergenerational teams which are especially 
active in areas of technical innovation in association with Industry 4.0. Creative 
intergenerational teams: 
– constitute the basis for the country’s innovative potential and their systematic
support is of fundamental significance for the stability and competitiveness
of the country,
– offer the key to resolving the problem of the permanent sustainability of the
pension system, because they are able to absorb an essentially unlimited number
of individuals of post-productive age, not on the basis of any substitutional
relationship (where older people remaining in the job market limit the access of
younger people to professional positions), but on the basis of a complimentary
relationship (where the employment of older individuals create the prerequisites
for the better employment of younger individuals and their faster professional
advancement), and provide the option of complimentary employment to
individuals who are oriented towards the strategy of extending the period of their
productive engagement,
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– they are effectively able to absorb the production of the branches of productive
services (i.e. services oriented towards acquiring, preserving and applying human
capital) and at the same time create the economic basis for the advancement
of these branches (by enabling their financing according to their achieved
economic effects on the basis of HCC contracts, i.e. contracts in the areas
of acquiring, preserving and applying human capital),
– they play a key role during a fundamental change in the character of economic
growth where the focal point of the economic growth shifts to the area
of productive services, which enables an increase in the dynamic and the unlimited
sustainability of the economic growth. This takes on a new quality which manifests
itself, amongst other things, in the radical reduction of the amount of natural inputs
(material and energy) into the economy which leads to its fundamental “easing”,
– the intergenerational dimension is significant for keeping stability, for
development and for expanding creative intergenerational teams.
The aforementioned also points to the fact that, if the reform of the pension system 
is to be successful, it must be based on the identification and analysis of the 
conditioning context both from the point of view of the use of the opportunities 
which it opens up and from the point of view of the creation of the essential 
conditions for achieving the expected effects. The issue of the systematic and 
conceptual creation of conditions for the maintenance, expansion and healthy 
development of creative intergenerational teams is one of the areas which  
is directly associated with the reform of the pension system. 
5. The wider context of pension reform
As we have already mentioned several times, the strengthening of the motivational 
role of the pension insurance system is about much more than merely the 
sustainability of the pension system. It also creates the economic basis for 
financing branches which contribute to the acquisition, preservation and 
application of human capital (for example, education, including lifelong learning, 
healthcare, but also upbringing in the family, the requalification system, the spa 
industry and so on) on the basis of HCC (human capital contracts). As such,  
it is suitable to not only understand the present period as a certain stage in the 
Industrial Revolution (for example, the commencement of Industry 4.0), but also 
as a change which is fully comparable with the Industrial Revolution where a new 
economic sector is becoming dominant, in this case the sector of productive 
services enabling the acquisition, preservation and application of human capital. 
This opens the path to investment opportunities associated with the acquisition, 
preservation and application of human capital being used (in the case of all 
members of society) according their yield rate. From this point of view,  
it is suitable to go ahead to an analysis of investment chains, i.e. a sequence  
of consecutive investment acts where the full investment effect only manifests 
itself after the realisation of the entire investment chain. The most important links 
in investment chains in the area of investments in human capital under the current 
conditions include: 
166 
– the quality of tertiary education (the role of tertiary education in a chain based
on social advancement enabled by education,
– the creation of networks of graduates as the prerequisite for the full application
of the production of universities – both with regard to graduates and research
results,
– the expansion and development of creative intergenerational teams,
– the focus of healthcare on the long-term engagement of individuals of
retirement age,
– the motivational role of the pension system with regard to extending the period of
productive engagement.
A very significant part of the chains which make use of investment opportunities 
associated with the acquisition, preservation and application of human abilities applies 
to the area of the extension of the zenith and horizon of an individual’s productive 
(educational) engagement. The kind of idea which a person creates about his or her 
future fundamentally influences his or her motivation in the education process, the 
choice of a career, taking care of his or her health and so on. Therefore, the way the 
pension system works, the way it “increases the value” of investment chains, 
substantially influences the condition of the entire society. This especially involves 
the investments [in:]  
– lifelong learning,
– care for one’s health,
– the creation of social contacts, including university graduate networks,
– inclusion in creative intergenerational teams.
One of the areas where the gradual introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension 
system which motivates individuals to voluntarily extend the period of their 
productive (gainful) engagement opens the path towards increased efficiency  
is healthcare. Here, the model of the Chinese Emperor’s physician is considered 
to be one of the difficult to achieve patterns. He was paid during the period when 
the Emperor was healthy, but his pay was suspended whenever the Emperor fell 
ill. The expansion of this example and its application under contemporary 
conditions comes up against a number of difficulties.  
If a system which effectively motivates an individual to extend the period of his 
or her productive engagement is introduced, it is possible to consider a certain 
extension of the aforementioned model. We can show this using the example  
of healthcare financing in the Czech Republic. This is financed by seven health 
insurance companies in the health insurance scheme. The health insurance funds 
are fully allocated according to the parameters of the insurance portfolios of the 
individual insurance companies. Unlike the original ideas about the possibility  
of competition in the given area, it has been shown that no other solution is 
possible under the current conditions. The reform of the pension system offers the 
option of competition which increases the efficiency and quality of the healthcare 
in certain areas, provided we exclude that part of the contributions paid  
by individuals who are older than retirement age, but have remained gainfully 
active, from the allocation of funds (for example, the current insurance 
contribution paid by an employee – 4.5%). The contributions to the healthcare 
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system from their earnings are significantly higher than the payments made by the 
state for non-working pensioners. The insurance companies would then be 
(in a similar way to the Chinese Emperor’s physician) interested in ensuring that part 
of their insurance portfolio consisted of individuals who could remain gainfully active 
at retirement age and for as long as possible thereafter. By contrast, however, 
individuals who would be interested (supported by the motivating role of the pension 
system) in extending the period of their productive engagement would look for 
insurance companies which would keep them in the best possible condition for as long 
as possible. It is of course necessary to resolve the question of how to set up the health 
insurance system for these cases, including the connection with prepaid healthcare 
programs, very sensitively. 
It is also similarly possible to motivate the providers of healthcare, for example  
in the spa and wellness industries, but also in other areas of expertise or directly 
in individual spas, to provide efficient and comprehensive care for productively 
active citizens of a higher age within the framework of prepaid healthcare 
programs, whose significance has been emphasised by Mertl (2018). This can also 
involve various forms of lifelong learning aimed at acquiring a general overview, 
upgrading and supplementing one’s education, refreshing one’s spirit and so on 
within the framework of the cultural programs offered by these spas, which  
a number of spas already offer at present. 
6. Summary and discussion
The reform of the pay-as-you-go pension system leading to people being motivated 
to extend the period of their productive engagement is realistic and it can be 
implemented gradually and without any risks or social pain. It is part of  
a comprehensive system of reforms which will potentially increase the role of those 
branches of productive services focused on the acquisition, preservation and 
application of human capital. From a long-term point of view, this involves a change 
which is comparable with the Industrial Revolution and which opens space for a new 
type of economic growth. The role of the pension system is significant precisely 
because most of the investment chains involved in the acquisition, preservation and 
application of human capital culminate in this area.  
The problems associated with pushing through the paradigm presented above are 
methodological on the one hand (new things always come up against stereotypes) and 
involve special interests on the other hand (they are at odds with the interests of certain 
lobby groups which see attractive spoils in the enormous amounts of funds which pass 
through the pension system). The elimination of the various barriers is an independent 
question and it is associated with the specific conditions of the individual countries, 
whereby these conditions tend to change drastically. 
From the point of view of the practical application, it is important to pay attention to 
the specific possible engagements for individuals of an advanced (retirement) age and 
the role of creative intergenerational teams which constitute the most valuable part of 
the economic potential of each country, whose significance will grow and will decide 
on which places or countries will face difficult development in the future. The 
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exchange of experience between individual countries in this area will also  
be highly significant. 
7. Conclusion
The current period is associated with several risks which the public is sensitively 
aware of and which it responds to, amongst other things, through its preferences 
in public choice and the political cycle. In this regard, one of the primary 
obligations of the social sciences is to come up with a comprehensible, promising 
and realistic vision which corresponds to the life experiences of people and their 
ability to contribute to its realisation. For a number of reasons, the pension system 
is one of the important components of any such vision-based idea on how to secure 
permanent sustainability (from the point of view of demographic development) 
and stability (from the point of view of possible turbulence in the financial markets 
and dynamic changes in professional markets). 
The experience gained from the preparation of the pension system reform, the clashes 
of opinions which have taken place in this area, the individual prepared steps in the 
reform and, we hope, also their realisation are of significance not only for the lives of 
the citizens of the Czech Republic, but, provided they are continuously evaluated with 
the use of the theory and practical participation in these changes, also for the further 
development of the theory and the options for its use in other countries. The traditional 
series of PenCon international conferences, the significance of which may one day be 
shown to be greater than it would seem from the position of our absorption with the 
present, offers a significant opportunity in this regard. 
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1. Introduction
Due to demographic aging of the population – a process that has been progressing 
in nearly all economically developed countries (for example the EU or OECD 
Member States) – public pension systems are not able to maintain the standard of 
living after retirement, to provide adequate old-age income. Additional pension 
systems – individual or occupational pension schemes – should fill this financial 
gap. There are, however, serious concerns about individuals under saving for 
retirement, in spite of economic incentives offered by state institutions and 
regulations (most popular – tax incentives). Policymakers in many countries take 
actions to stimulate the development of additional voluntary forms of retirement 
savings (Rutecka 2014; Jedynak 2016; Marcinkiewicz 2018). Traditional 
incentives – such as tax incentives, matching contributions or institutional 
regulations supporting retirement savings are not always efficient. For example, 
tax benefits for participants of supplementary pension systems are most often used 
by wealthy people. They have some positive impact on retirement savings but 
generally it is limited in generating new savings1.  
The achievements of behavioral economics are used to stimulate additional 
retirement savings generally and in the following three ways, impact  the decision-
making process: 1) changing the choice architecture, 2) changing the reference 
system (framing) and 3) offering appropriate behavioral incentives (nudges).  
Nudges can be defined as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s 
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their economic incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 6). Nudges 
have been implemented in a variety of contexts (pension systems, health systems, 
other areas of public policy) to alter people’s behavior.  
1 This assessment of the limited effectiveness of traditional incentives to participate in 
additional pension schemes applied to pension schemes of voluntary nature. Mandatory 
or quasi-mandatory additional or supplementary pension schemes (in such countries as the 
Netherlands, Sweden or Switzerland) usually play an effective role in stimulating 
additional pension savings. 
DOI: 10.34658/9788366287938.15
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Relatively new instrument to increase savings for retirement – using choice 
architecture and nudges in a form of a default option – is “automatic enrollment”, 
where employers enroll employees automatically into an occupational pension 
scheme. Nudges are specifically designed to preserve agency and control the 
subject making pension decisions. There is always an “opt-out” option (possibility 
to not make use of the nudges). This solution is based on findings of behavioral 
economics (Thaler and Benartzi 2004; Benartzi and Thaler 2013; Madrian 2014; 
Thaler 2016).  
Automatic enrollment as a default option reduces complexity of the decision  
to save in an occupational pension scheme and which financial instruments  
to choose. Default contribution rates paid by employers and employees and 
default allocation make decisions regarding pensions much easier. It also helps  
to avoid another serious problem of retirement savings and financial planning for 
retirement – the lack of self-control and procrastination (understood as “voluntary 
delay of an intended course of action despite expecting potential negative 
consequences for the delay” (Steel 2007).  
Automatic enrollment (or auto-enrollment) has been implemented in various 
countries (USA, New Zealand, UK, Italy, Turkey and since 2019 also in Poland). 
It is gaining popularity as a means to increase the rate of participation in additional 
pension schemes and retirement savings. It is a kind of compromise between 
obligatory and voluntary participation in additional pension schemes.   
 This paper studies the effect of introducing automatic enrollment into workplace 
pensions in the following chosen countries: New Zealand, Great Britain, Turkey). 
The main aim of the research, preliminary results of which have been presented 
in this paper, was to seek an answer to a fundamental question: whether behavioral 
stimuli (nudges) proved to be effective in different countries and in different 
pension schemes, or whether there were significant differences in the strength 
of their impact. And if such differences were identified – what factors would 
influence the effectiveness of nudges in pension systems of different countries.  
2. Behavioral economics literature on retirement savings
and investment choice
Behavioral economics – a relatively new branch of social sciences, developed over 
last 30 years – has considerable real-world applications (Corr and Plagnol  2019).  
It has appeared in response to unrealistic assumptions and a specific anti-
psychology of the so-called mainstream economics. Behavioral economics 
criticizes the assumption about the rationality of decision-makers (based on the 
homo economicus model) and takes a more realistic view of human behavior 
based on evidence that human beings are fallible, easily confused in complex 
scenarios, unable to calculate risk accurately and more irrational than the 
neoclassical theory would suggest. Behavioral economics literature shows that 
there are many deviations from the neoclassical decision-making model, for 
example: intuitive thinking, motivated reasoning and prospect theory (OECD 
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2016, p. 2). The testing of people’s decisions has led to formulation of concepts 
of bounded rationality and bounded self-interest.  
Behavioral economics has been used to explain the phenomena occurring on the 
financial market, and especially regarding the behavior of investors. From the 
point of view of pension economics, it is important that the retirement savings 
behavioral theory has also been established along the retirement behavioral 
theory. Traditional neoclassical economic theory (especially the theory of utility 
maximization) assumes that people in their retirement decisions act in a rational 
and consistent manner. In standard economic models (for example in the Life 
Cycle Hypothesis, Ando and Modigliani 1963) individuals rationally plan their-
long term consumption and savings needs: a part of their earnings in working 
years is saved for the post-working period. Empirical research and comparative 
studies show that most of people do not achieve their long term saving goals, 
especially such as appropriate retirement savings (Lusardi 1999, quoted after: 
Peksevim and Akgiray 2019).   
This article will not present an overview of possible applications of behavioral 
economics in pension economy and public policy as this topic has been 
comprehensively discussed and presented in both foreign and domestic literature 
(Camerer et al. 2004; Cartwright 2018; Corr and Plangnol 2019; Pieńkowska-
Kamieniecka 2017; Szczepański 2017; Jedynak 2019). However, it seems 
necessary to indicate selected results of research on behavioral economics,  
in particular regarding decision-making processes that have been used both 
in pension economics and in the construction of additional pension systems. 
In funded pension systems with individual accounts their participants bear 
investment risk during the accumulation phase. This risk applies to both public 
pension systems with a capital pillar, as well as to additional pension systems 
(individual and company pension systems). The basic policy question in these 
systems is “how much choice workers should have over key decisions, such as the 
choice of provider, the choice of investment portfolio, and the choice of income 
stream at retirement” (Tapia and Yermo 2007, p. 4). There is a number  
of behavioral biases – referring to  systemic patterns of deviation for rational 
human behavior – identified in behavioral economics (see Table 1): 
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Table 1. Chosen behavioral biases which have impact on retirement savings 
Biases Description 
Choice and information 
overload 
The impact of the number of investment choices upon 
investor behavior. 
More choice is not always better. Information overload and 
too many choices. Too many options and information 
overload can lead decision-makers to refrain from acting or 
make wrong decisions. 
Unstable and undefined 
preferences 
The problem of incoherent preferences for making 




Heuristics are mental shortcuts, based on intuitive thinking, 
so called “rules of thumb”, which reduce the complexity of 
assessing probabilities. Many heuristics, which are useful 
in everyday situations, lead to false decisions when 
problems are more complicated and require analytical 
thinking 
Inertia/procrastination: Inertia and procrastination have significant impact on 
decisions about starting retirement savings, amount of 
savings, investment strategy etc. Many decision makers 
(investors) postpone their decisions. This problem is 
connected with “bounded self control” – the problem 
identified by Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) in retirement 
saving decisions. 
Passive decision making Individuals take pass or option of least resistance in 
retirement savings decisions and plans. 
Loss aversion People dislike potential losses more than potential gains 
Framing effect Individuals make or accept certain savings decisions 
because of how the selection or choice is framed  
Present bias Individuals struggle to save more or spend time 
considering savings decisions because they manifest 
limited self-control and willpower and prefer immediate 
gratification over future gains 
Status quo bias and 
anchoring/pure 
endowment effect 
Individuals become anchored to default funds and 
contribution rates as the status quo and treat them as a 
superlative endowment  
Source: own elaboration based on Tapia and Yermo 2007, pp. 6-9 and Townsend 2018, p. 86. 
Key conclusions from the study (Tapia and Yermo 2007) are that a wider array  
of choices, too many investment options can cause information overload and 
confusion. This conclusion was formulated on the basis of comparative analysis 
of 10 countries where participants of pension systems (public pension systems 
with a funded pillar) had to make investment choices. Tapia and Yermo 
recommend introduction of default options and reduction of investment choices 
in public pension schemes with individual accounts and the funded pillar. Similar 
recommendations – also with regard to additional pension schemes – were made 
by many other authors (Thaler 2004; Rutecka 2016).       
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However, it turns out that the use of nudges does not always carry the expected 
results. A comprehensive literature review on the strength of impacts and 
restrictions on the effectiveness of nudges, prepared by Hummel and Maedche 
(2019, p. 1), indicates that “the effect of its influences vary considerably across 
studies (…)”. 
3. The effects of using nudges in the chosen countries – comparative
study
3.1. Automatic enrolment in the U.K. 
An example of the use of defaults to restrict procrastination, delaying decisions to 
start saving was an automatic enrolment of workers to the UK's occupational 
pension schemes with an option to opt out. Between October 2012 and February 
2018, the government rolled out automatic enrolment into workplace pension 
schemes. All employers now have a legal duty to enrol all qualifying workers aged 
between 22 and State Pension age who were earning over GBP 10 000 in 2018/19 
into a qualifying workplace scheme. To support automatic enrolment, the 
government established the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST), a trust-
based occupational defined contribution scheme, to ensure that all employers are 
able to access a good quality, low cost pension scheme. NEST carries a public 
service obligation to accept all employers that wish to set up a pension scheme 
with them regardless of their income (OECD 2019). 
This solution was being successively implemented since 2012 (until 2018)  
in order to increase the level of participation in occupational pension schemes, 
increase the rate of replacement of retirement income relative to the period  
of professional activity and ultimately reduce dependence on the public pension 
scheme, which provides only basic financial security for old age (basic security 
against poverty – see Table 2).  
Table 2. Main features of the pension system in the UK 
Three pillars 
Pillar I The public pension scheme, comprising of the following two 
components: the basic pension and the additional pension. 
Pillar 2 Gathering the occupational pension plans, sub-divided into 
the following two categories: the defined-benefit plans 
(salary-related) and the defined-contribution plans (money 
purchase arrangements); 
Pillar 3 Individual (voluntary and supplementary) pension savings 
products 
Source: Pension Savings: The Real Return 2019, p. 501. 
The public pension system in the U.K. provides only a modest part of retirement 
savings. Privately managed, funded  pension products play a very important role 




Table 3. UK Pension system overview 
Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3 
Public pension scheme Occupational pension 
schemes 
Personal pensions:  
Group Personal Pension  
or Individual contracts 
(Stakeholder and Self 
Invested Personal Pensions) 
For men born before 1951 
and women born before 
1953: Basic, Additional 
State pensions Since April 
2016, for men born after 
1951 and women born after 
1953: new State pension 





Mandatory Since 2012, auto-enrolment or 
explicit opt-out. Since 2019, 
compulsory contribution equal 
to 8% of earnings 
Voluntary 
Quick facts 
Source: own elaboration based on Pension Savings: The Real Return 2019, p. 502. 
 
Automatic-enrolment obliges employers to include in the qualifying occupational 
pension scheme all employees who meet certain criteria of age (at least 22 years old), 
income (at least £10,000 per year), and who work exclusively or primarily in the UK 
and pay at least the minimum contribution (Department for Work 2016, p. 1). 
Employees with lower incomes are also entitled to join occupational pension schemes 
but on a voluntary basis. Enrolled employees hold the right of opting out. After three 
years, employers are obliged to enroll them once again unless they resign voluntarily. 
Initially, auto-enrollment covered only large employers, then medium ones, and by 
2018 all employers (large, medium and small enterprises and other workplaces) are 
required to include their employees in an occupational pension scheme and pay the 
required contribution themselves and for their employees.  
Data on automatically enrolled employees who opted out of the program during the 
first month and withdrew their contributions comes from a quantitative survey 
conducted in 2013 on a representative sample of 3000 employers, and a qualitative 
survey involving enterprises included in the quasi-compulsory occupational pension 
scheme in 2014 (Automatic Enrollment 2014). Both of these studies show that the 
percentage of workers who opted out of the occupational pension scheme in which 
they had been enrolled automatically was relatively small – between 9% and 10% in 
2012-2014. This is much less than originally accepted during the program's start-up 
phase in 2012 when it was assumed that up to 30% of employees had opted out. 
People with the lowest income predominated in the first month after enrollment 
among those who opted out.  
There is no doubt that the introduction of automatic enrollment has substantially 
increased participation in the occupational pension scheme (about 60% in 2018) and 
led to an increase in savings regarding a workplace pension (Cribb and Emmerson 
2016, Pensions Regulator 2018). 
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3.2. Automatic enrollment in New Zealand – the KiwiSaver system 
The case of New Zealand can be also regarded as a success story of automatic 
enrollment. New Zealand’s pension system is based on a tax and transfer ‘pay-as-you-
go’ (PAYG) system, including a unique near-universal flat rate one-pillar pension. 
Since 2007, NZS has been complemented by KiwiSaver—a hybrid, Pillar 2/3 scheme 
(a combination of an occupational and an individual pension scheme). “KiwiSaver is 
funded by a mix of individual and employer contributions plus a government 
subsidy known as member tax credit” (MacDonald, Gues 2019). 
KiwiSaver’s statutory purpose under the KiwiSaver Act 2006 was  to encourage long-
term savings and asset accumulation by those who would be unable to maintain their 
pre-retirement standard of living with solely New Zealand public pension scheme and 
voluntary individual pension scheme, so called private superaanuation  (the first pillar 
of the New Zealand’s pension system – see Table 4). 
Table 4. Main design features of the New Zealand pension system 
Three pillars 
Pillar 1 NZS, a universal pension, funded from PAYG. The New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund was established in 2001 to commence partial 
funding of NZS from 2020. 
Pillar 2 KiwiSaver is a hybrid of 2nd Pillar and 3rd Pillar schemes. Minimum 
employer contributions is a 2nd Pillar feature, and the employee opt-out, 
along with optional higher contribution rates, is a 3rd Pillar feature. 
Pillar 3 Voluntary private superannuation separate from KiwiSaver. Taxation is 
the same as for KiwiSaver. No private saving tax incentives. 
Public pension
Eligibility Age 65, subject to residence test*
Amount** Singles 42% of 2016 median weekly wage/salary. Approximately 
40% of average national income (male and female) per beneficiary. 
Couples 32% each of 2016 median weekly wage/salary 
Means testing None
Taxation Taxable at marginal rate 




Employer contribution  
Minimum 3% of gross earnings. Employee contribution Minimum and  
a default rate of 3% (optional rates 4% or 8%) of gross earnings. Applies 
to employees aged 18-65 but employers may choose to continue to 
contribute for employees aged 65+. A contribution holiday cannot be 
taken in the first year of membership without evidence of financial 
hardship. Beyond the first year, it can apply for between three months 
and five years without providing a reason, renewing the holiday at any 
time or taking an unlimited number of future contribution holidays. 
Employer contributions also cease during this period*** 
*For New Zealand residence requirements, see Ministry of Social Development (n.d.). **These figures 
are calculated from the 2016 median New Zealand weekly earnings of NZ$924 (A$883) and maximum 
after-tax weekly 2016 pension payments of NZ$384.76 (A$367.66) (Statistics NZ 2018).  
***As of June 2017, approximately 5 per cent of the membership base is on contribution holidays, 
the majority of which are over 60 months in length (IRD 2017). 




Individuals are auto-enrolled when starting work for the first time or when changing 
jobs. The auto-enrolled individuals can only opt-out within 8 weeks of being 
automatically enrolled. After this period, they can apply for an unlimited number of 
contribution holidays of up to five years. In NZ, members have a unique KiwiSaver 
account throughout their working life. After 13 years, KiwiSaver has over 2.8 million 
members and has become a permanent feature of New Zealand’s pension system and 
savings sector. “The individual is being automatically enrolled (as there is only one 
default fund type) and only requires a contribution rate selection. This means that even 
those automatically enrolled members who wish to select their preferred fund are 
unable to do so. Default members are automatically and randomly allocated into one 
of the nine government appointed default provider funds, with a default contribution 
rate of 3% unless a different rate is consciously selected” (Townstead 2018).  
The number of KiwiSaver members is systematically increasing (see Figure 1). 
Participation rate in KiwiSaver  2018 amounted to about 75%. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Number of active KiwiSaver members by enrollment method 
Source: https://www.kiwisaver.govt.nz/statistics/annual/joining (access: 10.02.2020). 
 
It is worth mentioning that both in New Zealand as well as in the U.K. auto-enrollment 
into pension scheme (nudge, behavioral incentive) is combined with traditional 
financial incentives (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Behavioral and traditional financial incentives in pension systems of New 
Zealand and the U.K.     
Country Minimum contribution rate Financial incentives 
United Kingdom  
 
Employee: 3% but will increase  
to 5% in 2019  
Employer: 2% but will increase  
to 3% in 2019  
Tax Incentives  
 
New Zealand  
 
Employee: 3%  
Employer: 3%  
Government match up  
to NZD 10/week  
Source: own elaboration based on OECD (2019) Pensions at a Glance and G20 Indicators. 
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However, there are significant differences between these two countries as far 
as default fund structure (investment strategy of default funds) is concerned  
(see Table 6). 
Table 6. Behavioral and traditional financial incentives in pension systems of 
New Zealand and the U.K.     
Country % Members in  
the Default Fund  
Type of  
Default Fund 





NEST Funds- Pre-retirement 
Fund, Higher Risk Fund, Lower 
Growth Fund, Ethical Fund, Sharia 
Fund, and Climate Fund  
New 
Zealand  





KiwiSaver Funds- Low risk (100% 
bonds), Defensive (< 20% invested 
in growth assets), Conservative 
(30% shares and property), 
Balanced (50-50% high risk and 
low risk investments), Growth (70-
85% shares and property), and 
Aggressive (90% or more shares)  
Source: own elaboration based on Poksevim and Akagiray 2019, p. 19. 
Automatic allocation system in New Zealand into default fund and contribution rate 
is based on an assumption that most pension scheme participants have not got enough 
financial literacy and limited knowledge about financial markets and investment 
strategy. This assumptions seem to be quite realistic. But there are also negative 
consequences of using nudges (or “soft compulsion”), such as auto-enrollment into 
default low risk fund. Most of automatically enrolled workers stay in conservative 
KiwiSaver default fund. Some authors (Townstead 2018)  propose to change default 
option from conservative fund to a target date fund (life cycle fund)2.   
KiwiSaver has been evaluated as a success of public policy to increase participation 
in additional pension schemes with the use of behavioral incentives (nudges), 
“rational behavior for the government, but not necessarily the best interests  
of KiwiSaver members” (limited effect on the accumulation of net wealth, potentially 
negative impact due to, already mentioned, conservative nature of default schemes – 
see IRD 2015).   
3.3. Automatic enrolment in Turkey – still an initial stage  
Quite a different situation has been observed in Turkey so far, where auto-
enrollment legislation was introduced in 2017. It is important to indicate that – in 
spite of the U.K.’s pension system, with very long tradition of private pension 
2 Such a solution has been introduced in Employee Capital Plans (PPKs) in Poland – new 
occupational pension schemes which will gradually be implemented from 2019 till 2021. 
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funds and huge capital market – the Turkish private pension system is relatively 
new, with short history of 15 years (see Table 7).   
Table 7. Main features of the Turkish pension system 
Pillar 1 State (public) pension scheme 
The PAYG social security programme, 
which covers employees’ old-age pension 
benefits and other social protection needs 
such as health care, survivorship, disability, 
work-related accident and occupational 
diseases, unemployment, and life insurance. 





net and flat rate
supplementary pension.
Pillar 2 Occupational pensions 
The second pillar of the Turkish pension 
system mainly consists of two mandatory 
occupational pension schemes: OYAK and 
TTK plans. OYAK has been established to 
provide pension and other social benefits 
for military personnel, and TTK pension 
plan covers employees of the state-owned 




 OYAK: Armed forces
pension plan.
 TKK: Employees of the
enterprise fund
 250 small occupational
pension plans
Pillar 3 Private Pensions 
A voluntary private pension system (BES) 
was first introduced in Turkey in 2003. The 
main purposes of introducing the third 
pillar pension were to increase domestic 
savings rates and develop domestic capital 
market. 
Voluntary fully-funded DC 
pension systems 
 18 licensed pension
companies and 408
mutual investment funds
 Introduction of auto-
enrolment in 2017
Source: own elaboration based on Poksevim and Akagiray 2019, p. 19. 
Automatic enrollment has been put into effect by Turkish government together 
with a traditional incentive (government contributes up to 25% of the amount paid 
by the employee). First results (data from 2017-2019) show that auto-enrollment 
is expected to boost participation among first-time savers in Turkey (like in New 
Zealand and in the U.K.), but the opt-out rate from the system is relatively high: 
54% in 2018 (Peksevim and Akgiray 2019).  
5. Conclusions and recommendations
A full assessment of the effects of the introduction of a pension scheme with auto-
enrollment in Turkey will be possible over a longer time horizon. However, there are 
significant differences in the first period of implementation of this program compared 
to United Kingdom and New Zealand where a much higher opting-out rate has been 
observed in Turkey. This may be due to the long tradition of additional private savings 
and the maturity of financial market in the UK and short tradition and smaller 
development of the financial market in Turkey. In New Zealand the time to opt out 
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is relatively short and limited after automatic enrollment. It has impact on the 
smaller number of withdrawals in the first years of the system’s operation. 
Also cultural factors should not be underestimated – a different institutional 
tradition and diversity of pension awareness (however, this is a subject to be 
investigated further). 
Undoubtedly the level of generosity of the public pension system affects the 
willingness to participate in additional pension systems. Public pension systems 
in the UK and in New Zealand offer only basic security against poverty and flat 
rate pension benefits. Turkey’s public pension system belongs to the most 
generous in the world, with replacement rate at 102.1% (OECD 2017, p. 107), the 
highest in OECD countries (!). Turkish society is still relatively young but the 
process of demographic aging has already begun there as well. Public PAYG 
pension system will not be able to maintain such high replacement rate in the 
future and additional retirement savings are needed to fill in this gap. 
The general conclusion that can be formulated on the basis of the comparison 
of pension programs with automatic enrollment in these three countries can  
be formulated as follows: Nudges are not a universal panacea for the problem 
of insufficient retirement savings. But they can provide a valuable addition to 
traditional (economic and institutional) incentives.  
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1. Introduction
Efficiency allows you to create combinations. It is still understood as the actual 
productivity of the analyzed subject to its maximum production efficiency. 
Efficiency has found wide application in economics, not only in business 
operations. Almost all activities checked for efficiency and distribution. One of 
the oldest approaches to assessing effectiveness is based on indicators analysis1. 
Parametric methods are also used. However, using them, you must know the 
functional relationships that occur between input and output variables. Especially 
in public organizations, it is extremely difficult to assess the value of the results 
got. In practice, a non-parametric approach is often practiced. Among them, the 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method is very popular, which is operated in 
many areas, not only related to businesses or management2. Managing this one, 
assuming constant inputs, the researcher is able to find the most effective object 
in the group he analyzes based on empirical data. 
Population aging and a systematic increase in the percentage of older people  
in society results in a greater financial burden on pension systems. Citizens require 
that, after years of paying social security contributions, they receive a decent 
retirement, which will make sure them adequate living conditions in old age. It is 
also important that society is aware of the destination of social security 
contributions3. These trends mean that the adequacy, stability and efficiency  
of pension systems will be checked more and more often. The mainly reasons is the 
control of existing policies and legal reforms so that these systems function better. 
The purpose of this publication was to show the most effective pension system 
among post-Soviet states. The author did this using the CCR model, which 
belongs to the group of models from the DEA method. This action will allow 
further analyses to show the essential features of an effective pension system so 
1 One of the most popular indicators are: Jensen, Sharpe and Treynor. 
2 The DEA method has been used, among others in evaluation: pension funds (Jablonsky 
2007), healthcare in Kenya (Kirigia et al. 2004), Australian universities (Abbot and 
Doucouliagos 2003) and in international comparative analyzes (Sengupta 2002). 




that other post-Soviet countries can model it and reform it. Besides the critical 
analysis of the literature on the subject, the article uses statistical analysis measures 
and, in line with the goal, an analysis of effectiveness using the CCR model. 
In the subsequent parts of the publication, interpretations of effectiveness are 
presented, the theoretical foundations of the DEA method are quoted, and have 
been showed the essence of the CCR model. Then, the process of the study was 
submitted, and the results got were discussed and it based the conclusions on them. 
2. Efficiency
Efficiency is one of the key concepts in economics and is also a popular criterion 
for assessing functioning. The best-known term of efficiency among economists 
is the so-called Pareto optimum. It is a situation in which it is not possible to 
change production or distribution in such a way as to improve the situation of  
a certain group without deteriorating the situation of other entities (Varian 2010, 
pp. 15-16). Another approach that is also widespread in economics is Kaldor-
Hicks effectiveness. It occurs when the profits of one group are higher than the 
losses incurred by another gather because of the changes made (Stringham 2001). 
On the other hand, in the DEA method, efficiency is defined as the ratio of 
weighted effects to the sum of weighted inputs. 
According to Chybalski, analyses of the effectiveness of pension systems have 
become more important because the demographic dividend phenomenon is no longer 
present. He also indicates that the effectiveness of pension systems should be 
considered at two levels. The first is the micro-level, which refers to smooth 
consumption in life. The second is the macro-level, which concerns the current 
GDP distribution (Chybalski 2016, pp. 16-17). Góra and Palmer (2004, p. 3) point 
out that an effective social security system does not affect individual decisions 
regarding the division between work and leisure, as well as consumption and 
savings. What is important in such a system, the value of the premiums paid by 
the entity are equal to the value of the benefit that it may receive, after the account 
is liquidated, after a period of t. 
3. Data Envelopment Analysis Method – theoretical aspect
The Data Envelopment Analysis method belongs to the group of nonparametric 
methods evaluating effectiveness. Using it, the researcher is able to estimate on  
the basis of data related to inputs and effects how the analyzed objects work in the 
examined group. This method assesses the efficiency of economic entities referred to 
as decision making unit (DMU). 
The units that are being analyzed can be graphically represented using an efficiency 
curve (called: best practice frontier), which is estimated based on empirical data. 
Effective units are found on the curve and their efficiency is 1 (the Greek letter theta 
is usually used–). Ineffective objects are under the curve because they are dominated 
by effective objects. The level of their effectiveness is 1-. 
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It is important to be aware of the pros and cons of DEA. An undoubted plus is the fact 
that data with heterogeneous measures can be used for the analysis. The analysis using 
the DEA method also assumes the absence of a random component and also rejects 
the functional assumptions that exist between the studied variables. This allows 
estimating efficiency in the public sphere where it is difficult to determine the 
relationship between inputs and effects (the efficiency curve is estimated based on 
empirical data) (Thanassoulis 2003, pp. 227-250). Important, the DEA method allows 
you to use more than one input and output variable in the analysis, which is not 
allowed by traditional indicator methods. The analysis of empirical data in the DEA 
method also indicates factors that do not have a direct impact on the effectiveness of 
the entity (Thanassoulis 2003, pp. 227-250). It should be borne in mind, however, that 
the set level of efficiency can only be referred to the analyzed set. Any modification 
(adding or removing an object) will affect the results, so the researcher should be 
choose the exact number. 
The undoubted disadvantage of the DEA method is also redundancy, i.e. the 
multiplication of effective solutions. Therefore, it is likely that several of the examined 
objects will be effective. The limitation, which may also be considered to some extent 
as a disadvantage, is the homogeneity requirement of the analyzed DMUs4. The 
condition of stability may also impede the analysis. A. Emrouznejad, G. Amin (2009, 
p. 489) point out that the standard DEA model is stable when:
𝑛 max 𝑚 ∗ 𝑠, 3 𝑚 𝑠  (1) 
Where n is the number of DMUs observed, and m and s are the number of entries and 
exits, respectively, In the development of the DEA method a great contribution was 
made, among others: Banker et al. (2004); Cook and Seiford (2009). 
4. The essence of the CCR model
The CCR model was proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978, is the first 
model from the DEA group5. It considers efficiency in Farrell’s sense, which allows 
the creation of a hierarchy of examined objects from the most to the least effective. 
The guiding idea of assessing the efficiency of facilities using the CCR model is to 
determine whether the technology that is used in the examinee facility best 
accomplishes the assumed tasks (Guzik 2009, p. 55). In addition, the CCR model 
allows you to create benchmarking formulas for facilities that have been ineffective, 
i.e.   1, and show results deficits or excess investments in them. All objects  
4 Polish researcher Guzik (2009) said that this is more because of the convenience of 
analysts than the needs of practice. 
5 For more on the origins of the DEA method and the beginnings of the CCR model, see 
Cooper et al. (2004, pp. 8-15). 
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considered effective, i.e.  = 1 in the CCR model are treated equally6, which can be 
considered a minus of this model. 
According to Tollo and Nalchigar (2008, pp. 597-598), the disadvantage of the CCR 
model may be the fact that it must be run n times, for each DMU, to calculate the 
efficiency of all facilities. They also believe that a permanent of scale may be a kind 
of trap, i.e. a proportional increase in outlays means a proportional increase in results. 
If we compare the CCR model to the regression equation, we can see it that in both 
cases a larger number of explanatory variables will cause higher efficiency 
(coefficient of determination). However, increasing the number of variables in the 
CCR model will worsen the efficiency got or leave it unchanged. With regression 
equations, it is difficult to determine whether this will increase or decrease the 
determination coefficient. While comparing this model to the production function, in 
both cases the relationship between inputs and effects is analyzed. 
5. Methodology of the research
The subject of the analysis is pension systems in the post-Soviet countries. The spatial 
scope of work is limited by the number of countries that arose after the collapse of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). They are Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan was turned off for the lack 
of availability of data from the analysis. This study covers the years 2012, 2015 
and 2018. Due to the fact that the literature recommends that the number of objects 
covered by the analysis exceed the number of inputs and results accepted for the 
study, three indicators have been analyzed – one input and two output (see Table 1). 
The adoption of relative values allowed the author to abstract, among others, on 
the size of the analyzed countries. 
Table 1. Indicators used in the study 
Name of the indicator Role in the model 
Insurance contribution for retirement security (in %) Input 
Replacement rate (in %) Output 
The value of an average pension in USD Output 
Source: Own study. 
The author knows that he could take other variables as measures of inputs and results, 
which could change the order of the benchmark presented in Table 2. However, the 
6 To rank objects that have proved to be 100% effective, other models are used that are  
a development of the CCR model. An example can be models of hyper-efficiency, which were 
initiated by Andersen and Petersen (AP model) in 1993 (Andersen and Petersen 1993, pp. 
1261-1264), which in later years were subject to numerous modifications. More about super-
efficiency models, e.g. Esmaeilzadeh and Hadi-Vencheh (2013). Another method is even the 
cross-effectiveness used by Jahanshahloo et al. 2011). The classification of various methods 
for ranking objects analyzed by the DEA method was presented by Adler et al. (2002) and 
Aldamak and Zolfaghari (2017). 
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selection of variables was determined by data availability. From the expenditure side, 
the amount of the insurance premium for retirement security (in %) was adopted for 
analysis. The values discharged by both the employee and the employer have been 
added. This is due to the fact that in most common pension systems, both the 
employee and the employer pay the premium to secure old age. The analysis omits 
the contributions that are required to pay from farmers or self-employed persons, as 
they often have different conditions (e.g. percentage of declared income or a specific 
amount). From the effects side, the replacement rate was adopted, which is the relation 
of the average pension to the average salary in the economy. It was chosen by the 
author because it is used as a reference point in many international documents (e.g. 
International Labor Organization regulations). In addition, it is an effective indicator 
for comparative analyses. The author is aware of the disadvantages of this indicatior7. 
However, he believes that it allows a good comparison between countries that do not 
have one common database. The second indicator related to the effects of the pension 
system is the value of the average pension in a country. It has been converted from 
local currencies to USD at the average annual rate so a researcher can compare your 
retirement benefits. Thanks to this approach, it is easier to estimate in which of the 
analyzed countries pensions are the highest and the lowest. 
Although in the literature one can come across an approach to compare the CCR 
model with the BCC model8, the author has not decided on such an approach. The 
main reason is that the CCR model has more discriminatory power (it shows 
higher levels of inefficiency than the BCC model). 
6. Evaluation of the effectiveness of pension systems
in post-Soviet countries
When analyzing the efficiency coefficients calculated on the basis of input and 
output data for 2012, 2015 and 2018, it can be seen that the most effective pension 
systems in Armenia and Estonia. However, the pension system in Georgia was 
definitely the least effective (efficiency at 20%). In 2012, the system in Belarus 
was also among the most effective. Subsequently, it was possible to rank 
Kazakhstan and Russia. However, from the end of the ranking for 2012, Moldova, 
Tajikistan and Georgia can be qualified (respectively efficiency ratios of 0.227, 
0.214 and 0.200). This year, 7 countries achieved an efficiency ratio higher both 
in relation to the average (0.605) and median (0.598). 
In 2015, the most effective pension systems included those operating in Armenia, 
Estonia, and Lithuania. The Belarusian pension system deteriorated in relation to the 
analyzed systems and came in 5th place. Kazakhstan remained in the same position, 
although its performance indicator slightly deteriorated. However, analyzing the last 
three items in 2015, the same countries were again noted (only the order of Tajikistan 
7 About the imperfections of the replacement rate, among others Chybalski and 
Marcinkiewicz (2016). 
8 A model created by Banker et al. (1984) that assumes scale variability. 
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and Moldova changed). This year, the median efficiency ratio was higher than the 
average for this indicator (0.036 difference). 
In 2018, only Armenian and Estonian were fully effective among the analyzed 
pension systems. The Lithuanian pension system has deteriorated significantly, 
which placed it 4th in the ranking. Significant drops also apply to Belarus and 
Russia (respectively from 5th to 9th and 6th to 10th). However, in 2018 significant 
improvements in efficiency ratios were also noted. Uzbekistan improved its 
position from 10th to 6th, and Azerbaijan from 7th to 5th This year also the median 
was higher than the average for the analyzed coefficients. 
When analyzing the average of individual indicators9 from 2012, 2015 and 2018,  
it can be concluded that the most effective pension systems (based on the variables 
adopted by the author) in post-Soviet countries occur in Armenia and Estonia. 
Systems in Lithuanian, Kazakh and Belarusian rank further. However, the last five 
positions in the created ranking included: Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Moldova, Tajikistan 
and Georgia (respectively efficiency ratios are 0.554, 0.411, 0.242, 0.232 and 0.200). 
It is worth noting that the highest average and median values for efficiency 
coefficients were achieved in 2015. At the same time, the standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation were the lowest. 
Table 2. Values of efficiency coefficients and position in the ranking of individual 
post-Soviet countries in 2012-2018 
2012 2015 2018 Average 
EC Rank EC Rank EC Rank EC Rank 
Armenia 1,000 1 1,000 1 1,000 1 1,000 1 
Azerbaijan 0,491 9 0,673 7 0,772 5 0,631 6 
Belarus 1,000 1 0,722 5 0,552 9 0,691 5 
Estonia 1,000 1 1,000 1 1,000 1 1,000 1 
Georgia 0,200 14 0,200 14 0,200 14 0,200 14 
Kazakhstan 0,771 4 0,760 4 0,984 3 0,715 4 
Kyrgyzstan 0,589 8 0,666 8 0,648 7 0,631 6 
Latvia 0,607 7 0,602 9 0,599 8 0,603 8 
Lithuania 0,728 6 1,000 1 0,831 4 0,836 3 
Moldova 0,227 12 0,242 13 0,266 12 0,242 12 
Russia 0,752 5 0,689 6 0,539 10 0,564 9 
Tajikistan 0,214 13 0,246 12 0,241 13 0,232 13 
Ukraine 0,450 10 0,493 11 0,268 11 0,411 11 
Uzbekistan 0,438 11 0,589 10 0,672 6 0,554 10 
Average 0,605 0,634 0,612 0,594 
Median 0,598 0,670 0,624 0,617 
Standard deviation 0,285 0,270 0,287 0,257 
Coefficient of 
variation (in %) 
47,2 42,5 46,9 43,4 
Source: Own calculations based on data from statistical offices of individual countries. 
Note: In the average column, the efficiency coefficient was calculated based on the average 
parameters for 2012, 2015 and 2018. EC means the efficiency coefficient. 
9 The author separately calculated the average for the amount of the insurance premium for 
retirement security, replacement rates and the average pension value in USD. 
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7. Conclusion
After analyzing the amount of the insurance premium for retirement security, 
replacement rates, as well as the value of the average pension in USD as variables 
of the CCR model, it was found that the most effective pension systems among 
post-Soviet countries exist in Armenia and Estonia. In all three analyzed years 
(2012, 2015 and 2018) they achieved 100% efficiency. Apart from them, Belarus 
(in 2012) and Lithuania (in 2015) were included in this group once. The average 
efficiency coefficient throughout the entire period exceeded 0.6. The least 
effective pension system was in Georgia, as the efficiency ratio was only 0.200. 
At the turn of the analyzed years, i.e. 2012-2018, two significant improvements in 
ranking position as well as two deteriorations can be listed. The improvement of 
the effectiveness of the pension system was noted primarily in Azerbaijan and 
Uzbekistan (from 9th to 5th and 11th to 6th, respectively). However, a significant 
reduction in the level of efficiency was observed in Belarus and Russia (from 1st 
to 9th and from 5th to 10th, respectively). 
The results showed that the rulers of responsible pension systems in post-Soviet 
countries should look more at the solutions adopted in Armenia and Estonia. 
Implement similar activities in your countries, taking into account other 
conditions not included in the analysis, including the growth rate of the proportion 
of older people, cultural conditions can help reform functioning systems. 
In further research, it is worth considering expanding the number of countries to 
be analyzed, e.g. by remaining countries from the Eastern Bloc, or by countries 
belonging to the European Union. According to the author, it is also worth 
considering in the next analyses of the effectiveness of pension systems the 
increase in the number of variables subject to examination. However, one should 
keep in mind the condition of stability of the DEA method, which was presented 
in part 3 of this article10. It is also worth considering the use of models other than 
CCR from the DEA group of methods. 
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1. Introduction
Occupational pension schemes are an important element of the pension systems 
of many countries. In the face of problems related to the financing of public 
systems, private forms of saving for retirement are becoming crucial (Antolin et 
al. 2012, p. 7). In recent years, changes in the types of occupational pension 
schemes can be observed. The once popular defined benefit (DB) schemes are 
replaced by defined contribution (DC) schemes (Wise 2001, p. 122; Turner and 
Hughes 2008; Bovenberg and Gradus 2015). As a result the risk associated with 
financing the pension scheme is transferred from the employer to the member. In 
order to enable risk sharing hybrid schemes have been developed in many 
countries by combining elements of two traditional forms (Turner 2014; Broeders 
et al. 2013). They are often a modification of the DB scheme e.g. by introduction 
of an indexation conditional on the financial position of the scheme, as is the case 
in the Netherlands (Blommestein et al. 2009, Ponds and van Riel 2009). On the 
other hand, the growing popularity of DC schemes has contributed to the 
development of hybrid programs that modify such a scheme by, for example, 
introduction of a guarantee on the minimum rate of return on investment, as is the 
case in Switzerland (Bütler and Staubli 2010). In addition, many authors search 
for solutions that would offer the benefits of the DC scheme for the employer (pre-
determined contributions) with the advantages of the DB scheme for the member 
(pre-determined benefits). 
Sutcliffe (2010) presented a proposal for a retirement program which satisfies the 
above criteria. It uses a deferred pensions financed by a single premium (SPDA – 
single premium deferred annuity). Aim of this paper is to construct a model that 
would allow to calculate expected benefit amount in a scheme financed by SPDA, 
and to compare it with an amount that could be achieved in a traditional DC 
scheme. Second aim is to extend the concept of SPDA scheme to allow for the 
risk of high annuity prices to be shared between member and employer.  
2. Scheme financed by SPDA
Scheme which uses single premium deferred annuities (SPDA) was described by 
Sutcliffe in 2010. SPDA is an insurance product which can be purchased at any 
time by paying a single premium, in exchange for payment of the benefit (pension) 





price of the deferred pension by adopting assumptions as to the probability  
of survival of the insured until the start of payment, further life expectancy from 
the time of start of payment or the interest rate used to discount future value  
of benefit to the time of purchase. 
In a scheme financed by SPDA a contribution (determined in advance as  
a percentage of the member's salary) is paid every year. It is used to purchase  
a deferred pension, the payment of which will begin when the member retires at  
a certain age in the future. In this way, the contributions are defined in advance 
(as in the DC scheme), while the benefit is fixed (as in the DB scheme) at the time 
the deferred pension is bought. The use of various types of deferred annuities, e.g. 
those offering a benefit adjusted with inflation, paid for a specified period of time 
or until the end of the member's life, allows the type of benefit to be adapted  
to the requirements of a given occupational scheme or a given member.  
An additional advantage of this solution is the fact that the investment risk and the 
longevity risk are borne by the insurance company offering the deferred pension, 
and not by the employer (as in the DB scheme) or the member (as in the DC 
scheme). Insurance companies are subject to strict legal regulations, which 
reduces the risk that the benefit will not be paid to the member (Sutcliffe 2010, 
pp. 16-18). 
The disadvantage of this solution is the underdeveloped market of deferred 
pensions in many countries, which means that buying this product may not be 
possible or may be very expensive (Blake 1999, p. 360). In addition, the costs that 
the insurance company will take into account when calculating the pension price 
may be higher than the management costs in the program offered by the employer. 
Sutcliffe (2010, p. 21) notes that the use of deferred pensions will likely result  
in a lower amount of benefit than that obtained in the DC or DB scheme.  
The member is also exposed to the risk of an unknown purchase price of the 
deferred pension, which may increase in relation to the assumed. 
 
3. Assumptions 
In order to compare benefit amount that could be achieved in a scheme financed by 
SPDA and a traditional DC scheme models of both schemes were constructed. It was 
assumed that a member saves for their retirement for 35 years, during which 
contributions are paid annually at the start of each year, and retires aged 60. 
Contribution rate was set at 3.5% of salary, the required contribution in the new 
occupational schemes in Poland. The assumptions are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Assumptions used in modelling benefit amount in pension schemes 
Parameter Value 
Retirement age 60 years 
Saving period 35 years 
Contribution rate 3.5% of salary 
Salary increase rate 1% per annum 
Source: own work. 
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In a DC scheme, the contributions are accumulated in the member’s account with 
an investment rate of return earned by the scheme’s investments. Model assumes 
that investment rate each year is a random variable following normal distribution 
with mean 3% and standard deviation 8%. At retirement value accumulated in the 
account is used to purchase an annuity from an insurance company. The price 
of this annuity is calculated using interest rate of 1% and expected future lifetime 
of a person aged 60 according to the formula: 
𝑎 | (1) 
where i is the annual interest rate and n is the expected future lifetime in whole 
years. If expected future lifetime is not an integer, an additional payment equal  
to a fraction of the last year survived will be made. It is assumed that when the 
member joins the scheme the expected future lifetime of a person aged 60 is equal 
to 21.85 (GUS 2018), and by the time of member’s retirement in 35 years this 
expected future lifetime for a person aged 60 will have increased by a certain 
amount every year. This amount is a random variable which follows normal 
distribution, with mean 0.1 and standard deviation 0.05 (see also Gierusz 2019). 
In a scheme financed by SPDA contribution paid is used to purchase a deferred 
annuity from an insurance company. This annuity is priced by calculating the 
value of annuity payable to a person aged 60 (as described above) and discounting 
it to the time of purchase using a certain discount rate, according to the formula: 
𝑎 || 𝑝 𝑎 | (2) 
where r is the annual discount rate, k is the number of years remaining till member 
reaches 60 years of age, x is the current member’s age, kpx is the probability that 
a member aged x survives the next k years. 
It is assumed that discount rate follows normal distribution, with mean μ and 
standard deviation 1%. Mean μ itself is also a random variable following normal 
distribution, with mean 2% and standard deviation 0.5%. A lower mean for 
discount rate was chosen than for an investment rate (2% vs 3%) due to the fact 
that discount rate is set by insurance company based on expected return  
on investments that will be used to back up the pension guarantee. These are likely 
to be more secure investments, such as corporate and government bonds, in 
comparison with investments that could be used by a DC scheme, such as equities 
and other more risky assets (see also Sutcliffe 2010, p.22). In addition,  
the insurance company will include its costs and profit margins in the discount 
rate. The insurance company also takes into account probability that the member 
will survive from the time of purchase to retirement using life Tables as published 
by (GUS 2018). The amount of member’s pension is then calculated as the sum 
of all the deferred pensions purchased during the scheme membership. 
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4. Results
Method of simulation of different financial and demographic scenarios was used 
to calculate and compare benefit amounts that could be achieved in both pension 
schemes. One of those scenarios is presented in more detail below. Figure 1 shows 
expected deferred annuity prices (calculated assuming that random variables – 
discount rate and expected future lifetime – will take values equal to expected 
value) and actual deferred annuity prices observed in this particular scenario. 
Fig. 1. Expected and actual deferred annuity prices in analysed scenario 
Source: own work. 
As shown in Figure 1, expected annuity prices increase with time left  
to retirement. This is mostly due to shorter discounting period. Using these 
expected prices, the expected benefit amount (expressed as % of member’s final 
salary) was 7.3%. The actual prices were broadly similar to expected, with some 
deviations, for example in year 14 when the actual price was much higher than 
expected due to low discount rate in this year. 
Each year a contribution rate paid into the scheme financed by SPDA was used  
to purchase a deferred pension payable from age 60. Figure 2 presents how the 
total member’s pension (sum of all deferred pensions purchased each year) was 
accumulated. Amounts are expressed as percentage of member’s final salary. 
Each year the total pension accumulated by that time is split between accumulated 





Fig. 2. Pension (expressed as % of final salary) accumulated each year, split 
between accumulated in the current and in previous years 
Source: own work. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the pension amount (expressed as % of final salary) 
increases in an almost linear way. Black rectangles show how much of the pension 
was bought using current year’s contribution, and grey show total pension benefit 
bought in previous years. 
In this scenario, at retirement the total pension amount was equal to 7.2% of final 
salary. In comparison, the replacement rate that could have been achieved from  
a DC scheme was slightly higher, and equal to 8.3% of final salary. 
The simulations were then repeated 10000 times and for each scheme mean and 
standard deviation of benefit amount were calculated. These are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Mean and standard deviation of benefit amount as % of final salary in each 
scheme – simulation results 
Scheme Mean benefit amount 
Standard deviation of benefit 
amount 
DC 8.1% 2.5% 
SPDA 7.5% 0.8% 









The mean replacement rate for a DC scheme was slightly higher than in the SPDA 
scheme due to higher mean investment rate assumed for reasons explained above. 
The variability of results was much lower in case of SPDA scheme, as it is not 
subject to year on year variability in investment rates, but only to variability in 
annuity prices. An additional advantage is that the member can observe the 
amount of pension that is being accumulated in SPDA every year (as shown in 
Figure 2), but in a DC scheme the pension amount remains unknown until 
retirement when it is purchased, hence member is also at risk of sudden changes 
in either investment rate or annuity price at retirement. 
In the scenario investigated in more detail above the replacement rate obtained in 
SPDA scheme (7.2%) was slightly below the expected (7.3%). This was due to high 
deferred annuity prices in some years. Member in this scheme is exposed to risk of 
high annuity prices, leading to a low benefit obtained from the scheme. In order to 
share this risk between member and employer the following modification of SPDA 
scheme was constructed, making it a hybrid scheme. If the actual deferred annuity 
price in a given year was much higher than the expected price, additional employer 
contribution was paid into the scheme so that the effect of higher actual price did not 
lower significantly the amount of pension bought.  
Firstly a price indicator for a given year was calculated as a ratio of actual and 
expected prices minus 1, expressed in %. Secondly, a new required deferred annuity 
price was calculated as follows: 
– if the price indicator was below 5% required price stayed the same as actual
price,
– if the price indicator was between 5% and 20%, the required price was equal
to expected price times 105%,
– if the price indicator was over 20% the required price was equal to expected
price times (100% + price indicator – 15%).
The benefit amount purchased in a given year was then based on the required 
price, and employer had to pay an extra contribution equal to a difference between 
the amount required to purchase such a benefit and the contribution paid that year. 
Figure 3 presents benefit amount purchased each year in the hybrid SPDA scheme. 
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Fig. 3. Pension (expressed as % of final salary) bought each year, split between 
amount bought by normal contributions and extra employer contributions 
Source: own work. 
In the investigated scenario the actual price was higher than the expected price by 
more than 5% in 17 out of 35 scheme years. In those years extra contributions were 
paid by employer, increasing the amount of benefit bought to 7.4%. Simulations  
of different scenarios were then run and results are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3. Mean and standard deviation of benefit amount as % of final salary in SDPA 





of benefit amount 
Proportion of 
scenarios were 
benefit was lower 
than expected 
SPDA 7.5% 0.8% 42% 
Hybrid SPDA 7.7% 0.7% 30% 
Source: own work. 
As shown in Table 3, by sharing the risk of high deferred annuity prices between 
member and employer the mean benefit amount was increased, and variability  
of the benefit amount was lowered. This was achieved by additional employer 
contributions. Mean employer contribution was 3% of member’s final salary,  
and on average the contribution was required in 11.8 out of 35 scheme years. 
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5. Conclusions
Pension scheme financed by SPDA combines features of a DC scheme (fixed 
contribution amount) with those of a DB scheme (part of benefit amount is fixed 
once the deferred annuity is purchased). The simulations performed in this paper 
have shown that the mean benefit amount obtained by the member from such 
a scheme was lower than that which could be obtained in a traditional DC scheme, 
but it was characterized by a lower variability (lower standard deviation of benefit 
amount). An additional advantage of SPDA scheme is that the member can 
monitor the amount of benefit already purchased at any time of the scheme 
membership, in contrast to the DC scheme where the benefit remains unknown 
until retirement. 
One of the main risks to the member in scheme financed by deferred annuities is 
the risk of high annuity prices. A modification of the scheme allows to share this 
risk between member and employer by obliging the employer to pay additional 
contributions in years when annuity prices are much higher than expected. Such  
a hybrid scheme was proposed and investigated in this paper. Simulations have 
shown that the mean benefit amount was slightly higher than in a SPDA scheme 
with no risk sharing, with lower standard deviation and lower proportion of 
scenarios where the benefit was lower than expected. 
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1. Introduction
The ageing population (Pestieau and Jackson 2000) is a big challenge for all advanced 
systems of social security (Tinker 2002; Soest et al. 2010). The problems are twofold: 
with prolonging human life expectancy individually, and with imbalances between 
generations, where different population behaviour can create unfavourable 
demographic pyramids and introduce tough issues of intergenerational relationships 
and solidarity. Similarly split are the tasks for resolve: how to handle the specific 
needs and high costs of the care for the elderly (regardless of their count), and how to 
resolve imbalances that are emerging in public budgets because of unfavourable 
demographic development in general (because of their count). 
Challenges of prolonging active participation emerged, as the developed countries 
face the pressure of increasing the pension age, which is connected with health status, 
politically sensitive and has got many risks and caveats, as well as opportunities for 
those individuals and jobs that can extend their productive activity with adequate 
support from social systems (Gessa et al. 2017). Also, ability to individually adjust 
workload is important. (Virtanen et al. 2014). In part, pension age problems can be 
solved by schemes that allow for individual adjustment of retirement age and the 
expansion of work activity; this may be better than changing the statutory retirement 
age for each participant.  However, a recent OECD’s editorial (OECD 2017) also 
states that “older workers are a diverse group and the flexibility of retirement  
is double-edged because it can increase the participation rate and standard of living 
of those who want and can work longer, but can also lead to an underestimation 
of financial needs in retirement and early retirement with reduced benefits and living 
standards”. It can also be difficult to plan flexibly for those with lower working 
incomes or fail to find good opportunities in the labour market, on the contrary, it can 
be easy for those with higher working incomes and want and can work in their 
profession longer than statutory retirement age. 
Various pension and health systems have responded to this issue differently. We 
could observe the reaction in different types of health care systems, such as 
introduction of government-financed health plans like Medicare in the USA since 
1960s (Berkowitz 2005), compulsory social insurance payments for health care 
and long-term care and special disease management programs for pensioners in 
Germany and the willingness to pay for health insurance there (Bock et al. 2016) 
or public administration’s efforts to improve the care for the elderly in 
DOI: 10.34658/9788366287938.18
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government-run systems like Great Britain’s one (Bowman et al. 1999; Ajayi 
et al. 1995). 
This paper aims to enlighten those issues and suggests prepaid health schemes as a 
supplementary financing scheme for voluntary healthcare provision, provided that the 
solid universal health care system is maintained well. At the same time, it tracks the 
changes in specific needs of the elderly and emphasizes the link to pension systems 
and their extensions as the reliable resource of financing voluntary care for the elderly. 
Methodologically we use empirical analysis of social system settings, SWOT 
analysis for the prepaid programmes, theoretical explanation of the financing 
mechanisms targeted at older age and general theory of public finance and  
social security.  
2. The importance of public financing of universal standards
Generally, when a public financed universal health system is run, the question  
of pensioners’ health financing is whether they ought to pay some contribution 
or tax for health care. The practice in OECD countries differs in this case,  
for example in Czechia, pensioners currently pay neither income tax, neither 
health contributions from their pensions, but in some countries like Germany  
or the Netherlands they must pay some compulsory contributions. Of course,  
if we impose some health contribution on pensioners, we must take it into account 
when doing pension system design, as it will decrease the “net pension” 
(disposable income) that the elderly will have for other expenditure. In this regard, 
the financing of the universal part of the system is mainly a question of public 
choice and configuration of the fiscal space for health (Cashin and Tandon 2010; 
WHO 2018). according to the incomes and pension schemes for the elderly. Usually, 
when a person enters pension age or retires, his or her social status changes, however 
and this has consequences on the rules of health contributions, too.  
We can see that with changes according to age works also the USA system, where 
reaching 65 years of age means that you can enrol to the government-subsidized and 
organized health plan called Medicare. It is obvious, that its existence is determined 
by the needs of the elderly and the behaviour of private health insurance, where the 
premiums can rapidly rise with age and therefore can be unattainable for many older 
people. The dilemmas associated with this can be very complicated, as can be seen  
on the following quote (which we cite in full because it shows well how it empirically 
works in the USA) about termination of company-based coverage at 65. 
“If you're not yet 65 but are retired and receiving retiree health benefits from your 
former employer, make sure you're aware of the employer's rules regarding Medicare. 
Some employers don't continue to offer retiree health coverage for former employees 
once they turn 65, opting instead for retirees to transition to being covered solely by 
Medicare. Without coverage from your company, you'll need Medicare to ensure that 
you are covered for potential health issues that arise as you age. 
Some companies will not cut a retiree off completely at the age of 65, but instead 
continue to offer supplemental retiree benefits, which can be used in conjunction 
with Medicare (they may require you to enrol in both Medicare Part A and Part B 
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in order to receive full benefits—as secondary coverage—from the retiree health 
plan). The supplemental retiree health benefits may include prescription drug 
coverage, doctor visits, and other outpatient health care. Medicare will be your 
primary coverage if you're covered under a retiree health plan, with the plan 
offered by your former employer serving as secondary coverage. 
If you have individual market coverage, purchased in the exchange or outside the 
exchange, you'll need to contact the exchange or your insurer to ask them to cancel 
your coverage when you transition to Medicare. Prior to the Affordable Care Act, 
individual market insurers typically wouldn't insure anyone over the age of 64,  
so plans were automatically terminated when people turned 65. That is no longer 
the case, so enrolees need to make sure that they actively cancel their individual 
market coverage when they switch to Medicare.” (Montgomery 2019). 
From the cited example, we can see that the differentiation of coverage according 
to age, albeit it can be defended from the individual freedom principle arguments, 
does not bring much when we must cover the necessary and required care. 
Therefore, in most health care systems, the public contributions as the share 
of income are the preferred way to finance health, the American approach of the 
government being one of the plans’ provider targeted on the elderly works  
in American context only. The same applies to pension schemes – we can say that 
the replacement rate to some level (e.g. 50-60% of previous wage – OECD 
average net replacement rate is approx. 58% in 2018) ought to be achieved from 
publicly (compulsory) financed and guaranteed scheme, so that the pension 
system is similarly stable as the health one in its basic functions.  
3. Lifestyle changes and the role of voluntary schemes for older age
Given the importance of universal care and financing, there is a possibility  
to utilize also voluntary schemes that consist of the care that primarily help to the 
well-being, quality of life, comfort and responsiveness of health services 
consumed by the elderly. They are not limited to the elderly and can be used  
at any age, but the older age is especially suited for them as the needs of seniors 
are both higher and more specific than general population in productive age.  
Paradoxically, a person with a certain health limit who wants to lead an active life 
requires a greater range of better-quality services from the health system than  
if he would only passively experience his illness. At the same time, a far larger 
proportion of patients previously isolated or largely excluded from normal life are 
actively involved in it, which is certainly desirable from the point of view  
of national economic and others, but on the other hand, it puts increased demands 
on the health system because the direct quantified costs of "putting" such a person 
in an adequately compensated state are higher than in the past. The financial 
benefits of integrating people into society are quantifiable only in the long run,  
if at all, and we will add to it the probably difficult-to-quantifiable contribution 
of moral and ethical, especially in relation to the specific fate and life feelings  
of a particular person. In addition, people who can live a normal life through health 
care, in most cases, thanks to the experience of life, are very grateful to patients 
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and are subsequently able to improve their health, which they have acquired 
through adequate treatment of their disease, really translate into your performance 
at work and improve the quality of your life as a whole. This is already the reason 
for which it is worth looking for ways that will improve the possibilities of such 
people to engage in everyday life. 
In other words, the current standard of living places far greater demands on health 
care than in the past, as many life activities are conditional on at least 
compensation for the patient's negative health in a particular area, which is not 
necessary for its "normal" survival, but for the conduct of modern, active life is 
necessary. Even the range of activities that people perform in life is increasing. 
People of a high age play sports, travel, work in responsible positions, even if part-
time. This puts increased demands on the system, as these “patients” come to the 
doctors, saying they do not want to put up with their illness or their limitations 
and want to overcome them. That is why people who, due to their profession  
or penchant, need to be in good health and simply want to be “fit” and, in the case 
of health problems, if they already arise, want to solve them effectively, preferably 
with minimal impact on their employment or leisure activities. The difficulty 
of these patients is also manifested in the level of the services required, comfort 
in terms of time, etc. This leads to a significant differentiation of patients in terms 
of needs, as the aforementioned groups mix with those who do not require or need 
these services.  
The above factors cause current medicine, of course, to continue to face problems of 
medical nature in the treatment of a particular patient, but increasingly with socio-
economic constraints. This is exacerbated by the increasing dependence of effectively 
performed medicine on medical equipment and advanced pharmaceutical procedures. 
Thus, the results of the health system are closer to integration with the economic level 
and the mechanisms of allocation of funds to the health sector.  
The current society has brought about fundamental changes in the view of the 
individual and his lifestyle. From the pursuit of mere survival, the emphasis is on the 
effective and responsible conduct of all actors in the economy. The economization 
of all areas of life and the emphasis on individual responsibility of the individual 
assume that each person will be able to take into account for their own actions and 
thus his own health, as well as the position of man in society and the relative level his 
remuneration is mainly due to his currently award-winning performance.  
The corresponding health situation thus becomes one of the basic conditions for 
one to be able to take advantage of the possibilities offered by the market 
economy, both in terms of the long-term life perspective and in terms of exercising 
its capabilities at a certain time. Therefore, in the market economy, the pursuit  
of a person's good health is not only an objective finding, which results from 
a general desire and an effort to survive, but also an important condition for 
a person's optimal position in individual life situations and the whole economy.  
Therefore, we can well justify that at least part of the population that has got “health 
investor’s” approach (Chytil et al. 2015) will have higher requirements that the 
universal part of pension and health system can adequately cover. So, we can 
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construct additional schemes of services’ provision. However, for financing such  
a program on a regular basis, the elderly need a reliable source of financing, and since 
their working capabilities can gradually decrease, they rely on pension system 
to supply them disposable income that they can spend also on the health and social 
care. Simultaneously, in some countries like Czechia, the current pension pillars have 
not been designed with this requirement in mind, rather they followed the assumption 
that the universal system will cover all the services that seniors are going to need. This 
philosophy is good concerning the universal segment of care, but cannot cope with 
the individual needs of those, who can and want to have a higher level of well-being 
at the older age. 
Therefore, a model of voluntary incentive pension system extension had been created 
and published (Mertl et al. 2019) which features the required scheme that allows the 
participants to gradually decrease the work load and provides supplementary pension 
benefits. Part of those benefits can be used also for financing health care, including 
the prepaid packages shown in this paper.  
The main advantage of the model is that it shows the real possibility of creating an 
economic base for the expansion of productive services enabling the acquisition, 
preservation, and employment of human capital. Therefore, it is not only about how 
to ensure a decent standard of living and quality realization for people in older age, 
but primarily that a very strong and big demand for productive services and, at the 
same time, sources for their financing, which are created on a purely economic basis, 
is created by employing these people (to which the incentive extension motivates). 
This is not the only one, but significant and easily achievable, and concrete form 
of transforming the development of human abilities into the most dynamic factor  
of economic growth and the change in the character of this growth. 
At this point, it is important to show how the benefits from the incentive extension 
can be utilized. There are various possibilities and various life situations, but in the 
context of this paper, the following usage may become essential (Mertl et al. 2019): 
1) Voluntary forms of health care and services financing, which are oriented
to prolonging the productive time and quality of life. From the pure point of view
of financial flows, we consider this area to be the most important. As a practical
alternative to private health insurance, which has strong limitations caused
especially by the necessity of individual health risk evaluation (medical
underwriting) and related information asymmetry, prepaid schemes for
individually adjusted health packages can be considered.
2) Providing at older age social and support services that can enable the relevant
productive person to spare time and energy in order to continue performing the
relevant work activities. Still nowadays in Czechia, this is an underdeveloped
sector of economy, which, of course, for many older citizens’ case with
retained abilities and qualification, means a waste of human resources.
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4. The role of voluntary prepaid programmes
The development of medicine and socio-economic environment has brought new 
treatment options and health services for patients. Likewise, some patients’ demand 
for comfort, time of health professionals and the extent of consumed health services 
are increasing. Although it has several ethical connections, it is currently recognized 
in developed countries that doctors can also provide care to those patients who have 
higher requirements than others, and these requirements are not strictly objectively 
justified by their health status. This moves us from the category of care that must be 
provided into the category of care a patient can or wants to consume. In this context, 
optional healthcare schemes can be created that can be used to finance and provide it. 
The first option is logically private health insurance. Although it has suitable features 
for some scenarios, it also has got many problems that are not addressed well using 
the market mechanism. This is mainly due to the information asymmetry and adverse 
selection issues, which in many cases lead to the failure of the health insurance market 
(Cutler and Zeckhauser 1997; 1999). The individual’s health risk is one of the worst 
quantifiable and insurable risks on the market, develops unpredictably among 
individuals, and its possible evaluation through medical underwriting constitutes  
a reason for major legal and ethical disputes. Moreover, health risks of the elderly are 
very high and therefore insuring  them is very difficult. In addition, in case of high-
quality healthcare, it is sometimes difficult to look for a randomness element that is 
generally necessary for the use of insurance mechanisms. Still, accident insurance, 
critical illness insurance, hospitalization or long-term care insurance can work.  
Even general private health care insurance can be offered, but its marketability is low 
for the stated reasons, especially for older people who had not bought such insurance 
product when they were younger and had lower risk. 
It is also possible to pay for optional health care directly out-of-pocket, which is 
the simplest form, but it has many limitations (Arrow 1963) (e.g. financial 
hardship at the moment of the treatment, time-limited decision in asymmetric 
position, highly limited ability of typical patient to “shop around” for the best price) 
leading to marginal role of these schemes in developed countries (OECD 2017). 
Suitable possibility for extending schemes of optional healthcare financing comprises 
prepaid health care programmes. Their economic construction is relatively simple and 
consists in the regular allocation of the amount chosen (e.g. monthly or yearly), for 
which the client receives a healthcare package according to their preferences and 
needs. Therefore, we need not quantify health risks or otherwise restrict access into 
the product, although it is of course really useful to adapt the package to the needs and 
health of the client according to their preferences or as a result of expert advice when 
purchasing the product. Different clients can consequently have different packages 
for the same money, as will be shown below.  
Let us assume that a patient can give 1 000 CZK for his health services monthly, 
e.g. 12 000 CZK annually (can be lower or higher amount according to the 
individual budget limitation and willingness to pay). Therefore, he can buy  




He then is offered, according to his preference and/or health status, a package  
of health services that he can consume for that money during a year. It can be 
offered purely according to his demonstrated preference, or he can get advice from  
a doctor according to his health status, which services he would the most benefit 
from. Model (theoretical) example of such program can be found in Table below. 
 
Table 1. Prepaid packages’ model examples for 12 000 CZK yearly subscription 
Healthy Already sick (e.g. cardiovascular 
condition) 
1 000 CZK for services of nutrition 
advisor 
3 000 CZK for wellness services 
2 000 CZK for annual specific complex 
screening of civilization diseases 
2 000 CZK for lifestyle activities and 
therapies (exercise, relaxation) 
2 000 CZK for better services at general 
practitioner (email/callback/SMS), 
additional consultations/screening 
2 000 CZK for vitamins, vaccination and 
reimbursement of regulation 
expenditures if introduced/expanded in 
universal part of the system 
3 000 CZK for additional 
services/consultations at cardiologist, 
lower co-payments for advanced drugs that 
he takes regularly 
2 000 CZK advisory services of 
physiotherapist and physical training 
aimed at cardiovascular rehabilitation 
1 500 CZK for vitamins and dietary 
supplements 
1 500 CZK contribution for a home cardio 
monitoring device 
2 000 CZK for better services at general 
practitioner (email/callback/SMS), regular 
monitoring of health status 
2 000 CZK for lifestyle activities 
(exercise, relaxation) specific for 
cardiovascular diseases 
Source: (Mertl 2018), updated. 
 
It is clear, that the structure of benefits can differ according to the status of the 
patient and is highly dependent on the creativity of the scheme providers. In 
addition, we can imagine that the employers will provide partial or full financing 
of those packages as a specific employment benefit. Thus, it can serve also as the 
factor of market differentiation and choice. If desired, special prepaid schemes 
can be created for e.g. dental, eye or spa (wellness) care. 
A real example from one provider’s content in the branch of rehabilitation care is 
cited lower in the Silver Card content (Klinika Malvazinky 2020): 
– comprehensive examination by a rehabilitation specialist, 
– package of rehabilitation services (7 x individual physiotherapy, 6 x massage 
services, 6 x group workout or gym, 12 x entrance to the pool, 2 x sauna access, 
6 x full body bath, 50% discount on entrance to the rehabilitation pool, 
hydrotherapy procedures, group exercises and access to the fitness and 
functional zone at times designated for the public), 
– individual approach in planning examinations and procedures according to the 
client's wishes, 
– extended basic medical check-up at the general practitioner, 
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– free inclusion in the preventive-rehabilitation program (once a year in the
chosen term and to the extent corresponding to the individual needs of the
client),
– preferential approach and mediation of appointment when ordering for expert
examinations in our clinic: internal medicine, cardiology, surgery, orthopaedics,
rehabilitation, neurology, general practitioner, clinical psychology, etc.,
– free coffee and water at the Malvazinky Rehabilitation Clinic Cafe (1 x per visit).
As we can see, in Czechia’s reality, we can already find some examples of those 
packages at the level of health providers and management organizations. They 
offer prepaid programmes with specified content, either general or medical branch 
specific (Santé 2020; Klinika Malvazinky 2020). It is possible to provide them on 
this basis, but systemically there are some disadvantages with integrating the 
provider and the payer, as it could be seen on the example of American Preferred 
Provider Organizations and Health Maintenance Organizations (Shin and Moon 
2006; California State University 2020). Therefore, it would be better if also the 
health insurance companies could offer them to their clients, with strict separation 
of public and private resources, of course. The reasons are that they have better 
information about prices and providers, can target much higher number of clients 
and can combine multiple providers into integrated packages. Therefore, synergic 
effects and economies of scale would be higher when health insurance companies 
provide those programmes.  
In practice, these schemes make sense especially as an extension of a universally 
available system because international experience with health savings accounts 
shows that they have disadvantages that become highly prominent if they are not 
supported with the aid of compulsory universal system – then they quickly fail 
with the poorer or sicker population or when clients grow old and require more 
expensive care. One of the disadvantages of health savings accounts is also the 
“pressure to save”, which means adverse health care seeking behaviour to preserve 
money saved into the account. Therefore, suggested prepaid health packages 
supply no special incentives to save money there and the amount paid should be 
fully spent for specified health services during chosen period.  
Employer can contribute to financing of these programmes, even in relation  
to workload compensation by influencing their content. Similarly, if the client  
is involved in the voluntary extension of the pension system (Mertl and Valenčík 
2017), then a part of the benefits from this extension may also be used to pay for 
the subscription. 
As opposed to out-of-pocket payments, these schemes have the benefits in 
a possibility for the creativity of health insurers and healthcare facilities in organizing 
and implementing care, economies of scale (large volumes of care can be planned and 
provided based on the batch of valid pre-paid contracts), promoting regional 
development, predictability and transparency of funding for the client and for 
healthcare facilities and reducing the difficulties with financing and decisions at the 
time of the treatment and health services’ consumption. The overall position of these 
healthcare schemes can be summarized in the following SWOT Table, which we 
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have created based on the socioeconomic characteristics of prepaid health 
programmes as a voluntary extension of universal system. 
Table 2. SWOT analysis of prepaid health programmes’ role  
Strengths 
Synergic effect with universal health 
coverage, while keeping public and private 
resources separated 
Non-discriminatory approach according to 
the health status of a client 
Patient has real choice about the character 
and volume of provided services 
Lowering transactional costs, reducing 
information asymmetry and increasing 
economies of scale compared to situation 
when the patient buys the services 
individually and/or at the moment of 
treatment 
Opportunities 
Possibilities of truly voluntary 
allocation of private resources for 
health care  
Possibility of individual or group 
targeting of those schemes, e.g. the 
elderly people, people with some 
chronic condition 
Options for health providers and health 
insurance companies to be creative 
about the content of those packages 
Transparency for client about the 
allocation of his resources 
Weaknesses 
Construction of the package can be 
perceived as “not necessary for healthy 
and not enough for sick” 
The amount of resources that individual 
can allocate might be too low for 
programme to be useful for him/her 
Does not cover bigger (catastrophic) 
expenditures nor provides full coverage for 
listed situations (as health insurance does) 
Those who can utilize it the most 
(sick/poor) might not afford to buy it 
Threats 
Some medical branches can offer more 
into packages than the others 
Character of competition and 
regulation on the market 
Unclear influence on the overall health 
system effectiveness 
Requires to be backed up by universal 
system (which is present in Czechia but 
if not maintained well can threaten 
even the operation of programmes) 
Source: (Mertl 2018), updated. 
5. Conclusion
The importance of universally financed health schemes and solid government 
guaranteed pension pillar is clear, but there is also space for voluntary extensions 
that can improve the well-being for the elderly. This is supported by the fact that 
the lifestyle and requirements of older population change and increase, and some 
countries face unfavourable population pyramid shapes that must be handled 
within social policy framework. Such schemes can be created both in pension and 
health systems, and the benefits from pension systems extension (additional 
pillars) can be used amongst other expenditure also for financing prepaid health 
care programs. In pension system, we can utilize the incentive extension described 
here (Mertl et al. 2019). The client can either have full engagement and then fully 
retire, or since some point, he can gradually decrease his engagement and start 
to receive the partial benefits during relaxed phase. The model can work with any 
realistic parameter settings. 
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The health status and available care is closely connected with pension age and 
prolonging active participation, both being key issues of pension reforms.  
As a possible alternative to private health insurance, which has strong limitations 
caused by individual health risk evaluation (medical underwriting), prepaid 
schemes can be considered. Systemically in the form of health savings accounts 
they also have got disadvantages that become highly prominent if they are not 
supported by solid universal system – then they can quickly fail with poorer  
or sicker population, or when the clients get older and demand more expensive 
care. In this paper, we have shown the prepaid schemes as an extension to well-
covering universal health care system, with link to incentive pension system 
extension as a financing resource and without special incentives to save money 
there, overcoming those disadvantages largely. 
As seen from SWOT analysis, they have got some unique properties that are lower 
transaction costs and high economies of scale, non-discriminatory approach to the 
health status of clients and voluntary allocation of money for concrete health 
services chosen individually with possible medical advice. These prepaid schemes 
are also more suitable for “health investor” than “health consumer” human 
behaviour (Chytil et al. 2015). 
We showed that some attempts of such prepaid schemes have been occasionally 
spotted in Czechia already, but they are highly selective, elementary and usually 
they are provided by larger hospitals or network of ambulances, being a limited 
offer to their patients. 
We do not want to pretend that prepaid schemes are a miracle that can resolve the 
issues of well-being for the elderly. The analysis shows also their threats and 
weaknesses and for some scenarios other financing schemes can be more appropriate. 
But we suggest that they should be seriously considered as an option for specific 
health packages consumption and financing especially in the form of voluntary 
extension of universal system, and pension system could provide reliable cashflow 
resources for them when the clients partially or fully retire. 
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1. Introduction
In economic analyzes, savings can be considered on a microeconomic or 
macroeconomic scale. In the microeconomic approach, it is emphasized that savings 
of individuals or households are accumulated as a result of their propensity to save. 
Savings are treated as a way of attain their objectives, often long-term related to, for 
example, securing old age. The importance of this saving motive seems to grow due 
to increasing longevity and unfavorable forecasts for the decline in the replacement 
rate at retirement (European Commission 2018; OECD 2019). Numerous empirical 
studies indicate that households are not saving enough for retirement (see e.g. 
Campbell 2006; Lusardi and Mitchell 2011). 
Simultaneously, on the macroeconomic scale, savings provide the sources  
of financing investments in the economy through financial institutions as 
intermediaries in the flow of funds between entities with a surplus and those with 
a demand for them. Financial savings gathered by households circulate in the 
financial system and therefore finance the debt of other sectors, which, in turn, 
cover their expenses by incurred liabilities, e.g. the investments of corporations. 
In this way, financial savings and tangible investments are closely related, linking 
the financial and “real” sphere of the economy.  
Considering these two perspectives on the savings exploration, the study therefore 
focuses on achieving two main objectives. The first one is to indicate the changes 
in the structure of household financial savings with particular emphasis on the 
share of retirement savings, including compulsory savings in open pension funds 
(until 2014) and voluntary retirement savings in the form of employee pension 
scheme (PPE), individual retirement account (IKE), individual security pension 
account (IKZE). The second objective is to examine the impact of savings within 
the capital pension system on the financial system reflected by flow of funds 
accounts. The role of households’ retirement savings in the network  
of intersectoral linkages in the financial system has been examined on the basis  
of financial input-output model. Multipliers of the model indicate the increase in 
the flow of funds induced by the unit increase in the supply of households’ funds. 
Simulation analyses based on these multipliers concern changes in financial assets 





investments financing through the financial system resulting from a decrease  
in supply of funds due to the planned liquidation of open pension funds. 
The research is based on statistical data published in the Eurostat database,  
i.e. annual accounts – financial balance sheets by institutional sectors and four 
subsectors of financial corporations. Statistical data derived from the annual 
financial accounts are constructed in accordance with European System of 
Accounts ESA 2010 (Eurostat 2013), published in the Eurostat database. 
The structure of the paper is the following. The first part is a brief literature review 
on saving reasons, paying special attention to savings aimed at securing old age. 
In the next part the structure of flow of funds accounts and the idea of the financial 
input-output model as a tool for simulation analyses are described. The third part 
is an short empirical report on the changes in households’ financial assets structure 
in Poland in 2000-20181 against the backdrop of the EU. Finally, simulation 
analysis results are presented. The concluding paragraph contains a brief summary 
and some directions of future research.  
 
2. Propensity to save for retirement 
Saving means limiting consumption during a given period, i.e. refraining from 
spending part of the income in order to meet current needs, taking into account 
future ones (e.g. after the end of professional activity or its reduction). Among the 
motives (factors) of saving mentioned by Keynes (1936), particularly important 
from the point of view of saving for retirement are: the foresight motive based  
on predictions about the relationship of current and future income, the 
precautionary motive – creating reserves for unforeseen expenses, to bequeath 
property. Future pensioners save to ensure an adequate standard of living in 
material and cultural terms, also during retirement, enabling them to spend their 
free time in a pleasant or even extraordinary way (e.g. having the opportunity  
to participate in tourist trips, travel abroad, etc.). 
It seems that the propensity to save for retirement, as the implementation of the 
aforementioned motives for saving, should grow in connection with the increase 
in life expectancy, which leads to the extension of the retirement period. When 
longevity increases households need more wealth to finance their retirement 
consumption. Research conducted by Cocco and Gomes (2012) indicates that 
individuals who expect to live longer and have higher earnings save more. 
From the perspective of institutions operating within the pension system, 
increasing life expectancy leads to an increase in their expenses which causes 
underfunding if at the same time the working age population is decreasing.  
The remedy for growing underfunding of these institutions, especially state-
sponsored pension schemes, is a reduction in retirement payments or an increase 
in contributions. Predictions of low pensions in the future should generate a need 
for households and individuals to save more for retirement.  
                                                            
1 The analyzed time period results from the availability of statistical data compiled by the standards 
of ESA 2010. 
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The increase in the propensity to save for retirement on a macroeconomic scale 
requires the following factors: growing importance of employer programs, 
government endorsement, financial educations, advertising (e.g. public awareness 
campaigns on the subject). One way to institutionally stimulate the propensity to save 
voluntarily are tax and other incentives for funds held in particular types of saving 
account. Tax incentives increase the rate of return to saving but they effectively 
contribute to increasing savings for retirement resulting from reducing consumption 
level as opposed to simply moving funds from one form of saving to another 
(Attanasio et al. 2004). Since financial products are becoming more and more 
complex financial literacy seems to be an increasingly important factor of retirement 
planning behavior (Fornero and Monticone 2011). Numerous studies show that 
financial literacy positively and significantly affects the probability of participation in 
a private pension scheme (see e.g. van Rooij et al. 2012, Lusardi and Mitchell 2011). 
Moreover, research conducted by Fornero and Monticone (2011) indicates too low 
financial knowledge, which is one of the barriers to saving, especially in the context 
of voluntary forms of saving for retirement (see also Behrman et al. 2012). 
Empirical research on American expenditures and savings (Choi et al. 2002) 
referring to behavioral theory of the life cycle show that people postpone the 
decision to save, although they are aware of the need to save, they are also 
characterized by a passive attitude towards planning savings for retirement. It is 
difficult to indicate research on behavioral inclinations of Poles in terms of saving 
for retirement. Some elements of this theory are included in the research by 
Liberda’s team (Liberda et al. 2012). The results of their analysis show that the 
perception of income affects the household saving. More precisely, if the 
household perceives its disposable income as average or at least sufficient to fulfil 
the household needs, this household saves quite a high share of income. 
3. Analytic framework
Flow of funds accounts (FFA), which are the basis of empirical analyses reported 
in the paper, show financial assets acquired by institutional sectors2 and liabilities 
incurred by these sectors in the form of various financial instruments3. FFA in the 
national accounts system are referred to as financial accounts. The data are 
compiled in accordance with the European System of Accounts ESA 2010 
(Eurostat 2013). FFA are presented in two forms: financial flows and stocks. 
2 Six institutional sectors are distinguished in the system of national accounts: non-
financial corporations, financial corporations, general government, households, non-profit 
institutions, rest of the world. Financial accounts are also compiled for four sub-sectors of 
financial institutions: 1) monetary financial institutions,  2) Other Financial Institutions 
(except ICPFs), financial auxiliaries, CFIs, and money lenders, 3) Non-MMF investment 
funds, 4) Insurance corporations and Pension Funds. Household sector and non-profit 
institutions serving households are combined. 
3 Financial accounts are compiled for over twenty financial instruments in eight groups: 
1) Special drawing rights (SDRs), 2) Currency and deposits, 3) Debt securities, 4) Loans,
5) Equity and investment fund shares, 6) Insurance, pensions and standardised guarantees,




Flows are recorded as financial transactions, other changes in volume and 
revaluation account, while stocks of assets and liabilities are shown in the form of 
financial balance sheets. Financial transactions take place between resident 
institutional units, and between them and the rest of the world. They show how 
the surplus or deficit of the capital account is financed by transactions in financial 
assets and liabilities. More precisely, the financial account indicates how net 
borrowing sectors obtain resources by incurring liabilities or reducing assets, and 
how net lending sectors allocate their surpluses by acquiring assets or reducing 
liabilities. All financial flows represent the difference between the opening 
financial balance sheet at the start of the year and the closing balance sheet at the 
end of the year.  
Financial balance sheets provided by Eurostat take the form of asset-by-sector 
Tables4 of financial assets (E in Table 1) and liabilities (R in Table 2). The data 
contained in Tables E and R show financial instruments in which entities 
(institutional sectors) invest surplus of funds and financial instruments in which 
they incur liabilities, respectively. Each financial instrument is recorded as asset 
of one entity and simultaneously as liability of another5 therefore the total amount 
of financial assets must be equal to the total amount of liabilities. 
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Stock of assets or liabilities of 
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4 They are analogous to commodity-by-industry make and use tables in classic input-output 
analysis – cf. Miller and Blair 2009, pp.185-187. 
5 Only monetary gold does not have an equivalent in liabilities on the financial balance sheet 
in order to preserve the double registrar principle. Therefore, this instrument has been excluded 
from the flow of funds table. 
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Source: own elaboration based on Tsujimura and Mizoshita 2004. 
However, this method of recording flows of funds does not show who (which 
sector) is the creditor and who is the debtor regarding the financial instrument. 
The sector-by-sector square matrix (intersectoral flow of funds Table) is 
constructed from a set of balance sheets of financial assets (E) and liabilities (R). 
The idea of compilation procedure of intersectoral flows tables, proposed by 
Tsujimura and Mizoshita (2004), is based on input-output methodology (see also 
Klein 2003; Okuma 2012; Trębska 2018). It was adopted in this study to construct 
the financial input-output table for financial flows in Poland in 2018. The scheme 
of financial input-output table is shown in table 3. 








Source: own elaboration based on Tsujimura and Mizoshita 2004. 
The ykj element of matrix Y reflects flows of funds from sector j to sector k as  
a realization of the j-th sector’s demand for financial instruments issued by sector k. 
In a different sense, ykj shows the j-th sector's supply of funds to sector k6. Vectors ρ, 
εT, z are the same as those in Tables of assets and liabilities (see Table 1, Table 2).  
6 Since each element of matrix Y has double interpretation, Tables of intersectoral flows 




The following balancing equation is true for table 3: 
 nY i +ρ=z              (1) 
where Y is nn  square matrix, in is the summing vector (n-element unity 
column), n is number of sectors. 
Taking into account the formula (1), and setting matrix 1ˆ  zYC ( ẑ is diagonal 
matrix of zj), a financial input-output model is obtained: 
zρzC              (2) 
Thus, 
ρΓρCIz 1  )(      (3) 
γkj elements of matrix G are the financial multipliers, which indicate the supply of 
funds in sector k induced by the increase by unit in the j-th sector's supply of funds 
(increase in savings). The column sums of matrix G, i.e. total multipliers show 
the total effect – the sum of the increases in all institutional sectors’ resources zj.  
Assuming an increase in the supply of funds, which is recorded as Δρ in financial 
input-output model, Δz = (I – C)-1Δρ for each institutional sector and total increase 
in financial flows ΔY = CꞏΔ ẑ  can be determined. The row and column sums of 
ΔY show increase in liabilities (Δr) of sector k and increase in assets (Δe) of sector 
j respectively as a result of Δρ – changes of savings. The increase in savings 
implies changes in demand for funds aimed at tangible investments of sectors 
whose liabilities excess financial assets: Δε = Δz – Δe.  
 
4. Retirement savings in the structure of Polish households’  
financial assets  
Securing the old age period is one of the motives for households’ saving. This saving 
goal can be achieved by accumulating assets in various forms, not only financial ones. 
However, the savings analysis presented in this paragraph of the paper is limited to 
financial assets. It is based on Eurostat database – financial balance sheets. Attention 
is focused on those financial instruments that are important in terms of household 
savings, e.g. currency and deposits, equity and investment fund shares, life insurance 
and annuity entitlements, pension entitlements. All of these assets can be a form of 
old age security. 
The specificity of the structure of Polish households’ financial assets consists 
primarily in a relatively high share of currency and deposits and a small share  
of insurance systems, pension and standardized guarantee schemes, especially life 
insurance and annuity entitlements (see Fig. 1). 
                                                            
financial input-output table is a transposition of table based on asset-oriented system. Columns 
of table Y in liability-oriented system show sectors which demand the funds that are supplied 
by sectors reflected in rows. Vector ε of excesses of liabilities over assets (investments) is 
exogenous.     
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In the group of UE28 countries the share of currency and deposits in households’ 
assets fluctuated between 28% and 31% in 2004-2018, only in 2008-2009, i.e. during 
the financial crisis and poor economic conditions in the capital markets, it increased 
to 33%. In Poland, this share decreased from 60% in 2000 to 34.5% in 2007 and 
ranged from 44 to 50% in the years 2008-2018. While the share of current deposits 
grew due to the increasing prevalence of settlement accounts, the share of other 
deposits decreased mainly because of low real interest rate. This may mean that the 
importance of deposits other than transferable as a form of saving for retirement has 
decreased. 
Fig. 1. Structure of households’ financial assets7 in Poland in selected years  
of the period 2000-2018 
Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat Database (update: 31-01-2020). 
The decline in interest in the long-term deposits was accompanied by an increase in 
the share of equities in households’ financial assets. This share exceeded 40% in 2007 
in Poland (28.5% in the UE28), but the financial crisis and the significant downturn 
in the capital markets led to a 50% decrease in stock of equities in 2008. A similar 
trend was observed in most EU countries. 
The share of life-insurance in financial assets of Polish households ranged between 
3.4 and 7% in the analyzed period (the average for UE28 oscillates around 15%) 
without a clear upward trend. Only the increase in the interest of households in life 
insurance combined with insurance capital fund is visible, which might be treated not 
only as precautionary saving, but also as a kind of saving for retirement. 
Formally, securing the old age period as a reason of saving is realized by 
instruments related to pension systems, including savings in open pension funds 
7 Data for household sector and non-profit institutions serving households are combined, 
but assets of non-profit institutions constituted less than 1,5%.  
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(compulsory until 2014 in Poland) and voluntary retirement savings within the capital 
pension system in the form of employee pension scheme (PPE), individual retirement 
account (IKE), individual security pension account (IKZE), etc. In financial accounts, 
these assets are recorded as pension entitlements (financial claims that current and 
former employees hold against their employers, a scheme designed to pay pensions 
or an insurer). These are reserves created by open and employee pension funds for the 
payment of pensions for their members, as well as funds accumulated under employee 
pension programs, on individual retirement accounts and individual retirement 
accounts. Pension entitlements are assets of the households sector. On the other hand, 
pension entitlements can be the liabilities of any institutional sector, although in 
practice they are mainly liabilities of subsectors of insurance corporations and pension 
funds. The entitlements related to social security funds subsector, which is part of the 
general government sector, are not recognized in financial accounts. 
The share of pension entitlements in the households’ assets grew systematically until 
2013, reaching 20%, which was similar to the average in the UE28. However, due to 
a series of acts8 changing regulations of the pension scheme in Poland, this share 
decreased to 10% in 2014 (8.7% in 2018) with a decrease of assets collected in open 
pension funds by almost 50%.  
The stock of voluntary retirement savings, which are accumulated for achieving old 
age security in the capital pension system, was steadily rising to reach 23.8 billion 
PLN in 2018 (see Fig. 2). The total share of PPE, IKE and IKZE slightly exceeded 
1% of total financial assets of households in 2016 (1.1% in 2018).  
Fig. 2. Voluntary pension entitlements (in billion PLN) 
Source: own elaboration based on data from The Polish Financial Supervision Authority. 
8 These acts involve transfer of part of the funds from the open pension funds to the social 
security finds and reduced contribution transferred to open pension funds from 2011 
onwards (J.o.L. 2011 No. 75 item 398 as amended) and the abolition of compulsory 
participation in the capital part of the pension scheme from 2014 (J.o.L. 2013, item 1717). 
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The liquidation of open pension funds (OFE) in Poland, planned for 2020, 
consisting in the transformation of entitlements in OFE into individual retirement 
accounts (IKE), will lead to a significant increase in the resources of voluntary 
retirement savings. 
5. Impact of the changes in pension entitlements in private schemes
on intersectoral flow of funds
Financial input-output model is used herein as a tool of simulation analyses aimed 
at estimating effects of the liquidation of open pension funds (OFE) in Poland 
planned for 2020. Pension entitlements in OFE will be transformed into individual 
retirement accounts (IKE) after their reduction by a transformation fee of 15%. 
Savers will have the option of transferring entitlements in OFE into social security 
funds (public pension scheme).  
Pension entitlements in OFE are recorded in the system of national accounts in 
financial accounts as assets of households and simultaneously as liabilities  
of pension funds (sub-sector of financial corporations). The transformation of 
pension entitlements in OFE into IKE means the change in the form  
of retirement savings. The amount of savings will decrease due to the 
transformation fee or declarations of funds transfer to social security funds. The 
structure of financial institutions in which households allocate their retirement 
savings will also change since IKE are managed by various types of financial 
institutions (not only pension funds). Data on assets accumulated on IKE by 
account operators, provided by The Financial Supervision Authority, indicate that 
about 22% of assets in this form are managed by banks, 17% by investment funds, 
31% by entities conducting brokerage activities and 30% by insurance institutions 
and voluntary pension funds. The scheme of flows due to OFE liquidation presents 
Fig.3. 
Fig. 3. Scheme of flows due to OFE liquidation 



















All these changes in assets and liabilities are introduced into financial input-output 
table (cf. table 3) compiled for 2018 by the following disturbances: 
 changes of flows from households to financial corporations (every sub-sectors) 
recorded by relevant elements of the Y matrix, what modifies matrix C 
coefficients in the model (see formula (2)), 
 decreases in total amount of households assets on zT and z vectors, 
 decrease in excess of assets over liabilities of households on ρ vector. 
The main aim of the simulations is to determine the effects of the liquidation 
of open pension funds if it was introduced in 2018, when the stock of pension 
entitlements in OFE was 157.3 billion PLN.  
Several variants of simulation can be considered: 
1) The whole amount of pension entitlements in OFE (157.3 billion PLN in 2018)
would be transformed into IKE, financial assets (savings) of households would
decrease by 23.6 billion PLN (15% of 157.3).
2) 20% of the amount of pension entitlements in OFE would be transferred into
social security funds (31.5 billion PLN), the remaining 125.8 billion PLN
would be transformed into IKE, financial assets of households would decrease
by 50.3 billion PLN (31.5 plus 15% of 125.8). This simulation variant is based
on forecasts provided by The Polish Ministry of Finance.
3) The whole amount of pension entitlements in OFE would be transferred into
social security funds, financial assets of households would decrease by 157.3
billion PLN.
In every variants the increase in general government resources due to transformation 
fee and funds transformed to social security funds would be distributed as current 
expenditures. 
Above mentioned changes connected with OFE liquidation cause decrease  
in households savings in the form of financial assets. The larger amount of 
entitlements in OFE are transferred into social security funds, the greater decrease 
in savings level is. If the whole amount of pension entitlements in OFE was 
transformed into IKE, financial assets of households would decrease by 1.2%.  
On the contrary, transfer to social security funds of all entitlements in OFE would 
cause a decrease in financial assets of households by 7.8%. The structure of this 
sector’s assets as the claims on other sectors also would change. In 2018 
households’ claims on insurance corporations and pension funds constituted 
13.9% of households’ financial assets but this share would decrease due to OFE 
liquidation. The scale of decrease depends on how much funds accumulated in the 
form of pension entitlements in OFE would be transferred into social security 
funds and how much would be transformed into IKE. The increase in the share 
of other sectors results from both decrease in the stock of households’ assets and 





Fig. 4. Changes in the sectoral structure of households’ financial assets 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Changes in the structure of households’ financial assets, which are reflected in  
C matrix in financial input-output model (cf. formula (2)), implies changes in 
multipliers (elements of matrix G), calculated according to formula (3). Financial 
input-output multipliers indicate that the supply of households’ funds has the 
strongest impact on financial flows between sectors (in the table before 
disturbance, as well as in all variants of simulation). An increase in supply of this 
sector’s funds by 1 billion causes an increase in financial resources of all sectors 
by 5.3 billion in total (5.26-5.28 depending on the simulation variant) as a direct 
effect and indirect effects resulting from chain reactions within the financial 
system (for comparison: the effect of the same increase in the supply of rest of the 
world sector’s funds is equal to 4.4 billion). Changes in household savings have 
the greatest impact on the financial resources of corporations (each additional 
billion causes increase in corporations’ liabilities by 1.3 billion). Effects  
of decrease in households’ supply of funds presented in table 4 combine the effects 
of initial disturbance and cross-sectoral feedback within the financial system 
(chain reaction) that is determined by multiplier matrix. The greater effects 
observed for insurance corporations and pension funds result from the greater 
initial decrease in this sub-sector’s liabilities.  
Decrease in households’ savings implies decrease in investments that are financed 
by them – corporations’ investments will decrease to the greatest extend. Chain 
reactions linking household assets with corporations’ liabilities may include, inter 
alia, households’ (or institutions investing on their behalf) financial investments 
in equity and investment fund shares issued by corporations. Similarly, there may 
be a reduction in the households’ acquisition of debt securities issued by the 
general government sector, which reduces the financing this sector’s tangible 
investments. 
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Table 4. Effects of decrease in households’ supply of funds by 50.3 billion PLN 
(second variant of simulation) 
Sector 
Initial disturbance of Effects (initial, direct and indirect) in 






-65.7 -32.7 -33.0 
Monetary financial 
institutions 
23.5 -35.6 -59.2 
Other financial 
institutions  
18.2 11.8 -5.0 -1.4 




-125.2 -132.3 -6.8 -0.3 
General government -29.6 -14.0 -15.7 
Households; non-
profit institutions  
-50.3 -15.8 -116.5 









The scale of total effects of OFE liquidation in particular simulation variants  
is proportional to the decrease in households savings (cf. Fig. 5), since the 
total multipliers for households saving change are almost the same in every  
simulation variants.  
Fig. 5. Aggregated results of three simulation variants (in billion PLN) 
Source: own elaboration. 
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Reducing household savings by 23.6 billion PLN (variant I) would result in  
a decrease in financial assets by 124.6 billion PLN (1.3%) as a sum of initial, 
direct and indirect effects. In turn, in the opposite extreme variant of the 
simulation, a decrease in households’ excess of assets over liabilities by 157.3 
billion PLN (variant III) would reduce the stock of financial assets by 827.6 billion 
PLN (assuming the financial input-output table structure is fixed). 
6. Conclusion
Redesigning pension systems is inevitable due to demographic structure changes 
observed in most developed countries in the world. Since policies cannot 
substantially alter demographic trends, institutions need to adapt to them. The 
share of retirement-age population expands and the working-age population shrinks 
with declining fertility and increasing longevity. The share of GDP spent on financing 
pensions increases9 and is projected to rise further (Góra 2019). Simultaneously, 
pensions will be reduced relative to wages (European Commission 2018). In this 
situation, it seems that institutional changes aimed at increasing the role  
of voluntary retirement savings are desirable. But if this makes the pension system 
so complex that it is difficult to understand for the average person, it leads 
misunderstanding about how the system works. The newest adjustment of the 
Polish pension system is designed in such way that the transformation of pension 
entitlements in open pension funds (OFE) into individual retirement accounts 
(IKE) is automatic, i.e. it does not require any action of holders of assets in OFE. 
Only people who want to transfer funds to social security funds (public part of the 
pension system) must make relevant declaration.  
The study is not intended to assess whether this change will positively impact the 
finances of future pensioners. Such an assessment would require an analysis of its 
potential impact on changes in the willingness to save voluntarily for retirement. 
The results of simulation analyses presented in the study show the effects  
of reducing household savings. This reduction, on the one hand, is a consequence 
of the 15% transformation fee associated with the conversion of the entitlements 
in OFE into individual retirement accounts (IKE). On the other hand, it may result 
from the transfer of these entitlements to social security funds, which are not 
treated as household savings in SNA.  
Simulations were conducted on the basis of financial input-output table for Poland 
in 2018 (the newest data available in Eurostat database), so formally the results 
show what the effect of the liquidation of OFE would be if it took place in 2018. 
In this sense, it is therefore a counterfactual simulation. However, since the 
structures of intersectoral flows are characterized by low variability, these results 
may constitute an estimation of the effects of OFE liquidation planned for 2020 
in Poland. Assuming that only 20% of the amount of pension entitlements in OFE 
would be transferred into social security funds, financial assets of households 
9 Old age pensions as a percentage of GDP in European Union increased by 1.5 pp. in the 




would decrease by 1.2%. It means that, the stock of household savings being the 
excess of assets over liabilities would shrink by 3.5% (2% of excess of assets over 
liabilities in total). While the 0.5% decrease in the flows of funds within the 
financial system does not have to be unambiguously negatively assessed, the 
reduction of the savings resource that can be used to finance tangible investments 
may constitute a limitation of corporations’ activity (assuming the financial input-
output table structure is fixed). This results from the principle of balancing  
of assets (as supply of funds) and liabilities (reflecting the demand for funds). 
Although the methodology employed in the study is quite common internationally, 
it is relatively rare in Poland. The study presented herein is the first application of 
the simulation method based on financial input-output table for the Polish 
financial system. The applied approach disturbs not only savings (elements of the 
exogenous vector in the model), but also coefficients reflecting the structure  
of intersectoral flows of funds.  
The classic input-output multiplier method used for production process analysis 
seems to be well enough examined from its beginnings (Leontief 1936). However, 
some of the principles of input-output analysis used for system of financial 
accounts simulations, may raise some reservations. Input-output multipliers show 
the effects of increasing selected elements of the exogenous vector (savings in the 
studied version of financial model) which are measured in the model by output 
increase (financial resources) assuming that the input-output coefficients are fixed 
(matrix C). Therefore, the following issues require testing: 1) stability of model 
coefficients, 2) equality of marginal and average increments of intersectoral flows 
of funds, 3) consequences of the switching from net lending to net borrowing 
sector (and vice versa), and many others concerning chain reactions within the 
financial systems. These issues verification will be direction of the author’s 
further research on the financial input-output models application.  
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1. Introduction
Inflation and the low indexation of bend points in the first half of the 1990s 
substantially reduced the dependence of newly granted old-age pensions on 
previous earnings. The pension reform from 1996 created a ‘pension insurance’ 
with two ‘amounts’: flat-rate and earnings-related. Each pensioner receives a flat-
rate basic pension, replacing the previous universal ‘state compensation 
contribution’ of 1990, which compensated the cancellation of retail price 
subsidies. Its amount is now 10% of the national average earnings (NAE).  
The earnings-related ‘percentage amount‘ of the pension generates a partial 
dependence of pension on previous lifetime earnings, adjusted by bend points and 
reduction coefficients: the crucial earnings are reduced to just 26% once the first 
low bend point of 44% is exceeded. Current second bend point is 400% of NAE 
with the reduction coefficient 0%. Figure 1 shows these current parameters of the 
Czech ‘pension insurance’. The ‘progressivity’ of this system is high: a newly 
granted old-age pension is roughly by 30% earnings-related. Thus, 70% of it is  
a Beveridge type pension. This is a rarity in Central Europe as ‘Bismarck’ clearly 
dominates in all neighboring countries.  
Fig. 1. Newly granted (net) old-age pension in relation to lifetime earnings,  
in % of NAE in 2020 (45 years of insurance)  
Source: Author. 
The transformation of the Czechoslovak predominantly Bismarckian pension 
system into the Czech predominantly Beveridgean system was influenced by the 
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poorly understandable calculation of both newly granted old-age pensions and 
indexation (valorization) of pensions. Recently, the marketing approach of 
politicians on these issues has also contributed to strengthening the levelling of 
pensions. More than half of Czechs nevertheless prefer ‘Bismarck’ to ‘Beveridge’. 
In 2010, the Czech Constitutional Court concluded that ‘whole complex design  
of the pension system is non-transparent to a degree that it is de facto 
incomprehensible for its addressees; and for the majority of the insureds the 
calculated amount of the pension benefit becomes unverifiable’ (Czech 
Constitutional Court 2010). In addition, the court declared the provisions of the 
Pension Insurance Act on bend points unconstitutional, ‘because in its 
consequences and in combination with other parameters and the existing 
construction of the pension system it does not guarantee a sufficiently 
constitutionally guaranteed right to adequate material security in accordance with 
… the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and it leads to unacceptable
inequalities between different groups of pension insureds’ (Czech Constitutional 
Court 2010). The Constitutional Court abolished the section of the Act containing 
the bend points and reduction coefficients and it forced the government to react 
quickly; the government has reintroduced the first bend point within the scope  
of the so-called small pension reform. Unfortunately, this reform (2011) did not 
increase the transparency and clarity of the pension system. The only 
comprehensible parameter of the Czech ‘pension insurance’ has been the basic 
pensionable age, which is differentiated for women according to the number  
of children raised (a remnant of the Communist pension policy). To date, it has 
also not been possible to establish a comprehensible system of indexing the 
percentage amount of pensions; after the introduction of parameterization of the 
basic pension amount, the indexation of the percentage amount of the old-age 
pension depends on the total room for increasing the average old-age pension, the 
increase in the basic amount being deducted; so far, no one has even tried  
to explain the logic of this dependence of the indexation of the percentage-based 
amount on the valorization of the basic pension amount.  
The fundamental challenge for Czech ‘pension insurance’ is its paradigmatic  
or rather technical reform, which would lead to the clarity and meaningful 
combination of the Beveridge (non-insurance) and Bismarck (insurance) 
components of this ‘system’. 
2. Proposal for a small pension reform
The non-restoration of the previous second bend point in the key range from 44% 
to 400% of NAE in 2011 created the preconditions for a simple reform of the basic 
and percentage amounts of the old-age pension without fundamentally changing 
the total amount of the old-age pension. Taking into account that earnings up  
to 44% of NAE are basically an exception, we can increase the total old-age 
pension in this range so that the total amount curve ‘straightens’ according to the 
grade of the straight line demonstrating the dependence of the total pension 
amount in the 44-400% of NAE range. The result of this operation is an increase 
230 
in the basic old-age pension amount from 10% to 32% of NAE and a reduction 
in the pension rate for 1 year of insurance from 1.5% to 1.5 * 0.26 = 0.39%  
see Figure 1. 
Fig. 2. Small pension reform: newly granted (net) old-age pension in relation to 
lifetime earnings, in % of NAE in 2020 (45 years of insurance) 
Source: Author. 
The outlined small pension reform does not change anything for the absolute majority 
of old-age pensioners. Only those whose pension is calculated from a wage lower than 
44% of NAE will ‘profit’ from it. (The costs of this reform are some CZK 7 bn. only, 
according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.) I believe that such a small 
pension reform can be feasibly implemented in a span of one year. Its main effect will 
be a demonstration of the real ‘progressivity’ of the Czech pension system: it will be 
clear to everyone that ‘pension insurance’ is not, in fact, mainly a social pension 
insurance, but a flat-rate pension. I assume that later the interest in changing the 
structure in favor of earnings-related pensions will prevail. In order to facilitate this 
restructuring, it would be useful to cancel the parameterization of the basic old-age 
pension amount (32% NAE) and set a fixed sum for this amount: under the conditions 
of 2020, it would be CZK 11,141 per month (near the OECD poverty threshold). This 
redefinition of the basic pension amount will also allow for a substantial simplification 
of the indexation of the (new) earnings-related pension amount, which will become 
understandable – as well as the indexation of the basic old-age pension amount.  
Disability pensions can continue to ‘copy’ the old-age pension formula after the small 
pension reform. For survivor pensions, it will be necessary to derive separately their 
basic and earnings-related pension amounts, as we have derived the rationalized the 
basic and earnings-related old-age pension amounts.   
The key objective of the small pension reform is the ‘irreversible’ removal of the basic 
bend point used in calculating the earnings-related amount of old-age pension. This 
will significantly increase the understandability of the Czech pension system. A small 
pension reform can be implemented by the current Czech government, with the 































































WageBasic amount Total pension
231 
3. Proposal for a major reform of public pensions
A consistent pension reform requires the division of the Czech current ‘pension 
insurance’ into two pension pillars: pillar 0 and pillar 1, according to the World 
Bank classification. Pillar 0, in its starting form a flat-rate pension at 32% of NAE, 
shall be financed from general taxes. On the other hand, the insurance pension 
(pillar 1) is to be financed from the social pension contributions, which does not 
exclude the financing of childcare credits from the state budget.  
Significant differences should or could be made in the basic conditions for 
entitlement to the flat-rate pension and the insurance pension. The vesting period 
for (insurance) pension entitlement should be no more than 5 years. By contrast, 
a full flat-rate pension may continue to be subject to paying insurance premiums 
or, more generally, taxes (or length of stay) for 35 years – as is the case in the  
UK today.   
Modern social pension insurance products include: 
 Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) system of individual pension accounts, 
in which the resulting balance of the account is converted into a lifetime 
pension according to actuarial principles, including the application of adequate 
mortality tables. The NDC generic scheme has also built-in stabilization 
mechanisms in the valorization of individual accounts as well as in the 
indexation of pensions. 
 ‘Points system’, where for each insurance year the client receives a fraction 
where the numerator is the client’s wage (up to the earnings ceiling) and the 
denominator is represented by the national average earning (NAE); the client 
accumulates the points until the old-age pension is granted, the law and the 
government set a point value (e.g. EUR 31.03) for each year, thus providing 
the actual amount of the pension paid.  
 (Austrian) pension accounts system, where pension entitlements are credited 
every year, calculated according to the pension formula e.g. 1.78% * annual 
wage of the insured, with the valorization of pension accounts using the wage 
index (amount of granted yearly old-age pension = final balance of the pension 
account), with indexation of paid pensions according to the law.  
In 2003, World Bank expertise for the Czech Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
(Chłoń-Domińczak 2003) recommended us to move to the NDC system. Two 
options were recommended here as a solidarity pillar: flat-rate or minimum 
pension. On my recommendation, the Czech Social Democratic Party subscribed 
to the transition to this system. However, a simulation of the NDC system in the 
first Bezděk's Pension Commission was accompanied by putting a ceiling on the 
pensionable age at 65 years, which suggested that NDC pensions would be very 
low at the end of the century. Until recently, Bezděk was claiming on the basis  
of this ‘analysis’ that the NDC system is not suitable for Czechia because pensions 
would be low (Mediafax.cz 2010). The lesson learned is trivial: any pension 
system can be ‘destroyed’ by bad parameters.  
All three products, which fit into a modern social pension insurance system, are 
transparent and understandable. After learning the relatively new Austrian 
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pension accounts system, I am in favor of its introduction in Czechia. It is 
a defined benefit system and its novelty consists in the fact that the insurance 
pension for the given year is definitively calculated after the end of this calendar 
year – see table 1. The Czech allowance would be calculated according to the 
formula 0.39% * annual assessment basis, which includes not only earnings, but 
also the basis for calculating sickness and other benefits, as well as e.g. valuation 
of childcare. Such care can be valued, for example, by the average national wage 
– just like, for example, in the German points system. The annual calculation
of pension entitlement (account balance after the end of the year) would be an 
important contribution to the comprehensibility of Czech social pension insurance. 




(1.78% * annual 
assessment basis) 
Account after the year 
(valorization of account after 
previous year + increment) 
2005 30,000 534.00 534.00 
2006 31,000 551.80 1 096.48 
2007 32,000 569.60 1 688.01 
… 
2047 72,000 1 281.60 57 365.13 
2048 73,000 1 299.40 59 811.83 
2049 74,000 1 317.20 62 325.27 
Source: SVS (2020). 
The preparation of the major pension reform bill would take 1 to 2 years and we 
might implement the pension accounts system in waves, as it was done in Austria: 
to start with new insureds, continue with e.g. 10 following years of birth and only 
in the further wave extend the system to the remaining clients incl. persons of pre-
pensionable age.  
The major reform of public pensions will also include a reform of disability and 
survivor pensions. The existing Czech disability pensions use the ‘pension-type’ 
concept of disability pensions: their construction is parallel to the construction  
of old-age pensions (Browne et al. 2018); disability is conceived as a kind of 
premature aging, or loss of ability to work. An alternative, more modern is the 
‘sickness’ concept of disability benefits, conceiving disability primarily as  
a prolonged illness, until resuming work (if possible). Disability benefits/ 
compensations are part of the sickness benefit system under this concept. Norway 
is one of the countries which apply the sickness benefit concept of disability 
pensions. Since 2015, the disability pension has been provided as 66% of the final 
wage (average wage in the best three of the last five years before disability; 
earnings ceiling), with a minimum disability pension at 40-50% of NAE, applying 
even to persons without previous employment. The minimum degree of disability 
is 50% (Støve et al. 2015). Since 2011, Norway has introduced an NDC-type old-
age pension system, supplemented by the ‘guarantee pension’. Pensions and other 




the Czech disability pensions (and all sickness insurance benefits) in the same 
manner, including the cancellation of bend points.  
The old-age pension system with a predominance of a flat-rate pension is best paired 
with a flat-rate orphan pension, in our country up to 25% of NAE. The flat-rate orphan 
pension (for orphans aged 10 and over) is of similar amount in the Netherlands, where 
the individual's flat-rate old-age pension is equal to about 30% of NAE. Such an 
orphan pension may be classified as a family benefit. It is not only from the 
perspective of Czech pensioners that universal child benefits should replace the 
current refundable child tax credit), which cannot be claimed by not only low-income 
families but also by non-earning pensioners, because they are not subject to the 
personal income tax. The decisive argument for the transition from universal child 
benefits to child tax allowances in our country was an effort to compel ‘non-adaptable’ 
citizens living on social assistance benefits to take up employment. Apparently, 
advocates of these views did not even try to make a simple example to confirm their 
ideas; the fact is that in the universal child benefit scheme, only the final social 
assistance benefit (subsistence benefit) is (substantially) reduced: by child benefits 
paid. The very discrimination against Czech pensioners as regards the tax credit for 
children may, of course, be eliminated by introducing taxation of old-age and 
disability pensions; but this is not foreseen in the framework of the major pension 
reform: we are postponing the solution of this problem for the future.  
The importance of widow pensions has long been declining in the western 
countries, also as a result of the unification of social insurance systems. The trend 
is to move to a ‘bridging’ widow/widower pension, paid for 6 to 12 months after 
the spouse's death – so that the surviving spouse can adapt to the new situation. 
(Widely conceived costs of raising orphans should be concentrated in the amount 
of orphan pension.) Modern systems of social old-age pension allow for the 
sharing of pension entitlements of couples. In any case, it is advisable to introduce 
into Czech law the sharing of pension entitlements of divorced couples, unless 
there is another agreement reached during the divorce proceedings.  
The key content of the proposed major pension reform is the reform of old-age 
pensions: the transition to a flat-rate pension, funded by general taxes, and the 
transition to a modern social old-age insurance system. In the interest of this 
transition to the two-pillar system in a relatively short period of time, it may be 
advisable to postpone the solution of some other issues that we mentioned in this 
section of the paper.  
 
4. Reform of personal pensions  
The introduction of the ‘supplementary pension insurance with state contribution’ 
in 1994 was a relatively positive step towards the development of financial 
services not only in the area of pension savings – new distribution networks were 
established and developed. The state contribution played an important role  
in kick-starting the pension pillar 3. With the rapid growth in the number  
of ‘supplementary pension insurance’ contracts, a strong pension lobby was 




of insurance companies was also partially successful. The result was the 
emergence of a segmented system of the pension pillar 3, which is unprecedented 
in the world. The number of the supplementary pension insurance contracts at the 
end of 2012 exceeded 5 million. In addition, there were 3.5 million ‘private life 
insurance’ contracts, of which about 1.5 million contracts drew deduction from 
the income tax base.   
The major pension reform of 2013 increased the transparency of supplementary 
pension insurance and introduced cost limits for the pension companies, but it did not 
affect private life insurance, tax deductions and non-payment of income tax and social 
and health insurance premiums in the case of employer contributions to 
supplementary pension insurance or private life insurance. The indirect state support 
for employer contributions is highest in the world, accounting for 65% of the 
employer contribution. State support for citizens' contributions is ‘only’ above 
average in an international comparison (OECD 2018), since this comparison assumes 
contributions of 5% of wage (the products compared in other countries are 
occupational pensions where the situation is significantly different!). The calculation 
also reflects the low rate (15%) of the Czech personal income tax. The Czech state 
support of supplementary pension savings in the form of employer contribution is 2,4 
times higher than the support of the same product in the form of a participant's 
contribution (if 5% of wage are to be saved). All state regulation of the state-supported 
pillar 3 should be – by its very nature – uniform.  
The main purpose of taking out Czech supplementary pension insurance is not 
individual protection in old age, let alone in a form of an annuity. The main 
purpose is the tax optimization and getting rid of excess liquidity. The 
construction of the product taken out till the end of 2012 was of fundamental 
importance for its high penetration: it was essentially a simple savings product, 
with high explicit state support in the form of a state contribution, with a guarantee 
of a non-negative nominal yield. Fiscal illusion, based on the assumption that the 
state support is for free, also played an important role. All of this explains the 
unusually high number of participants. ‘Personal pensions have relatively wide 
take-up in only a few Member States (over 60% coverage in the Czech Republic, 
over 30% in … Germany) while in most Member States take-up is moderate and 
fragmented, and in some, nearly non-existent’ (EC 2017). In general, ‘ the third 
pillar is not really a pension scheme. It is akin to a tax-advantaged savings account. 
The system should not be presented to the public as a source of meaningful future 
replacement income’ (WB 2017). If we think this through to all its consequences, 
we come to the conclusion that: ‘Pillar 3 (voluntary retirement savings) should not 
receive tax subsidies, which are regressive and, in any case, have not been shown 
to have any significant effect on private saving’ (Willmore 2000). Therefore, the 
persistently repeated ideas of some Czech party experts that the impact of the 
ageing population can be solved by pension savings in the third pillar are 
completely unrealistic. The standard pension pillar 3 is of no practical importance 






The parallel existence of several Czech systems of generous fiscal support (state 
contribution, tax deductions, exemption of employer contributions from income 
tax and from payment of social and health insurance premiums), even for one 
single product (supplementary pension savings), is unconstitutional, because  
it significantly distorts the (oligopolistic) market and it is also a manifestation of 
clientelism and illiteracy. Last year, public spending (including tax expenditures) 
on these subsidies for supplementary pension savings and private life insurance 
amounted to approximately CZK 22 billion. Real investment returns for clients 
are increasingly negative. Due to the extreme state support and the consequent 
very high number of participants, this (hypertrophic and chaotic) ‘system’ can be 
included in the rank of ‘soft compulsion’. According to the World Bank's 
classification of pension pillars, this is essentially pillar 2, not pillar 3. It is  
a chaotic variant of the neoliberal model of private pensions/savings. More 
efficient systems of this kind use auto-enrolment, opt-out, auto-escalation of 
contributions, matching contributions, mostly in the pillar of occupational pensions.  
Top managers of the pension companies (Poklop, Homolka) recommend the 
introduction of compulsory employer contributions, boosting of state support and 
auto-enrolment of citizens or employees; they like the new 2019 Polish system, 
which is essentially a copy of British workplace pensions. It is a neoliberal pension 
concept that has nothing to do with the typical pillar 3. It must be noted that even 
specialized pension (joint stock) companies do not belong to the third pillar. This 
is a Czech specificity, which arose only because public servants in 1993 did not 
want the new business (supplementary pension insurance with state contribution) 
to fall into the lap of the then almost monopoly Czech Insurance Co. (the reason 
were two increases in premiums for motor liability insurance – in a short time 
interval). The existence of special pension companies is completely unnecessary; 
moreover, almost all these companies outsource most of their activities  
to affiliated companies within their respective financial groups.  
A fundamental reform of the supplementary pension insurance, supplementary 
pension savings and private life insurance is indispensable and, in general,  
we have several options for the ‘public choice’. From a technical point of view, 
liberal policy is the simplest solution: abolishing all fiscal support for financial 
products and reducing taxes. Social democratic policy could have a broader scope: 
the abolition of fiscal support for financial products could be linked to an increase 
in pensions or other social expenditure – for example based on the argument that 
the relative amount of old-age pensions in our country (slightly) lags behind the 
OECD or EU (‘pension gap’). A conservative (Christian Democratic) policy can 
be described as the transition to exclusive tax deductions, with the pay-out  
of pension savings being fully burdened by a personal income tax (EET tax 
regime). This is the most common practice in the world, which is especially 
beneficial for higher income groups, due to the usual existence of progressive 
income tax rates. Under the conditions of a flat-rate income tax rate (as in 




or investments are made from taxed income and the state support has the form of 
an exemption of capital income from taxation. In Czechia, the TEE tax regime 
applies to mutual and investment funds. The TEE tax regime has been increasingly 
recommended around the world over the last decade, at the expense of the EET 
regime, as it is significantly simpler and more equitable (equal approach to all 
income groups); notwithstanding the fact that when applying the EET regime, 
there is a significant risk that tax rates will be different in the future (when, for 
example, entire pension savings are taxed). Thus, the TEE tax regime can be 
unambiguously recommended for Czechia.  
5. Future parametric pension reforms
The current Czech pension ‘system’ requires the above-mentioned fundamental 
reforms to introduce some order/system into it and at the same time to get rid of  
a lobbyist weed that eats up a considerable part of the pension ‘cake’ or the 
national income as such. It would not be surprising if, for example, the social 
pension insurance is to be strengthened at the expense of the flat-rate state pension 
in the coming period – we are not so different from the neighboring nations so that 
the flat-rate old-age pension would have to dominate in our country.  
However, due to the ageing of the population, there will be no need for (further) 
paradigmatic pension reform, despite many experts (and institutions) trying 
to give an impression that it would. The ineffective ‘second’ pension pillar in any 
form will not become effective or at least economically acceptable due to ageing 
of the population. I leave aside the issue of occupational pensions, which are 
basically already past their prime in Western countries. Especially when trade 
unions in our country are too weak in most private sectors to negotiate pensions 
or savings of this kind. (Nevertheless, I recommend lifting the de facto Czech ban 
on occupational pensions.) Pension savings are not even a partial solution to the 
problem of population ageing, even if investment yields should return to the 1990s 
levels. In the upshot, if a miracle were to become and investment returns could be an 
argument for their large-scale use in the pension system, it would have to be 
advantageous to gradually replace taxes as such by those. But this will not happen, 
because the globalized world is full of savings that are difficult to utilize. And many 
governments prefer to borrow from elites instead of taxing them (Streeck 2014).  
Retirement age is one of the essential parameters of pension systems. Flat-rate 
pension generally includes a different concept of the basic pension age than that 
in the social insurance pension. In the solidarity pillar, the statutory pension age 
should be fixed, and in the insurance pillar, the retirement age might be flexible. 
With regard to the now largely prevailing retirement just after reaching the current 
statutory pensionable age, it can be recommended that the pensionable age for the 
basic pension remains fixed (inflexible), preferably at the level of the current basic 
retirement age for men (including its increasing in accordance with the current 
law); raising of the pensionable age of women with children could be accelerated. 
Conversely, in the case of the insurance pension, we can afford – to begin with – 
to set a (minimum) pensionable age at 60-61 years – while concurrently the 
237 
‘premature’ retirement would be eliminated; the system simplifies. At present 
80% of Czechs could work without problems until the age of 65.  
A family policy reform can contribute to reducing the pace of demographic 
ageing: in particular, the integration of parental allowance into the basic maternity 
benefit, the payment of a new single parental benefit for up to 100 weeks (up to 
150 weeks for twins) from the sickness insurance system, in the amount of the 
gross wage of the mother/father (however, at least 50% of NAE, at most 200%  
of NAE), after deduction of income tax (including the current insurance 
premiums). It is also necessary to introduce the right to a place for all children 
from one year of age in full-day preschool facilities at an affordable price or even 
free of charge of charge (Vostatek 2019). ‘It is also advisable to shorten the 
inefficiently long periods of formal study’ (Münich 2019). ‘The current setting 
of labor taxation, along with parental leave setting and low availability of creches 
and kindergartens contributes to the highest drop in employment of Czech mothers 
with young children across the EU’ (Šatava 2016). This has a considerable impact 
also on the state budget, incl. the pension system. 
6. Conclusions
The 1996 Pension Insurance Act has added a small basic amount of all pensions 
to the system of ‘percentage amounts’ of individual pensions, heavily levelled by 
bend points and reduction coefficients; ‘Beveridge’ prevailed over ’Bismarck’ but 
he left the massive pension insurance premiums live. Substantial conceptual 
contradictions were not removed by later pension reforms. The main problem  
is the lack of transparency and comprehensibility of the system not only for its 
regular clients. With regard to the unpreparedness of the overall reform of public 
pensions, and also of the forthcoming parliamentary elections, we recommend 
dividing this reform into two steps: a small reform and a major reform. Small 
pension reform shall focus on simple but fundamental rationalization of the basic 
and percentage amounts of the old-age pensions. The new basic amount of these 
pensions should be at the level of 32% of the national average earnings; for  
the percentage amount, the valuation of one year of insurance cover shall be 
reduced from 1.5% to 0.39%.   
The major pension reform might be a paradigm reform of old-age, disability and 
survivor pensions. The basic amount of old-age pension will be transformed into  
a separate flat-rate pension, with an independent system of retirement age, 
minimum residence or economic activity (35 years) in Czechia and valorization. 
The percentage amount of the old-age pension will become an independent 
pension pillar of social insurance, optimally with the construction of the Austrian 
pension accounts, with a separate retirement age and valorization system and with 
a minimum insurance period of 3-5 years. Disability pensions can be newly 
designed as social insurance and incorporated into the sickness insurance. Orphan 
pensions may be redefined as a universal, flat-rate benefit. The significance of 
widow and widower pensions may decrease, given the introduction of a flat-rate 
old-age pension and the assumed increase in the (average) orphan pension. 
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All these proposals are based on the pension development trends in the OECD 
countries.   
Only social pension insurance is to be financed by insurance premiums on a model 
basis, which would allow for a substantial reduction in the Czech pension 
insurance premium rate. However, the general economic approach favors the 
cancellation of health insurance premiums – regarding the existing system 
of Czech public health care and due to the absurd conception and structure  
of health insurance premiums and their collection by all seven health insurance 
companies. Anyway, we can simply reduce insurance premiums only by 
integrating employee premiums (11% of gross wage) into the personal income tax 
– which is desirable also in view of the low capital income taxation (when
compared to the western countries and the OECD average). When reforming the 
personal income tax, we get rid of the super gross wage taxation. This reform 
of personal income tax is also important in the interest of reforming pension 
(and building) savings: for political reasons, we need to compensate for the 
reduction in state support for these products by increasing the basic tax credit. 
An increase in this tax credit is also needed in order to increase the progressivity 
of income taxation.  
The extremely complicated system of state support for ‘personal pensions’  
is almost entirely the result of lobbying by the completely superfluous ‘pension 
companies’ that have a monopoly on the provision of supplementary pension 
savings. The rate of state support for employer contributions to these savings  
is 65%, which is by far the highest one in the world. State support for participant 
contributions is lower. More than half of the population is involved in the system, 
but its role in protection is as low as in other countries. The main purpose  
of ‘pension savings’ (and ‘building savings’) is tax optimization, coupled with the 
fiscal illusion that the state support is a free lunch. State support essentially ends 
in the overhead and profit of the providers. In accordance with the relevant social 
models, we recommend either a complete cancellation of state support for  
all financial products or the transition to a uniform TEE regime (exemption 
of returns from income tax) – optimally in the form of British Individual Savings 
Accounts (ISA) or Canadian Tax-Free Savings Accounts (TFSA), where annual 
deposits are limited and withdrawals are unlimited. Not only in our country 
the (previous) housing investments are far more important for (future) pensioners 
than any third pension pillar. 
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THE GLIDE-PATH MECHANISM  





The regulatory landscape of pension funds in Poland continues to become ever more 
complex. One of the most significant changes in the Polish pension market is the 
introduction of Employee Capital Plans (ECP). This new form of occupational 
pension plan is featured by auto-enrolment and investment policy based on the glide-
path mechanism (Kolek et al. 2020). 
Auto-enrolment, which is designed to cover people having no access to any 
occupational pension programme, is bringing millions of workers into a private 
pension plan based on capital funding, many for the first time (Szczepański 2017; 
Kolek and Sobolewski 2019).  
This puts a special burden on the ECP system – to invest capital of individual ECP 
participants in the most responsible way. Adoption of the glide-path mechanism 
in the investment policy of the ECP funds is one of the ways of fulfilling this duty. 
The glide-path represents the fund’s changing mix of investments. Over the years, 
the ECP fund adjusts allocations to the equity portion and the debt portion. When 
ECP participants are young, the asset mix is more growth oriented. This means 
the dominance of the equity portion. When ECP participants get older and their 
retirement date nears, the ECP fund’s investment portfolio “glides down” to 
a more conservative mix of investments. This means the dominance of the debt 
portion. This fairly new concept has not been fully analysed in the literature. There 
are a limited number of publications mentioning this new way of conducting 
investment policy (Ge 2019; Sołdek and Stachnio 2018; Melicherčík et al. 2015; 
Krawiec 2014, 2015). But the glide-path mechanism in ECP funds has never been 
analysed. Moreover, there are a very limited number of publications on ECP 
system, both in local literature (Jedynak 2019; Fijałkowska et al. 2019; Wrzesiński 
2019; Kolek and Sobolewski 2019; Wojewódka 2019; Jakubowski and Prusik 
2019) and in the international literature (Ociepa-Kicińska and Dawidowicz 2018; 
Naczyk 2019; Pobłocka and Dybał 2019;). It is because the ECP system is quite 
new. It began operation on July 1st, 2019 and it is still at the stage of introduction. 
The system will be fully implemented in 2022. Thus, there is need to describe and 
analyse the new concept of the glide-path mechanism and the way it has been 





The purpose of this research is to analyse the regulatory landscape for the glide-path 
mechanism implemented in the ECP system. To achieve this research objective  
the method of critical legal dogmatics and the economic analysis of law method  
were employed. 
 
2. Debt portion and equity portion of an ECP fund’s portfolio 
The investment policy of an ECP fund is determined by all levels of regulations. 
The most important and the most universal regulation for the ECP fund’s 
investment policy is to be found in the act of 27 May, 2004 on investment funds 
and alternative investment fund management (the IF Act 2004). In principle, an 
ECP fund follows the investment limits for open-end investment funds (art. 42 
para. 1 of the ECP Act). The specific provisions that bind only the ECP funds are 
set in the act of 4 October, 2018 on Employee Capital Plans (the ECP Act 2018) 
One of the most important regulations, specific only for ECP funds, is a division 
of their portfolio into an equity portion and a debt portion (art. 2 para. 1 point 1 
and 2 of the ECP Act). 
 
2.1. The debt portion of the investment portfolio 
The debt portion of the ECP fund’s portfolio may be invested in: 
– money market instruments, 
– bonds, treasury bills, mortgage bonds, deposit certificates, 
– other transferable securities incorporating debts, 
– bank deposits, 
– vanilla derivatives, 
– selected non-standardised derivatives (providing underlying asset is an 
aforementioned debt instrument), 
– units of investment funds (providing half of their portfolio is invested in 
aforementioned debt instruments) (art. 2 para. 1 point 1 of the ECP Act). 
Pursuant to art. 37 para. 11 of the ECP Act the debt portion of ECP fund’s 
investment portfolio is divided into two parts. At least 70% of the debt portion 
must be invested in securities issued or guaranteed by the Polish Treasury, the 
National Bank of Poland or a local government unit. This part of the debt portion 
may be also invested in securities issued or guaranteed by central governments or 
central banks of EU states, the European Central Bank, the European Union or the 
European Investment Bank. Also, securities issued or guaranteed by selected 
international organisations (the European Economic Community, the International 
Monetary Fund or the Bank for International Settlements) (Marcinkowska 2009, 
p. 234) might be included in the debt portion of ECP fund’s investment portfolio, 
providing these instruments have an investment-rating provided by one of the 
biggest rating agencies (S&P, Fitch, Moody’s or DBRS). In order to maintain 
liquidity, an ECP fund is also allowed to hold cash deposits in banks or credit 
institutions. The cash deposits are also included in the 70% part of the debt portion. 
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The remaining 30% of the debt portion can be invested in other debt instruments 
(art. 37 para. 11 point 2 of the ECP Act). This means that no more than one-third 
of debt portion might be invested in money market instruments, corporate bonds, 
mortgage bonds, deposit certificates, other transferable debt securities, other debt 
derivatives or other units of investment funds, providing these instruments have 
an investment-rating from one of the biggest rating agencies. Debt instruments 
without an investment-rating can constitute no more than 10% of the debt portion 
of the ECP fund’s investment portfolio. 
There is very small group of scholars raising doubts as to whether the ECP capital 
should be used to fund the public debt (Oręziak 2016, 2019; Hrynkiewicz and 
Szukalski 2018; Kalina-Prasznic 2019). They argue that ECP funds shouldn’t be 
allowed to invest in Polish Treasury Bills in the same way as Open-end Pension 
Funds are forbidden to. The majority of scholars point out that the Polish debt 
market is too shallow to exclude Treasury Bills from the investment portfolios of 
ECP funds (Dybał 2017; Jedynak 2018; Jakubowski 2019; Szczepański 2013, 
2015, 2019; Kolek and Sobolewski 2019; Wojewódka 2019; Jakubowski and 
Prusik 2019; Chybalski 2018; Chybalski and Marcinkiewicz 2018). 
2.2. The equity portion of the investment portfolio 






– other transferable securities incorporating property rights,
– vanilla derivatives,
– selected non-standardised derivatives (providing the underlying asset is the
aforementioned equity instrument),
– units of investment funds (providing half of their portfolio is invested in
aforementioned equity instruments) (art. 2 para. 1 point 2 of the ECP act).
Pursuant to art. 37 para. 13 of the ECP Act the equity portion of ECP fund’s 
investment portfolio is divided into several parts. At least 40% of the equity 
portion must be invested in blue-chip stocks. To be more precise, shares, pre-
emptive rights, allotment certificates and other equity instruments issued by the 
biggest companies quoted on Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) and which are 
quoted on the Warszawski Indeks Giełdowy 20 (WIG20). Art. 37 para. 13 point 
1 of the ECP Act also includes derivatives on these instruments and derivatives 
on the WIG20 index. 
Pursuant to 37 para. 13 point 4 of the ECP Act, at least 20% of equity portion must 
be invested in foreign equity instruments (shares, pre-emptive rights, allotment 
certificates, derivatives, etc.) quoted on stock exchanges located in OECD countries.  
Both the 40% and 20% limits are minimum limits. It means that up to 80% of the 




companies quoted on the WSE or derivatives of these instruments. On the other 
hand, up to 60% of the equity portion may be invested in equity instruments 
quoted on stock exchanges located in the OECD countries. Together, just these 
two classes of assets may constitute 100% of the equity portion. 
But ECP fund is also allowed to invest in medium-sized and small-sized 
companies quoted on the WSE. Pursuant to art. 37 para. 13 point 2 of the ECP 
Act, an ECP fund is allowed to invest in shares, pre-emptive rights, allotment 
certificates and other equity instruments issued by the medium-sized companies 
quoted on the WSE and included in the Warsaw Stock Exchange Index of 40 
medium-sized companies (mWIG40). This limit also includes derivatives of these 
instruments and mWIG40 index. The limit for these equity instruments is no more 
than 20% of the equity portion. As opposed to the limits to the WIG20 equity 
instruments and foreign investments, this is the maximum limit. The ECP fund is 
not allowed to buy more shares of medium-sized companies. 
The ECP fund is also allowed to buy shares of small-sized companies quoted, or 
soon-to-be quoted, on the WSE . Pursuant to 37 para. 13 point 3 of the ECP Act, 
the ECP fund is allowed to invest no more than 10% of the equity portion in shares, 
pre-emptive rights, allotment certificates and other equity instruments issued by 
small-sized companies in Poland. Just like the limit on medium-sized companies, 
this is also the maximum limit. The ECP fund is not allowed to buy more shares 
of small-sized companies. 
Regulations shaping the equity-portion are much more controversial than the 
regulations shaping the debt-portion. First, the ECP fund investments on the local 
bourse are strongly directed towards the blue-chips included in the WIG20 index. 
This index is dominated by state-controlled enterprises as defined by Bałtowski 
and Kozarzewski (2016). Only 8 joint-stock companies included in the WIG20 
are not under control of the state. These are LPP S.A., Santander Bank Polska 
S.A., NG2 S.A. (former CCC Obuwie S.A.), CD Projekt S.A., Cyfrowy Polsat 
S.A., mBank S.A., Orange Polska S.A., Play Communications S.A. The remaining 
12 companies are state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. According to the 
official information from December 31st 2019 – the State Treasury holds 29.43% 
of PKO BP S.A. shares, 27.52% of Polski Koncern Naftowy ORLEN S.A. shares, 
34.19% of PZU S.A. shares, 32.8% of Pekao S.A. shares , 31.79% of KGHM 
Polska Miedź S.A. shares, 71.88 % of PGNiG S.A. shares, 31.94% of Alior S.A. 
shares , 55.16% of Jastrzębska Spółka Węglowa S.A. shares, 53.19% of LOTOS 
S.A. shares, 40.45% of TAURON S.A. , 51.52% of ENERGA S.A. shares. 
Together these companies comprise more than 70% of the average weight of the 
WIG20 index. Thus, forcing an ECP fund to invest 40% and more of the equity 
portion into WIG20 companies should be considered as directing ECP capital into 
state-controlled enterprises. In this way, the ECP system is used to increase the 
state’s impact on the Polish economy and to expand economic nationalism  
in Poland (Flores-Macias and Musacchio 2009; Kozarzewski et al. 2019).  
The declared objective of this is to enhance, in the long run, the Polish State’s 
economic capacity, international importance and even reindustrialisation (The 
Strategy for Responsible Development 2017). Thus, the role of local equity 
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investments of ECP capital is significant, especially in recapitalizing of the so-
called “national champions” – the biggest and the most valuable state-controlled 
enterprises. In this respect, the state itself is the indirect beneficiary of ECP capital 
accumulation and local equity investments of ECP funds. 
The regulations concerning foreign equity investments also raise some doubts. 
According to statutory provisions, foreign investments into equity instruments are 
not limited by the size of a company at all. In consequence, the ECP fund has  
no barriers for financial support of foreign small-sized companies. This is a stark 
difference to the harsh limits on investments in Polish small-sized companies. 
This loop-hole in regulations on foreign equity investments allows the mechanism 
of the purposeful placing of initial public offerings (IPOs) on the most liberal 
stock exchanges located in the OECD countries and transferring ECP capital  
to small-sized companies owned by selected people (e.g. friends and acolytes  
of the governing party). This creates the conditions for the proliferation  
of cronyism (Hellman et al. 2003; Jasiecki 2013; Kozarzewski and Bałtowski 
2019). Economic entities from the outside of the public sector may benefit from 
facilitated access to ECP capital at the expense of local companies and local 
financial institutions. This means a higher investment risk for ECP participants 
and lower chances of development for local financial markets. 
The threats of economic nationalism and cronyism are additionally magnified by 
the domination of state-controlled financial institutions (ECP providers) on the 
ECP market. On December 31st, 2019, after half a year of functioning of the ECP 
market, the total value of assets accumulated in ECP funds reached 84.7 mm zł. 
48.3% of these assets were gathered by state-controlled financial institutions 
(Kolek 2020). PKO TFI gathered 28.7 mm zł, PZU TFI gathered 9 mm zł, Pekao 
TFI gathered 3.1 mm zł, Pocztylion-Arka PTE gathered 60,000  zł, PFR TFI 
gathered 1,500 zł. The dominance of the state controlled ECP providers is another 
major threat for the proper functioning of the ECP market.  
Non-state controlled ECP providers that failed to gather a sufficient number 
of ECP participants are likely to quit the market. ECP providers driven exclusively 
by profits are discouraged by the high administrative costs of functioning on the 
ECP market (Wojewódka 2020). High economic barriers to enter this market will 
push away potential new entrants and petrify low competition between ECP 
providers. A similar process took place in the Open-end Pension Funds market in the 
noughties and teens of 21st century (Banaszczak-Soroka and Jakubowski 2011). 
In the near future we will probably see that domination of state controlled ECP 
providers creates a feedback mechanism. In this scenario, state-controlled ECP 
providers may direct a growing amount of ECP capital into state-controlled 
companies and even into private entities that have connections inside the 
governing party. 
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3. The Glide-path mechanism
The ECP fund has a target-date that roughly (+- 5 years) coincides with the year 
of the participant’s anticipated end of their professional career and their 
retirement. In order to provide target-date funds to all generations of ECP 
participants, ECP providers must manage at least 8 target-date funds. Right now, 
these are: target-date 2025 fund, target-date 2030 fund, target-date 2035 fund, 
target-date 2040 fund, target-date 2045 fund, target-date 2050 fund, target-date 
2055 fund and target-date 2060 fund. Some of the ECP providers also created  
a target-date 2020 fund and a target-date 2065 fund. The target-date in the ECP 
fund is the approximate date an investor reaches 60 years of age and acquires the 
right to benefits from an Employee Capital Plan. 
The ECP fund investment policy is based on the glide-path mechanism. The glide-
path represents the fund’s changing mix of investments. Over the years, the ECP 
fund’s managing company (ECP provider) adjust allocations to the equity portion 
and the debt portion. When participants are young and further from retirement, 
the asset mix is more growth-oriented (domination of the equity portion). As the 
participant’s target retirement date nears, the ECP fund “glides down” to a more 
conservative mix of investments and reduces the amount of equity over time in its 
portfolio (dominance of the debt portion). This is due to the changes in the risk 
tolerance of ECP participants.  
The three key decisions in building the glide-path are: the percentage for the 
equity portion of the portfolio, the final equity portion landing point, and the rate 
at which the equity portion declines in a portfolio. The glide-path also needs  
to take into consideration the participants’ need for future growth and their 
tolerance for volatility during their retirement. 
Table 1. Equity portion, debt portion and room for the discretionary investment 
policy – % of ECP fund’s assets 
Age of ECP 
participant 
Equity portion Debt portion 
Room for the 
discretionary 
investment policy 
18 to 40 years old from 60% to 80% from 20% to 40% 20% 
41 to 50 years old from 40% to 70% from 30% to 60% 30% 
51 to 55 years old from 25% to 50% from 50% to 75% 25% 
56 to 60 years old from 10% to 30% from 70% to 30% 20% 
60 and more years 
old 
from 0% to 15% from 85% to 100% 15% 
Source: art. 40 para. 1 of the ECP Act. 
Pursuant to art. 40 para. 1 of the ECP Act, for the first 22 years, ECP funds’ glide-
path provides between 60% and 80% equity exposure (equity portion of the 
portfolio). The rest is typically invested in debt instruments (debt portion of the 
portfolio). This changes when the target-date is 20 years away. The next stage 
lasts only 10 years and equity exposure is from 40% to 70%. This changes when 




and 50%. For the last 5 years before the target date, the equity exposure is from 
10% to 30%. At the target date, the equity exposure is lowered to between 0% and 
15% and remains stable for the rest of the ECP fund existence. 
This shape of the glide-path leaves some room for a discretionary investment 
policy. During the first 22 years, 20% of the ECP portfolio can be invested either 
in equity or debt instruments. From 10 to 20 years to the target-date, the latitude 
for discretionary investment policy is the widest at 30% of the ECP portfolio.  
In the following decades, it systematically declines. Between 5 and 10 years to the 
target-date, the freedom for a discretionary investment policy is still wide at 25% 
of the ECP portfolio. In the last 5 years before the target date, the room for  
a discretionary investment policy is lowered to 20% and at the target date, it falls 
to just 15% of the ECP portfolio. 
Thanks to the wide freedom for a discretionary investment policy, ECP funds can 
function either as to-target-date funds or through-target-date funds. To-target-date 
funds maintain a static asset allocation once a participant reaches the target date 
(he or she is 60 years old). This approach is useful for the ECP participants that 
want to cash out the accumulated capital as soon as they reach the age of 60.  
Through-date-funds continue to gradually ease back on equity exposure through 
the first ten- or twenty-years post target-date. This approach is useful for the ECP 
participants that want to slowly decumulate ECP capital. This aims to address the 
needs of ECP participants who are exposed to longevity risk. The assumption 
behind target-date funds with a “through” glide path is that ECP participants 
should adopt a consistent long-term strategy that adjusts asset allocation well into 
retirement (International Labour Organisation 2019). Increasing life expectancy 
forces many ECP participants to maintain earnings potential from significant 
equity exposure – in order to avoid the prospect that an ECP participant might 
outlive his or her savings (Bielawska 2019). 
The rationale for equity exposure even after reaching the target date is the high 
long-term earnings potential. On average, equities have historically generated 
stronger investment returns than debt instruments over the long term, albeit with 
higher volatility (Bielawska 2017). While it’s not unusual for equities  
to underperform compared to debt instruments or other assets for relatively short 
periods, equities have a historical record of outperforming them over time. This is 
especially important for those ECP participants who reached their target date (60 
years of age) and are being paid out their money for the next 10 years in monthly 
instalments (Jakubowski 2020). 
It’s worth noting that the glide path statutory regulations are so well designed that 
the majority of ECP providers just duplicate these stipulations. Only Nationale-
Nederlanden ECP refined these regulations and introduced a smooth glide path 
that changes on a quarterly basis (Nationale-Nederlanden 2019). The further 
analysis of Key Investor Information Documents (KIID) issued by ECP funds 
leads to the conclusion that ECP providers don’t use the full potential of the ECP 
investment policy. All ECP providers miss the opportunity to emphasise socially 
responsible investments and green investments. It is inadvisable to create narrow 
247 
and detailed statutory regulations that promote these types of investments.  
The statutory regulations should be general enough to leave some room for  
a discretionary investment policy. It is the ECP providers who should grasp the 
opportunity and use the lowers rank regulations (statues of individual ECP funds) 
to direct ECP capital into green and socially responsible investments. In more 
developed and mature pension markets, these types of investments are 
a meaningful incentive for the accumulation of pension capital and an important 
factor during the selection of a pension plan (Dopierała et al. 2020). 
3. Conclusion
The Glide-path mechanism makes an ECP fund a single and easy-to-use 
investment vehicle for participants who lack financial literacy and need 
professional management of their retirement assets. But the target-date fund 
approach in the ECP system also creates possibilities for financially experienced 
ECP participants. They have a chance to manage their ECP capital in a more 
personalised way. Art. 45 of the ECP Act provides ECP participants with the right 
to conversion of target-date funds’ units. This means that ECP participants can 
transfer their ECP capital from one target-date fund to another – providing these 
funds are managed by the same ECP provider and the minimum transfer is not 
less than 10% of ECP participant’s capital. In consequence, ECP participants can 
change and even spread their ECP capital among 10 different ECP funds.  
The right to transfer ECP capital to another target-date fund would be one of the 
biggest advantages of participation in the ECP system, providing it was also 
accompanied by the right to change the ECP provider. Denying this right  
to financially experienced ECP participants, who accumulate capital in state 
controlled ECPs, is a major disincentive. In consequence ECP participation 
among financially experienced workers is low (Instytut Emerytalny 2019).  
In conclusion, it should be stated that in the era of incoming technological 
singularity (Kurzweil 2005), it is impossible to outline the pattern of growth for 
the global economy in the next 50 years. This means a universal formula for the 
glide-path mechanism for ECP funds does not exist. Thus, it’s of great importance 
that statutory provisions leave room for discretionary investment policy. 
The regulations of the ECP Act do that quite well. 
At the same time the glide-path mechanism implemented in the ECP funds 
strongly protects the interests of financially illiterate participants of the ECP. 
Increasing the share of the debt portion in ECP fund’s portfolio lowers the 
investment risk and protects the accumulated capital of ECP participants.  
For financially experienced ECP participants the glide-path mechanism is not 
problematic. They are aware of their rights and they know how to transfer their 
ECP capital to other ECP funds. It is the regulation of investment limits that  
is flawed and needs to be liberalised. 
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The universal, mandatory social security system introduced in 1999 is based on  
a defined contribution. The funds registered on the insured's account constitute 
the basis for determining the amount of the old-age pension and divided by 
the average life expectancy allow determining the amount of the monthly benefit. 
This way of determining the amount of the old-age pension is accompanied  
by a significant reduction. The benefits that will be paid by the Social Insurance 
Institution in the next decades will be only a fraction of the insured person's  
last salary. 
According to forecasts, the average pension from ZUS in 2040 will be around 
35% of the average salary, and in 2050 even 25% of the average salary. Therefore, 
it has been assumed since the 1999 reform that additional savings would be 
created. The so-called Third-pillar voluntary forms of saving. However, over the 
past twenty years, additional forms of saving have not become common in Poland 
(Jedynak 2016). The insufficient level of retirement savings of Poles met with the 
reaction of public authorities, which from 2019 obliged all employers to create  
a group form of long-term saving. 
The purpose of this article is to determine on which axiological foundation the 
system of Employee Capital Plans (EPC) is based and to answer the questions: 
– how do the authorities want to achieve universal participation in EPC?
– what obligations have been imposed on employers, and what are the expected
benefits for enterprises?
– will investing in EPC funds support the development of the Polish economy?
In order to be able to answer the above questions, the first part of the study presents 
a method of analyzing public policy. Further, the work contains characteristics of 
behavioral economics mechanisms on which the main ECP institutions were 
based. Then the Author presents the obligations of employing entities and possible 
benefits to be achieved by entrepreneurs. In turn, the third part of this article 





2. Metodology and theory – public policy analysis  
Public policy analysis is a form of reflection that allows juxtaposing various 
aspects of political decisions. Assuming the functioning of the social security 
system under a democratic state of law together with the strong key role of legal 
regulations to which citizens and public institutions comply. Based on the principle of 
legalism, where citizens can do anything that is not prohibited by law, and state 
institutions operate within the limits and on the basis of law. When conducting public 
policy analysis, the researcher's interest should focus on identifying the interests of 
parties involved in shaping public policy, and if possible also be based on evidence or 
justifications of the legislators. In this case, it is not the most important issue of policy 
impact, i.e. the outflow of implemented activities assessed ex post, or the area related 
to the acquisition of power – politics. In contrast, the area of policy analysis focuses 
on issues such as the role and participation of various actors in shaping legal 
regulations, or the assessment of assumptions and forecasts presented by 
intervention project promoters (Kraft and Furlog 2007).   
Based on Dunn's concept, public policy analysis should be based on a review 
of activities undertaken in the course of designing and implementing 
regulations (Dunn 1981). In turn, W. Parsons claims that the format of expert 
analyzes carried out as part of public policy analysis should refer to the 
problem identified, the goals set by the authorities, possible alternative 
scenarios, the options chosen for implementation, and the results obtained 
 as a result of intervention. Therefore, public choice theory may be appropriate 
to explain public policy analysis (Parsons 2005).  
Public choice theory assumes that people are only motivated by their own interests 
to make choices. Although they sometimes act in a way for the good of other 
people, their main interests are their own interests. This theory equally applies  
to the choices of an employee, employer or consumer (Buchanan  2000). 
Drawing attention to the above issues, the subject of public policy analysis in the 
area of introducing Employee Capital Plans in Poland is the analysis of the reasons 
for the introduction of ECP, as well as the relationships of various entities at the 
stage of designing a new institution, as well as the planned obligations and rights 
during its functioning. 
The research method of institutional analysis adopted in this article, adopting the 
assumptions of new institutionalism, allows to explore the nature and genesis  
of the institution of social life, which are employee capital plans. The analysis 
allows defining and characterizing the reasons for which the institutions are 
established and the functions they perform. The achievements of new institutionalism 
also make it possible to ask questions about the very nature of the relationship 







3. Employee Capital Plans as a behavioral public intervention
The concept of Employee Capital Plans proposed by public authorities, which 
entered into force on January 1, 2019, is based on the achievements of behavioral 
economics (ECP act 2018). 
In response to the identified public problem, which was the low level of retirement 
savings for Poles, it was pointed out that additional forms of saving for retirement 
organized by employers (intended for over 60 years of age) were indicated. Based 
on the assumption that the key to effective public intervention is to change the 
behavior of individuals, or collectivity, to date, it was found that, while maintaining 
freedom and freedom to dispose of private property, employees should be 
encouraged to save. To this end, ECP was introduced. 
The authors of the ECP concept assumed that people are inherently inclined to act 
and are afraid of risk. What's more, people do not behave rationally, but make 
decisions under the influence of emotions, views, habits, as well as mental errors 
and taking actions based on such premises as: 
– unwillingness to lose – in a situation where an individual feels that he or she is
threatening to lose something that they had before, they are ready to take action
to prevent loss,
– tendency to maintain the status quo – expressed as fear of change and new
(Kolek and Wojewódka 2017).
Therefore, the mechanisms contained in the regulations shaping Employee Capital 
Plans deliberately affect the elements of the long-term saving system. 
4. Employee Capital Plans duties for employers
The fundamental mechanism of ECP is to relieve the employee of any administrative 
duties. The legislator has introduced that the employer is responsible for enrolling 
employees in the long-term saving program. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act 
of October 4, 2018 on employee capital plans, the obligation to create ECP lies with 
the employing entity, which will have to choose a financial institution in the 
appropriate period depending on the number of employees, and then implement ECP 
in its company. Employees aged 18-55 whose employment period at the employing 
entity is at least 3 months will be automatically enrolled in the ECP. On their behalf, 
the employer concludes a ECP contract to which the ECP participant and the financial 
institution will be parties. In turn, people aged 55-70 will be able to join ECP at their 
request submitted to the employer. This treatment is aimed at creating an informed 
choice for people who are closest to retirement so that they can decide for themselves 
what will be the best form of saving for them. It should be emphasized that an 
important group of people who will be able to participate in ECP has been defined 
more broadly than just employees and those who have been obliged to save in ECP 
were also covered by mandatory social insurance of the contractor, persons 
performing outwork, members of agricultural production cooperatives, and members 
of the supervisory board contributory remuneration for his work.  
Another mechanism to facilitate savings in ECP is the employer's obligation  




regular savings and the lack of obligations on the part of the participants 
themselves is to relieve employees of administrative obligations. 
In addition, the introduction of a savings co-financing mechanism in which the 
ECP participant discharges 2.0% of his remuneration, the employing entity adding 
1.5% of remuneration. Additionally, from public funds, by financing the welcome 
payment – PLN 250 and the annual surcharge – PLN 240, it is expected  
to contribute to a real increase in the accumulated funds. The legislator also 
allowed the possibility of larger payments to ECP by introducing an additional 
payment of a participant – up to 2.0%, as well as an additional payment of the 
entity employing up to 2.5% of remuneration. 
An important mechanism from the perspective of participation in ECP is the 
possibility of reducing the basic payment made by the participant of the capital 
plan. If the gross remuneration of a ECP participant does not exceed an amount 
equal to 1.2 times the minimum remuneration. The saving person will have the 
right to make a declaration on reducing the payment to 0.5%, provided that his 
remuneration does not exceed PLN 3,120 gross in 2020. The employing entity is 
responsible for verifying the achievement of the 1.2-fold limit, however, if the 
ECP participant exercises this right despite exceeding the limit – incurs a penalty 
in the form of no annual surcharge – PLN 240 from the labor fund (ECP act 2018). 
The provisions of the Act of October 4, 2018 on employee capital plans also 
contain a catalog of sanctions for non-compliance with obligations, as well as non-
implementation of statutory assumptions. One of the basic regulations is the ban 
on imposing savings on ECP. The legislator has indicated that the employing 
entity or persons acting on its behalf discouraging participation in ECP are 
exposed to a sanction of 1.5% of the remuneration fund for the previous financial 
year. This sanction will be granted in the form of a fine imposed by the National 
Labor Inspectorate (ECP act 2018). 
From the employers' perspective, an important aspect of introducing ECP is to 
increase labor costs. Basic employer's payments amounting to 1.5% of the salary, as 
well as the costs of implementing and servicing ECP constitute real expenses for 
companies. It is true that these expenses are tax deductible costs, but the economic 
effect in the form of an increase in labor costs has not been compensated in any way. 
 
5. Employee Capital Plans responsibility of state  
It is also worth noting that the voluntary participation in the ECP will have  
a character that determines the need to renew your declaration of resignation. By 
introducing ECP, the government, fearing that many people would give up saving, 
introduced a mechanism of self-saving. Re-enrolled people who have made  
a declaration of resignation for some reason in the past is a form of cyclical 
incentive to save. Therefore, the legislator imposed on the employing entity the 
obligation to re-enroll all employees who had withdrawn from the Plan to ECP. 
Every 4 years, starting from February 2023, the employer will be required  
to inform (by the end of February) all those who have resigned from saving and 
are under 55 years of age that if they do not receive a resignation declaration again, 
255 
from April 1, 2023, these persons become participants of ECP – by concluding  
a ECP contract on their behalf and for their benefit. 
The responsibility of the state in the ECP area is related to both launching a long-
term saving program, as well as controlling employers whether they perform 
obligations allowing participants to accumulate funds in ECP. To this end, the 
legislator has granted inspection rights to both PFR S.A. as well as for the Labor 
Inspectorate to ensure the correctness of performed duties. In turn, to carry out 
information and education activities, a special purpose company was established 
to manage the PFR Portal S.A. In turn, the Financial Supervision Commission 
watches over the correct way of investing in ECP. All these entities being the 
emanation of the state are aimed at protecting ECP participants and enforcing the 
statutory obligations of employers and financial institutions.  
However, from the perspective of public authorities who have decided  
to introduce ECP, the key goal is to achieve universality of savings. After the first 
stage of implementation, the level of participation in PPK is about 40% (Kolek 
Wojewódka 2019), which should be assessed as a result significantly below 
expectations, because at the stage of designing the government the government 
talked about 75% participation (Impact assessment of the ECP act 2018). 
6. Employee Capital Plans – perspective of savers
The use of behavioral economics mechanisms does not mean, however, completely 
abandoning the tools and motivators used so far. Employee Capital Plans provide for 
exemption from public levies both at the accumulation stage and after reaching the 
age of 60. It is worth emphasizing that payments made to ECP are exempted from 
social security contributions. In addition, funds accumulated in ECP are free from 
classes and bailiffs' execution (except for maintenance due to maintenance), which is 
supposed to protect funds. The legislator also decided on the default form of payment 
of accumulated funds, indicating that no deductions (taxes and contributions) will 
occur if the participant decides to make a one-off payment of not more than 25%  
of the accumulated savings, and the remaining 75% will be spread over at least 
120 monthly installments. This mechanism is to deter early withdrawal of funds. 
At the stage of accumulation of funds to mitigate the so-called "Bad date risk", 
when an ECP participant just before acquiring the right to benefit invests its assets 
in risky financial instruments, the legislator decided to introduce a precise 
framework for investment policy. Each ECP participant will be enrolled in the 
Defined Date Fund appropriate for his age and date of reaching 60 years of age. 
Each of the funds will have a specific investment policy appropriate to the age  
of the participant. This means that by adapting to the age of a ECP participant, the 
Fund will invest more funds in the debt part – to reduce investment risk. The ECP 
participant will be able to change the fund in which he accumulates funds, and the 
instruction should be sent to a financial institution. 
In turn, the participant will have the right to use the funds accumulated in ECP 
both at the stage of accumulation and after 60 years of age, regardless of gender. 
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Before reaching 60 years of age. The Act on Employee Capital Plans provides for 
the possibility of payment at the accumulation stage in 4 cases: 
– transfer payment – i.e. transferring 100% of accumulated funds to another ECP
account or other participant's account related to long-term saving,
– in the event of a serious illness – a ECP participant will have the right to pay
up to 25% of the accumulated funds if a participant, his spouse or child of a
participant in a specific disease entity is diagnosed or is completely incapable
of work or has moderate or severe disability,
– to cover own contribution – in connection with applying for a mortgage for the
purchase of real estate, the ECP participant will be able to obtain a loan of up
to 100% of the funds accumulated on the ECP account, which will be used
to cover the own contribution; it should be remembered, however, that the
possibility of using this form of withdrawal will take place only up to the age
of 45 of the ECP participant and will be connected with the obligation
to transfer funds to the account,
– payback – the ECP participant will be able to withdraw 100% of the funds
accumulated in the ECP at any time, however, before receiving the funds, the
financial institution will make appropriate deductions from public tributes and
transfer funds from the welcome and annual payments to the state Labor Fund
(ECP act 2018).
Noting the short-term effect of ECP implementation, the problem of reducing the 
net salary of an employee appears in the minds of savers. 2.0% of remuneration 
transferred as savings in ECP means that disposable household income has 
decreased. The legislator noticed this problem in the case of people earning less 
than 120% of the minimum wage, but in the case of other groups of employees no 
mechanism was introduced to compensate for the loss due to saving in ECP. 
7. Perspective of financial institutions
Admission of commercial financial institutions by the legislator requires financing 
for their functioning. It is worth emphasizing that ECPs have the right to create 
only financial institutions with relevant experience and an appropriate level  
of equity, and offering funds for a defined date. In addition to organizational costs, 
the financial institution must pay a fee for registration in the ECP Register for the 
right to offer ECP. 
When adopting the optics of a financial institution, it should be noted that it may 
receive remuneration for managing the fund on a defined date, in an amount not 
exceeding 0.5% of the fund's net asset value. In addition, if the financial institution 
meets the criteria, it will acquire the right to a success fee of 0.1% of the value  
of the fund's assets. This means that the ECP product is cheap for the participant and 
low-margin for the financial institution. Therefore, it should be pointed out that 
launching the ECP product by financial institutions is an investment and involves 
many obligations and costs of conducted activity. Only achieving economies of scale, 
gathering hundreds of thousands of participants and assets counted in PLN billion will 





In connection with the changes introduced in 2019 in the area of social security, 
attention should be paid to the need for additional savings by ECP participants. 
Benefits received from the universal retirement system will be determined by the 
contributions paid to the system, which means that the replacement rate will drop 
to as much as 25% in 2050. Therefore, an indispensable action of the authorities 
was the introduction of an additional source of income from payments paid during 
the period of professional career. These benefits will supplement the benefit 
received from the system based on the insurance method – from ZUS. 
Answering the research questions indicated in the introduction to this article,  
it should be stated that the mechanisms of ECP functioning adopted by public 
authorities are associated with current benefits for employees. The universality  
of participation in ECP is to be achieved thanks to automatic enrollment to ECP, 
subsidies from public funds to the accounts of participants and tax preferences 
when withdrawing funds. The private nature of ECP funds is also important,  
as well as the possibility of using them before the age of 60. 
The analysis of public policy shows that the authorities have shifted the burden  
of implementing ECP to the employers. Employers bear the economic and 
organizational cost of ECP, and in the event of failure to comply with statutory 
tasks they are also required to pay the cost of any penalties. From the capital 
market perspective, ECP as a relatively cheap product is not of a high margin 
character and for financial institutions in the first years or even 10 years  
of operation will be a source of costs, not potential profits. 
Thanks to ECP, the capital form of investment financing is gaining importance. 
By investing in shares of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange that 
are in the WIG20 and mWIG40 indexes, investments implemented by these 
entities have the chance to be financed. From the perspective of government 
involvement of state-owned companies, the universality of participation in ECP 
will allow for raising investment-friendly capital. 
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1. Introduction
Collecting savings in a way organized by the employer should also include the 
role of employee representation. Therefore, in the functioning forms of additional 
saving, which are organized by employers, the legislator envisaged the participation 
of partners at the stage of implementation as well as program support. 
The purpose of this article is to indicate the role and competence of the 
representation of employees in long-term saving. The study aims to answer 
research questions: 
– what are the rights of people employed in long-term saving programs?
– how can employee representation block the implementation of long-term saving?
– what are the differences in the rights of employee representation in PPE and
PPK in Poland?
The research method used in this study is based on the analysis of institutions 
representing employees. The institution's analysis allows answering the above-
mentioned research questions. As a result of the analysis, the competences of the 
representation of employees will be determined, as well as legal possibilities 
to block or delay the implementation of PPE or PPK. 
2. Introduction to PPE and PPK in Poland
2.1. A legal obligation to set up PPK or PPE 
Recent years have been a period of increased activity of the legislator in Poland 
in many law areas, including individual and collective labor law and social security 
law. There are more and more acts which, among others, impose certain obligations 
on employers in relation to the employees they employ, and in particular provide for 
specific obligations of employers in relation to various employee representatives.  
One of such areas are pensions and long saving. As of today, in practice almost every 
employer in Poland has to provide to its employees a defined contribution long term 
benefit. The employer’s choice is between two solutions. Namely between the newly 
introduced since 2019 an employee capital plan (PPK) and an employee pension 





distributed and used among employers. In both cases, PPK and PPE, the law 
imposes on employers’ certain obligations in relation to employee representatives 
and provides those representatives with different powers. Moreover, there are 
differences that result form the legal form of employee representation, depending 
whether this is a trade union representation or a representation elected or selected 
directly among employees.    
 
2.2. Main characteristics of PPK  
Employee capital plan (PPK) is a mandatory solution for every employer  
in Poland, with some exemptions and is a kind of defined contribution long term 
savings plan with mandatory employer and employee monthly contributions that 
are rewarded by the State with additional payments into individual participant 
account within PPK. All contributions are managed externally within defined date 
funds by investment fund companies according to rigid rules of law. As a rule, 
payouts from PPK shall take place after the participant reaches age of 60 years. 
There are some fiscal incentives in place. From a legal point of view a PPK is 
composed by two agreements signed in practice by employer with the investment 
fund company. The most important agreement is a PPK management agreement.  
 
2.3. Main characteristics of PPE  
While in case of PPE there is only a mandatory employer contribution, with 
voluntary employee contribution and less rigid than in case of PPK, an investment 
policy. The time of payout from PPE is similar to this in case of PPK and starts 
when participant reaches age of 60. There are as well fiscal incentives in place. 
Establishment of PPE requires to run an administrative procedure of PPE 
registration. From a legal point of view a PPE is composed by two agreements. 
The most important agreement is a PPE company pension agreement, that is 
stipulated between employer and employee representatives. 
 
3. Role of employee representation in PPK  
3.1. Legal basis for employee representation in PPK 
In the case of employee capital plans (PPK), which are an obligatory element of the 
system of additional pension security for employers and at the same time voluntary 
for employees, the legislator granted employees' representatives limited consultative 
rights. The legal basis in this case is the Act of October 4, 2018 on employee capital 
plans (PPK Act), which provides for mandatory participation of representatives  
of employees employed in the creation of PPK. It is, however, a compulsory but non-
binding participation. Moreover, in this case, the legislator provided that shall the 
trade union organizations does not operate in a given workplace, then other 
representatives of employees must be obligatorily involved in the procedure  
of selecting a financial institution that will manage PPK in a given workplace. Thus, 
in practice for every employer that sets up an employee capital plan it is necessary to 




3.2. The method of selecting the representation of employees in the PPK 
According to the art. 7 item 3 of the PPK Act, the employer is obliged, in consultation 
with the company trade organization operating in this employing entity, to select the 
financial institution with which the PPK management contract will be concluded. 
However, shall the trade union organization does not operate at this employer,  
the employer shall select the financial institution with which the PPK management 
contract will be concluded, in consultation with the representation of employees 
selected in accordance with the procedure adopted in the given employing entity. 
However, if one month before the expiry of the period within which the employing 
entity is obliged to conclude a PPK management agreement, no agreement is reached 
on the selection, the employer independently chooses the financial institution with 
which the PPK management agreement will be concluded. PPK (Kolek et al. 2019,  
p. 23). Act states in practice, that it is employer’s obligation and right to set up the rule 
that shall enable the selection of employees representation for PPK purposes. The 
above results from the fact used in the provisions of the wording "in the manner 
adopted in a given employing entity", which means that in this respect the legislator 
leaves individual employers a certain degree of discretion (Jakubowski and Prusik 
2019, p. 122). This means that the correct and lawful solution will be the organization 
by the employer of universal elections among the employees of the employees' 
representation in question, as well as the reception and appropriate documentation that 
such representation will be e.g. the employee council or the social commission 
operating at the employer's office (Kolek and Sobolewski 2019, p. 28). There is no 
doubt that for the successful selection of the representation it is necessary for the 
employer to provide employees with the opportunity to articulate their will. 
 
3.3. Consultative competences of employee representation in PPK  
In the case of PPK, the legislator equipped the representation of employees solely with 
the consultative powers (Jakubowski and Prusik 2019, p.120). It is the employer's 
obligation to include the representation of employees in the process of selecting  
a financial institution managing a given PPK, but this obligation only arises in the 
scope of submitting by the employer a representation of employees of a proposal to 
select a specific financial institution as the PPK manager in that employing entity 
(Kolek and Sobolewski 2019, p. 27). Moreover, the abovementioned consultation 
entitlement on the part of the representation of employees is only temporary. The 
employer is obliged to attempt to reach an agreement with the representation of 
employees only up to one month before the final date of the mandatory conclusion of 
a PPK management contract in this entity. However, after this date, it will be lawful 
for the employer to completely ignore the employee’s representation (Wojewódka 
2019, p. 39). Moreover, in the case of PPK, the representation of employees is not a 
party to any agreement constituting PPK and in practice has no impact on the content 
of the obligations and rights of PPK participants. The regulations of PPK Act also 
does not provide for any restrictions on the length of existence of such representation. 
It can be stated that the employee’s representation in PPK has an ad casum character, 
what means that once in the future there will arise a need to run a new consultation 
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process on the selection on a new PPK provider it will be necessary to have a new 
employees representation.    
4. Role of employee representation in PPE
4.1. Legal basis for employee representation in PPE 
The issues of representation of employees' interests in the case of employee 
pension schemes are regulated by the Act of 20 April 2004 on employee pension 
schemes. In this case, the employee pension scheme consists of two agreements  
a company pension agreement and an agreement with the managing entity. In both 
cases, the party to these contracts is always the employer, but in the case of  
a company pension agreement, the employee representation selected for  
the purposes of PPE is by law a party of this agreement. The legal basis for the 
existence of employee representation is art. 11 of the PPE Act, which in para.  
1 introduces the principle of empowering this representation to be a party of the 
company pension agreement. 
4.2. The method of selecting the representation of employees in the PPE 
According to the content of the instruction of art. 11 paragraph 2 of the PPE Act, 
employee representation is made up of all company trade union organizations 
operating at a given employer. However, as it is often mentioned the trade unions 
in Poland were not very supportive to the PPE, even in the light of their established 
by law supremacy in the area of decision process of setting up a PPE (Szczepański 
2010, p 373). However, if within the employer does not operate a company trade 
union organization, the employer concludes a company pension agreement with 
employee representation, that should be selected in accordance with the procedure 
adopted at the given employer. Also, in this case, the legislator did not regulate in 
any way the rules for selecting the employee representation in question, limiting 
themselves only to the indication "in the manner adopted by a given employer". 
It must be deduced from the above that it is the employer's responsibility to work 
out and determine the rules or appropriate regulations for selecting the 
representation in question and to do so. As it is stressed within a doctrine an 
employer shall not in this case directly indicate a Work Council or any other 
existing body without employee’s engagement in the decision on selection (Kopeć 
and Wojewódka 2005, pp. 78-79). By law it is not compulsory or even necessary 
to agree this mode of selection of with the employees themselves. Employers 
must, however, remember that the empowerment of employee representation for 
PPE purposes, and thus also indirectly the correctness of the process of selecting 
this representation, is subject to examination by the Polish Financial Supervision 
Authority in the process of PPE registration before this body. The above 
supervisory power of a state body, which de facto co-decides on the establishment 
of a given PPE, by issuing an appropriate administrative decision, indicates that 
employers should exercise due diligence within their duty to select an employee 
representation for PPE purposes. It should be stressed that some authors provide 
such employee representation with the ability to represent employees in front  
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of court in case of potential dispute with employer (Rycak and Derlacz-Wawrowska 
2010, p. 131). 
4.3. Rights representing employees' representation in PPE 
Pursuant to the provisions of the PPE Act, the basic right of each employee 
representation in PPE, regardless of whether it is a trade union organization or  
a representative office selected in accordance with the procedure adopted by 
a given employer, is being a party to the company pension agreement under PPE. 
(Wojewódka 2015, p. 99). This agreement can be somewhat simplified as a kind 
of PPE constitution. Being a party to the company pension agreement means the 
right not only to sign it, but also to have a real impact on its content, e.g. in the 
form of negotiations with the employer, the amount of the basic contribution 
obligatorily paid by that employer to the PPE. The competences of employee 
representation under PPE also include issues related to the change in the content 
of the agreement (and thus the terms of the PPE), as well as limited possibilities 
of co-deciding on the existence of PPE as such a solution in a given employing 
entity. In practice the employer is not able to set up unilaterally a PPE in case 
when the employees representation refuses to sign a company pension agreement. 
4.4. Temporary aspect of non-trade union employee representation in PPE 
In the case of provisions on PPE, the legislator applied a new solution, practically 
unknown in other cases, in the form of a specific term of office of non-union 
representation of employees. From the content of art. 11 paragraph 3 of the PPE 
Act shows that the authorization of such representation to take all actions provided 
for by the Act after 24 months from the date of selection of the representation 
(Kopeć and Wojewódka 2005, p. 80). However, it will expire sooner if at least 
half of the employees' representatives cease to be employees of the employer 
or the employer's trade union organization starts operating at the employer. 
5. Comparison of selected areas
5.1. Similarities 
The comparison of the representation of employees for the purposes of PPE with 
the representation of employees for the purposes of PPK indicates both similarities 
as well as significant differences between these bodies. Certainly, the common 
feature is the fact that both representative offices can function only if the employer 
does not have trade union organizations. The second common feature of both 
representations is the fact that they are selected in the mode adopted autonomously 
at a given employer, and de facto the employer decides how to select them. 
However, the list of similarities does not outweighs the list of differences between 
the two bodies.  
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5.2. Differences 
The most important difference between employee representation in PPE and PPK 
is the nature of the competences held by the body. While in the case of PPK they 
are in practice only consultative competences, it is actually the employer, who can 
independently make all decisions regarding PPK. In the case of PPE, the employee 
representation has decisive competence and co-decides on the creation of PPE  
as well as on its individual parameters. In addition, the procedure for selecting an 
employee representation for PPE purposes is the subject of a supervision of the 
Polish Financial Supervision Authority, which is not the case for the representation of 
persons employed for PPK purposes. Another significant difference is the lifetime 
of the employee representation. In the case of PPK, we are dealing with a body 
appointed in principle ad casum. However, in the case of PPE, the legislator 
introduced a specific 24-month term of existence to this body. The above list 
clearly shows that just as you cannot put an equal sign between PPE and PPK, it 
is also not possible in the case of employee representatives in these solutions for 
long-term additional saving. 
6. Conclusion
In the present paper there were discussed both main similarities as differences 
between employees’ representations in both PPE and PPK, that are forms in place 
of long-term savings organized by employers for employees.  
The research questions set out in this article have been answered using the 
institutional analysis method. Thanks to legal and organizational analysis of the 
principles of functioning of the representation of employees, the main rights and 
possibilities of employees employed in implementing and servicing PPE and PPK 
were indicated. 
The comparison shows clearly that in case on PPE the legal position of employee’s 
representation is much stronger, that the one in case of PPK. However as, due  
to the recent changes in law a PPE system will not develop substantially in future, 
in practice the main way to deliver long term savings in Poland will be PPK, where 
the position of employee representatives is respectively less important.  
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EMPLOYEE CAPITAL PLANS IN POLAND – 





Employee capital plans are designed to create a long-term saving system for vast 
majority of employees in Poland. The main aim of the implementation of the PPK 
is to establish an effective, voluntary funded pension scheme. In political 
discourse, the PPK is mostly presented as a way of ensuring decent pensions and 
aims to supplement public pensions with income from pensioner’s own savings. 
In the economic discourse it is perceived as an alternative to existing long-term 
savings product for retirement purposes which “thanks to the use of innovative 
solutions derived from behavioral economics—would convince to save voluntarily 
for retirement and would contribute to a universal system of retirement savings’ 
accumulation” (Jedynak 2019, p. 35). The PPK is addressed to 11,4 million 
(according to data from 2018) of potential participants. The PPK will be tied with 
employment legal relations which are obligatory subjected to the public social 
security with exclusion of self-employed. 
The act on employee capital plans1 entered into force in January 2019 and pursuant 
to the regulation the private savings of employees are co-financed by employees, 
employers and at some point, by public funds in the form of welcome (250 PLN) 
and annual (240 PLN) contribution. By 2021, every employing entity which 
employs at least one person will be obliged to establish the PPK.  
To some extent, the PPK system is inspired by the British occupational scheme’s 
reform. Under Pension Act 2008 British employers are required to enroll their 
employees in a defined contribution retirement plan. Automatic enrolment has 
been introduced gradually, starting with the largest employers from 2012 (those 
with 250 workers or more) and duties applied to employers of all sizes by the end 
of February 2018 (The Pension Adequacy Report 2018, volume 2, pp. 267). The 
PPK system pursue similar ideas of additional pension schemes including 
employers’ obligation to establish the scheme, gradual introduction depending on 
employer’s size and automatic enrollment of employees with the right to opt-out 
(Rudolph 2019, pp. 10-11).   
1 The Act of 4 October 2018 on employee capital plans (Dz.U. z 2018 r. poz. 2215) – 
hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. 
DOI: 10.34658/9788366287938.24
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Savings collected in the PPK will be invested in completely new investment 
entities (DDFs) created by private operators (investment companies) in 2019. 
Their only purpose is to collect and invest savings from the PPK. The PPK 
investment vehicles are expected to offer long-term investment products based on 
life cycle investment strategy – “a dynamic asset allocation fund where the asset 
allocation shifts from riskier investments as the individual ages and gets closer to 
the target retirement date” (Booth and Chang 2011, p. 55).  
Pursuant to the Act, most of the formalities regarding the establishment of the 
PPK and commencement of the employees’ participation shall be handled by 
employers. The employer will be responsible to choose an investment company 
and its DDFs. However, such decision should be made in agreement with 
employees’ representation, in case of lack of thereof the employer will choose 
unilaterally.  
From a legal standpoint the employer concludes a management agreement with 
DDF (or DDFs – depending on the internal structure of the investment product 
there might be a DDF as a one legal entity with internally separated sub-funds or 
plural number of DDFs each acting as a separated legal entity) operated by the 
chosen investment company. The management agreement will set the contractual 
framework of PPK in his enterprise. Afterward, the employer will enroll 
employees in the PPK. Enrollment in PPK will take place through the conclusion 
of a contract between the DDF and each employee although without theirs active 
role in the process of contract’ conclusion. The contract in concluded by the 
employer acting on behalf of and for the benefit of his employees. As the most of 
employees will be enrolled automatically2, the employer will act on their behalf 
as a statutory representative.  
Every employer will be also responsible for the transfer of  contributions. Pursuant to 
the Act, the PPK contributions are calculated and deducted from a remuneration paid 
by the employer to active participants. In general, the employer will deduct 2% from 
the remuneration and transfer it to DDF’s account. The employer's contribution will 
be 1.5% of the employee’s remuneration. Both sides may raise their financial 
involvement independently by declaring the voluntary contribution up to 2% in case 
of employees and 2.5% in case of the employers. 
2. The legal framework of the defined-date funds in the PPK
Pursuant to the Act the DDFs may be created and offered in the PPK system by four 
kinds of investment companies, which are: investment fund companies (TFI), general 
pension societies (PTE), labor pension societies (PrTE) or insurance companies (ZU). 
The principle expressed in the Act assumes that each employer may choose only one 
investment company3. The savings are invested respectively in mutual fund 
2 Pursuant to the Act employees between 55 and 70 years old will be enrolled only at their 
request. Employees between 18 and 55 years old will be enrolled automatically unless 
they submit to the employer declaration of resignation before the enrollment date. 




(or funds), pension funds or in insurance-based investment product operated by  
a chosen investment company.  
The operational dimension of investment products in the PPK is strictly regulated 
on two levels of legislation. The first level is the “sectoral legislation” – separate 
for each of the abovementioned kind of investment companies. Pursuant to each 
“sectoral legislation” investment companies operate under the authorization of the 
Polish Financial Supervision Authority. 
In case of a mutual fund (the specialized open-end investment funds) operated by 
TFI, as well as a pension fund operated by PTE or PrTE, the “sectoral legislation” 
provides for separation of legal personality between the fund and the investment 
company. The distinction between mutual and pension funds has its historical 
reasons associated with the creation of the second pension pillar over 20 years ago 
(Maśniak and Lados 2014, pp. 124-127). In practice, both mutual and pension 
funds have a similar legal design. Insurance form of the PPK is created as an 
insurance-based investment product and it’s not separated from the legal 
personality of the insurance company.  
The establishment and operation of mutual funds or pension funds is also strictly 
regulated and requires additional permission of the Polish Financial Supervision 
Authority, however DDFs are excluded from this authorization process. 
Nevertheless, further operations of DDFs are supervised by the Polish Financial 
Supervision Authority within the scope of general aims of the supervision of the 
financial market – i.e. to ensure the proper functioning of this market, its stability, 
security and transparency, confidence in the financial market, and to ensure that 
the interests of the market’s participants are protected. 
The second level of regulation is specified in the Act on employee capital plans.  
Under the Act investment companies need to fulfil the array of statutory 
requirements to become involved in the management of funds gathered in PPK. 
The requirements concern at least 3 years of experience in the management  
of investment funds, appropriate level of own equity capital and specific 
investment strategy. The financial institutions may operate in the field of PPK 
after meeting these requirements and obtaining an entry in the public PPK register. 
Financial supervision based on the Act is also carried out by the Polish Financial 
Supervision Authority and is exercised in the scope of compliance with the law 
and the interest of PPK participants (article 51 par. 2 of the Act). The Act should 
be seen as a lex specialis for sectoral legislation applicable to investment 
companies. The role of the Act is to introduce detailed regulations, especially  
in the aspect of investment policy of the DDFs or automatic enrollment  
of participants.  
The regulation of investment policy of the DDFs under the Act is based on several 
basic assumptions: 
– investment strategies based mainly on debt and equity instruments 
– differentiation of the level of risk based on the aging; 
– standardization of investment mechanism; 
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– automatic enrollment of participants based on age (with the possibility to switch
the funds at the request of the participant);
– minimization of the possibility to differentiate investment strategies.
2.1. Investment strategies based on debt and equity 
Pursuant to the Act, investment strategies of defined-date funds are based mainly 
on investments in debt instruments and equity instruments. For the purposes  
of the Act the definition of the “debt part” of the assets include such debt 
instruments as money market instruments, bonds, treasury bills, mortgage bonds, 
certificates of deposit, bank deposits, derivatives based on debt instruments, 
participation units of investment funds as well as other transferable securities 
incorporating property rights corresponding to the debt rights.  
The “equity part” of the assets include shares, pre-emptive rights, rights to shares, 
subscription warrants, derivatives based on equity instruments, participation units 
of investment funds as well as other transferable securities incorporating rights 
corresponding to the equity (article 2 par. 1 of the Act). 
The division of the DDFs’ assets between debt and equity part is not dichotomous. 
The aim of such division is to shape appropriate risk profile (Zagadnienia prawne 
2020, pp. 71-72), therefore debt and equity parts will constitute majority of the 
DDF’s assets. Nonetheless, pursuant to the Act the DDF may invest limited part 
of the assets in instruments not assigned to either debt or equity part – e.g. 
currency derivatives or alternative investments (Prusik 2019, pp. 341-342). 
2.2. Differentiation of the investment risk based on the aging 
The basic assumption of the DDFs’ investment policy is the differentiation of the 
level of investment risk based on the aging. Pursuant to the Act, every DDF will 
increase the level of debt investments and reduce the level of equity investments 
along with approaching the defined-date. PPK regulation basically limits the 
possibilities of choosing an investment strategy only to the life cycle strategy.  
The Act sets out five levels of equity and debt involvement during the life cycle 
of the DDF, from its establishment until reaching the defined date (article 40 par. 
1 of the Act).  
Pursuant to the Act, the establishment of the DDF its equity part should not be 
less that 60% and may not be more than 80% and with debt part between 20  
to 40%. While approaching defined date of the fund its investment policy will 
gradually decrease the engagement in equities. As from the year in which the fund 
reaches its defined date, the equity part of its assets may not be more than 15%, 
and the debt part of its assets may not be less than 85%. 
2.3. Standardization of investment mechanism 
The important conclusion derived from the Act is that the statutory investment 
mechanism is implemented in every DDF separately and independently. From the 
participant's perspective, the cycle of investment policy evolution takes place 
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within the particular DDF of his choice. Each DDF must fulfill these statutory 
requirements and adjust its investment policy once it reaches the subsequent level 
indicated in the Act. Therefore, the differentiation of the investment risk is related 
rather with the aging of the defined-date fund than with the aging of participants. 
By the operation of law participants will be enrolled in the DDFs appropriate for 
their age, nonetheless they are allowed to switch and move their assets and future 
contributions to other DDF offered by the chosen investment company.  
The standardization of the investment mechanism on the level of each DDF 
requires from the investment company to maintain an appropriate number of such 
funds. Pursuant to the Act, investment companies are obliged to manage, 
respectively, investment funds or pension funds in a number corresponding to at 
least the number of restrictions on the level of investment risk referred to in article 
40 par. 1 of the Act. However, the Act specifies elsewhere (article 38 par. 5 of the 
Act) that the investment company creates a DDFs with defined dates falling every 
5 years for the next five age-groups of participants. As it’s impossible to establish 
a fund with more than one defined date, it means the obligation to the investment 
company to maintain appropriate number of DDFs covering all professionally 
active age groups of participants.  
Each investment company is obliged to manage at least eight DDFs and will create 
more in every next 5 years. Each DDF will follow the same path in the investment 
policy evolution as it’s set forth in the Act. 
The first defined date of such fund is specified in the Act – the 2025 DDF which 
is dedicated to participants born no later than 1967 (article 136 par. 1 of the Act). 
Determining the first defined date in the Act is an another mean of standardization. 
It determines the defined dates of subsequent DDFs in each investment company 
involved in the PPK system. 
The scope of standardization affects even the name of the DDFs. The name must 
specify the fund’s defined date – pursuant to the article 38 par. 4 of the Act.  
As a result, each of 20 investment companies entered in the PPK register has  
a similar investment product for PPK. 
2.4. Automatic enrollment of participants based on age  
      (with the possibility to switch funds at the request of the participant) 
As it was mentioned before, participants are enrolled in the DDF appropriate for 
their age. The Act sets out in details how to assign participants by age to a given 
DDF. According to the definition, set out in the Act, the defined date is the “year 
in which the age of 60 is reached by participants born in the year constituting the 
middle of the year range of participants for whom the given defined-date funds  
is appropriate”. Given the abovementioned definition the fund with defined date 
falling in 2040 is appropriate for participant born between 1978 and 1982 
(as participants born in 1980 will reach the age of 60 in 2040). 
The participant may invest in one DDF during the whole period. Automatic 
enrollment to the appropriate DDF would allow to limit the investment risk level 




The important conclusion is that the differentiation of the investment risk is related 
with the aging of the defined-date fund not with the aging of a specific participant. 
Therefore, participants are allowed to switch and move assets and future 
contributions to other fund offered by the chosen investment company and change 
the life-cycle investment mechanism apply to them. However, participants cannot 
switch to the funds of different investment company. 
 
2.5. Minimization of the possibility of differentiating investment strategies  
       between the investment companies 
The Act introduces detailed requirements regarding the specific investment 
strategy both in debt as well as the equity part of the assets. As for the equities the 
Act is referring primarily to investments in companies listed in the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange (WSE) basic stock indexes. The equity part of the assets – pursuant  
to the Act – should represent:  
– not less than 40% of the value of assets in equity instruments of public 
companies listed in WIG20 stock index,  
– no more than 20% of the value of assets in equity instruments of public 
companies listed in the mWIG40 stock index, 
– no more than 10% of the value of assets in equity instruments issued by other 
public companies listed on the WSE or companies listed on the organized 
market in the Republic of Poland. 
The Act stipulates also that not less that 20% of the value of assets invested in 
equity instruments should be invested in foreign organized market in an OECD 
member countries. 
At the debt part of the assets the Act requires to invest majority of the assets in 
debt securities issued or guaranteed by Polish or UE member states central 
governments (State Treasury), central banks, local authorities,  international 
organizations, multilateral development banks (not less than 70% of the assets 
invested in the debt part). 
To some extent, the Act requires internationalization of the investment policy. 
However, such requirement regards only the equity part. The investments in debt 
instruments may be as well internalized but it’s not mandatory. 
On the other hand, the Act introduces a limit on foreign exposure, by introducing 
a limit of assets denominated in foreign currencies – setting the limit at 30%  
of assets. It is also the minimum threshold that the legislator could introduce  
in accordance with UE law (see: Directive (EU) 2016/2341).  
The foreign investments of the DDFs are limited to the assets denominated  
in currencies of the UE member states and other OECD members states. 
Therefore, there is no legal possibility to invest funds in assets denominated  
in currencies of other countries – such as Russian ruble, Ukrainian hryvnia  





The legislator decided to introduce detailed rules regarding the investment 
strategies of the DDFs, which certainly promotes uniformity on the PPK 
investments. Such regulation may be considered as another tool of standardization 
within the legal framework established in the Act.  
As a result, the legislation tends to minimalize the possibility of differentiating 
investment strategies between the investment companies. Pursuant to the Act it’s 
impossible to establish the investment fund investing only in debt instruments 
(however it’s possible situation when the fund will reach its defined date) or only 
in certain categories of foreign equity instruments. Even though DDFs may differ 
in detail they basically will follow the same pattern in each investment company. 
 
3. The scope of standardization established in the Act 
Standardization is seen in the Act at many different levels, beginning with the 
standardization of the DDFs’ names, its diversity and number, automatic 
enrollment by age, up to detailed requirements established within the scope of the 
investment policy.  
Since February 2020 each of 20 investment companies that entered in the PPK 
register has established 8 DDFs with the first defined date falling in 2025 and 
subsequent falling in five-year intervals up to 2060. Only two investment 
companies established more than 8 DDFs. The first one established already the 
DDF with defined date falling in 2065 and the second has established 10 defined-
date funds including defined date of 2020 and 2065. 
Standardization also applies to investment policy. From the perspective of the 
statutory requirements, for every 100 PLN of a participant's contributions to  
a 2055 DDF, at least 24 zlotys will be invested in 20 public companies listed in 
WIG20 stock index (the equity part of the 2055 fund is to be at least 60% of its 
value of assets, and at least 40% of the equity part is to be invested in equities  
of companies listed in WIG20). 
It is difficult to determine at this stage how the statutory requirements will affect 
the differentiation of rates of return between investment companies active on the 
PPK market. Nevertheless, it clearly affects the unification of the risk categories 
of the DDFs, as indicated by the SRRI risk and reward profile. Most of the DDFs 
has been categorized on 3rd or 4th level in the SRRI (synthetic risk and reward 
indicator) scale, according to information revealed in its Key Investor Information 
Document (source: https://www.mojeppk.pl). 
The area not specified in detail in the Act consists of investments denominated in 
foreign currencies. It may be expected as a factor enabling a greater diversity  








4. The assessment of the statutory legal framework
Simplicity and clarity are among desired features of additional pension scheme 
(Jedynak 2016, p. 37). If PPK is perceived in terms of an additional pension 
scheme, the reason for standardization clearly aims to achieve simplicity of the 
entire PPK system.  
PPK is intended to be a common product for vast majority of the employees. 
Differentiation of PPK products would increase complexity of the system and  
in effect discourage participation. It could also increase investment risk. In future 
it could be a source of political risk in the event of radical differences in 
profitability, particularly in terms of rates of return or security of the investments. 
The history of open pension funds indicates that political risk factors are crucial 
for the sustainability of the long-term investment system. 
On the other side, the Act clearly limits the possibility of individual approach 
to investment strategy and offers the same approach to nearly 12 million  
of potential participants. In practice, the PPK participants cannot avoid life-cycle 
investment strategy. The alternative option was to create an existing legal 
framework as a default option, but enabling participants to choose a different 
assets allocation strategy and ultimately resign from a life cycle on their own 
decision. In practice, each investment company could rely on two or three DDFs 
– focusing respectively on equities, debt instruments and alternative investments.
The default option could be established as a system of automatic assets allocation 
between these DFFs with variable proportions depending on age. Such solution 
would allow to establish individual allocation. Moreover there would be no 
necessity to create more DDFs. Such a solution would allow for co-occurrence 
of passive participants with the default option and active participants taking 
control in fitting the strategy and the risk for themselves. The PPK system would 
be more flexible and take greater account of the savings holders` will, however  
it would increase both complexity and the risk of wrong investment decisions. 
The other effect of such standardization is the limitation of the active role of the 
participants. In the PPK, it is the employer who actually chooses the investment 
company to entrust participants’ savings. Savings holders’ have no formal 
influence on this choice, nor can they force an employer to change the investment 
company. A participant (or an employee as a potential participant) cannot open 
a PPK account with an investment company other than the one chosen by his 
employer. Therefore, the savings holders’ decision and freedom of choice within 
the scope of the Act is limited to simple “yes” or “no” in regard to his active 
participation. Those who are dissatisfied with this scope of freedom or with the 
employer’s choice will lose the opportunity to receive additional payments from 
the employer and from public funds.  
It also has other potential effect. In the future, the decision of the employer itself 
may result in mass and sudden "exit" of a large number of participants from single 
DDF, e.g. as a result of a decision to change the investment company. In such 
situation, the employer enrolls his employees to a new financial institution and 




institution (although the participant has the opportunity to oppose the transfer  
of funds, he cannot oppose changing the institution as for future contributions). 
This situation, depending on the size of the employing entity, may relate to  
a significant part of the assets of the DDF and may other participants. Unlike the 
management of individual investors' funds, where the risk of a significant and 
sudden outflow of assets is associated with massive decision-making by 
individual investors, the group investment mechanism may lead to one decision 
taken by the 'organizer' of a given group of investors. 
Another issue is the precise definition of the rules for investing in the equity part 
of the DDF’s assets in public companies enlisted in Warsaw Stock Exchange 
indexes. The introduction of a minimum exposure limit for public companies 
listed in WIG20 may result in stable and long-term inflow of funds and demand 
for equities of 20 biggest companies on Warsaw Stock Exchange. Standardization 
at this level means that DDFs might support each other in their investments.  
One should also not forget about the need to ensure an adequate level of 
investment liquidity. On the other hand, however, such an investment requirement 
may appear to be excessively restrictive, depriving managers of an appropriate 
level of discretion, for example in the event of an overvaluation of equities prices. 
The statutory legal framework aims to achieve simplicity, clarity and standardization 
within the whole PPK system. Nevertheless, these objectives are attained at the 
expense of limited freedom of choice of own investment strategy. The Act could 
create mechanisms that would enable the coexistence of the default option and  
the possibility of individual asset allocation. Lack of such possibility may weaken 
the popularity of the PPK as a universal system dedicated to nearly 12 million  
of potential participants.  
 
5. Legal paternalism 
Standardization should also be assessed in terms of the principles of contract law 
and interference of legal paternalism (Kronman 1983). The Act itself is created  
on assumptions arising from behavioral economics described as “libertarian 
paternalism” which insists on preserving choice but favors the proper decisions. 
It interferes especially with the concept of freedom of contract. The scale of such 
interference is in question. Some provisions of law “preserve freedom of contract 
but impose procedural or substantive restrictions on those who seek to move  
in directions that seem, to the planner, to be contrary to their welfare” (Sunstein 
and Thaler 2003, p. 27).  
The basic principles of private law is the equality of parties and the theory of 
contract is based on “fundamental premise that a contract is the expression of the 
free will of two consenting individuals” (Cserne 2012, p. 82). As in Poland, the 
contract law is based on the intent of contracting parties. A contract is based on 
parties’ intent to create, transform or terminate given legal relationship. From the 
perspective of Polish legal doctrine, the freedom of contract is understood as  
a freedom to enter into contract, freedom of choice of parties, freedom of shaping 
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the content of a contract and freedom to terminate a contract (Machnikowski 2020, 
pp. 520-521). 
To some extent, the reason for paternalistic approach is to enhance the equality 
between contracting parties or to balance the interests within the legal relations 
deprived of such balance by its nature.  
From the PPK participants’ legal perspective their participation in the PPK has  
a contractual nature. The Act assumes that the contract between the DDF and the 
employee, by which the participation in the PPK begins, is concluded in absence 
of one of the parties – the employee. Pursuant to the Act the contract is concluded 
on behalf of the participant by the employer, acting for majority of employees  
as a statutory representative. Although each employee may resign from 
participation before the conclusion of the contract on his/her behalf, the Act does 
not require the employee to be notified or to be informed before the conclusion  
of the contract of his rights and legal consequences of assuming his implied intent. 
The employer “has the right” but no obligation to inform his employees on terms 
and conditions related with the PPK. The exercise of this right might be weakened 
by fear of criminal charges for discouraging employees from saving in the PPK. 
In fact, the first hard obligation to provide information lies with the financial 
institution after the conclusion of the contract. It should be added that the context 
of the Act implies inability to terminate the contract during employment period. 
The participant may resign from active participation and from contributing to the 
PPK but such declaration does not mean the contract will be terminated.  
The conclusion of an explicit contract on behalf of employees as stipulated in the 
Act underlines the importance of considering the extent to which the behavioral 
economics’ mechanism interfere with the concept of freedom of contract. There 
is a difference between assuming the implied intent and ignoring the matter  
of conscious intent in contractual relations. 
Therefore, the PPK legislation might be seen as a significant breach of basic 
principles of private law in Poland, in which the disposition of private property 
based on contractual relation needs freely undertaken actions by the parties 
themselves. It might be questioned whether the Act assumes implied intent of the 
participant or whether ignores his intent in such contractual relation.  
In terms of behavioral economics, the automatic enrollment may be seen as useful 
tool increasing the participation level (Szczepański 2017, p. 44). The automatic 
enrollment in the PPK system from legal perspective is a bright exception in terms 
of creating contractual relationships in private law. Even the option of resignation 
after the conclusion of contract does not mean the contract is terminated. 
Therefore, the voluntary nature of the PPK after establishing legal relations for 
the participant is limited to the possibility of unilateral resignation from making 
further contribution not as a termination of legal relations. 
In this context, the standardization may appear as a kind of safeguarding the 
interests of participants. As entering into contractual relations and even investing 
the first contribution might happened beyond participants will, the Act specifies 




participants are omitted in the decision process of choosing an investment 
company and contract conclusion, standardization resulting from the Act reduces 
the risk associated with the unlimited scope of possible investment strategies that 
might be applied while investing employees’ savings or with wide range  
of potential terms and conditions that may interfere with employees interests.  
That might be called a “vicious circle” of paternalistic interference in freedom  
of contract where the primary interference leads to another. 
Not without significance is the fact that the employer is the real decision-maker 
in the process of choosing an investment company to be entrusted with employee’s 
savings. From the employer's perspective, such a decision carries a significant 
burden of responsibility towards employees so the standardization may tend  
to ease it by reducing the risk and differences between possible choices. 
 
6. Excessive complexity and unnecessary formalities deriving  
    from the statutory legal framework 
From the perspective of the organization and operation of the DDFs as well as 
from the employer’s perspective, the legal framework established in the Act 
involves in part excessive complexity and the creation of unnecessary formalities. 
 
6.1. Unnecessary explicit contract  
Pursuant to the Act, the establishment of PPK by employers requires two legal 
steps. First step is related with the choice of an investment company. The step  
is concluded by the management agreement with DDF (or the DDFs – depending 
on the internal structure of the investment product) managed by the chosen 
investment company.  
The second step will be the enrollment of the employees which will take place 
through the conclusion of contracts for them – the agreements for operating PPK 
with DDF as a second party. The contracts are concluded by the employer acting 
on behalf and for the benefit of employees.  Each employee becomes the 
participant of the PPK upon signing this agreement unless he/she submits to the 
employer a declaration of resignation before the contract conclusion. 
The introduction of a formal and explicit contracts between DDF and the 
participants does not contribute much from legal perspective. The essence of the 
contract in private law is to create or shape a legal relationship between parties. 
In this case, most of the rights and obligations in the relationship between the 
participant and the DDF arise either from the Act or from the internal regulations 
and statutes of the DDF. Mostly, the content of the contract between the 
participant and the DDF is informative and does not create basic rights and 
obligations on its own.  
Similar legal configurations on the occupational pension schemes assume the 
existence of an implied contractual relation between an employee and an employer 
(Sierocka 2010, p. 253). The core legal relation between an investor and a mutual 




Participation units represents participant's property rights. Only by holding 
participation units an investor has a claim towards the mutual fund to repurchase 
them and receive invested money back together with generated profit. 
The Act creates therefore different scope of legal relation between the investment 
fund and its participants as such contract exists even without purchasing the 
participation units and with no money transfer. By introducing a new type  
of contract, the legislator also created a dilemma related to the need to bypass the 
role of one of the parties. 
For employers, concluding formal contracts on behalf of and for the participant 
involves inconvenient formalities. The employer must set a deadline by which  
he should conclude the relevant contract, determine whether the employee has 
previously submitted a resignation declaration. As the contract is concluded for 
each employee, so this duty is repetitive. 
 
6.2. The problem of the PPK accounts’ multiplication 
Participation in the PPK is related to a specific employer. In contemporary 
economic realities, characterized by the mobility of employees, it means the 
problem of multiplication of the PPK accounts. From a long-term perspective,  
an employed person may have split his/her savings between several or even 
several dozen of the PPK accounts at various financial institutions depending  
on the frequency of employment changes. 
Accounts created with a given employer become inactive after termination  
of employment and there is no possibility of making direct payments from the 
current place of employment (indirect possibility requires making transfer 
payments between the accounts held). 
With regard to funds accumulated in previous places of employment, the Act 
provides for a "consolidation" mechanism which takes place when new 
employment starts. The mechanism is initiated by the employee, however  
it creates additional obligations for the new employer who should act on behalf  
of the employee during the transfer procedure. The new employer should inform 
the employee of his intention to carry out the transfer from previous workplaces 
unless the employee will raise a written objection to that. The consolidation 
mechanism seems to be complicated and formalized and as it’s initiated by the 
employee’s action it could be ineffective as well. 
Multiplying accounts in PPK means complicating the system and multiplying 
administrative and legal obligations. 
The negative effect of such a solution may be the phenomenon of "abandoned 
accounts". It cannot be ruled out that over the years, part of the population  
of participants may "forget" about their accounts, and as a result of discontinuing 
the update of identification data, the financial institution's communication with 





6.3. The excessive formalities in the operation of DDFs 
The assumption adopted by the legislator means that each DDF has a specific 
lifetime. After obtaining the defined date, no further policy modifications are 
foreseen. Reaching the defined date by the particular DDF will probably be 
associated with a successive decrease of assets and, ultimately will lead to  
a merger with other DDF (or to liquidation). After reaching the defined date, the 
growing number of participants will be entitled to make withdrawals. As the Act 
does not prohibits withdrawals in full (although such withdrawal involves taxation 
by capital gains tax), the ratio of such withdrawals will affect the speed of the 
decline of assets. It may have a negative impact for the rest of the DDF’s 
participants.  
In the long-term, investment companies will be required to gradually create more 
DDFs (for subsequent groups of participants entering the labor market), which 
will be a duplication of those previously created and to merge the existing ones. 
7. Conclusions
The statutory legal framework of the PPK is based on standardization of 
investment products and minimalization of the possibility to differentiate 
investment strategies.  
The statutory legal framework aims to achieve simplicity, clarity and 
standardization within the whole PPK system. Nevertheless, these objectives are 
attained at the expense of limited freedom of choice of participants own 
investment strategy. The Act could create mechanisms that would enable the 
coexistence of the default option and the possibility of individual asset allocation. 
Lack of such possibility may weaken the popularity of the PPK as a universal 
system dedicated to nearly 12 million of potential participants. 
The PPK participation is based mainly on automatic enrollment. The participation 
in the PPK has a contractual nature although the enrollment may occur without 
providing information to potential participants on their rights and legal 
consequences. The employer “has the right” but no obligation to inform his 
employees on terms and conditions related with the PPK. The exercise of this right 
might be weakened by fear of criminal charges for discouraging employees from 
saving in the PPK. In fact, the first hard obligation to provide information lies with 
the financial institution after the conclusion of the contract (automatic enrollment) 
on behalf of an employee. 
The conclusion of an explicit contract on behalf of employees as stipulated in the 
Act underlines the importance of considering the extent to which the behavioral 
economics’ mechanism interfere with the concept of freedom of contract and 
limits of legal paternalism. There is a difference between assuming the implied 
intent and ignoring the matter of conscious intent in contractual relations. 
Therefore, the PPK legislation might be seen as a significant breach of basic 
principles of freedom of contract. 
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From the perspective of the organization and operation of the DDFs as well as the 
employer’s perspective, the Act involves excessive complexity and the creation 
of unnecessary formalities. 
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